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Abstract 
This thesis examines the interactions between the Chinese State and market forces 
in the country's rural market development since the reform of 1979. Employing a 
contextual approach, this study re- establishes the connections between China's 
rural market development and its political and socio- economic conditions. 
Particular attention is focused on the dynamics of China's political economy and its 
impact on market development, its pattern and formation. Specifically, the role of 
government regulation and its influence on market patterns and growth is 
examined. Further, unlike previous studies, which focus on policy implications, this 
work concentrates on peasant- market interactions. Peasants are the major 
participants in rural markets and consequently, their behaviour and preferences are 
decisive in shaping market activities and growth. 
Case studies of Deqing and Dongguan in Guangdong province - with 
markedly different levels of economic development - are used to illustrate China's 
current market development, its spatial distribution, pattern and hierarchy. 
Variations between Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate the complexity of China's 
situation and also the inadequacy of Skinner's mid -1960 thesis. Rural market 
development is not merely a function of one or two key factors, but is generated by 
a number of political, economic and social elements such as the degree of self - 
sufficiency, income of the peasants, transport improvements and government 
intervention and existence of toll stations - each component is important but in 
different ways. 
The complex correlation between these key factors and rural market 
development highlights the significance of local conditions. Economic, social and 
political factors have variable impact when they are embedded in different 
contexts. These findings demonstrate that attempts to generalise are always 
inadequate in explaining differences between locations. This is particularly true 
when scholars have to cope with China's extraordinary geographic scale and 
extreme local diversity. 
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Abbreviations and Glossary 
CCP 
city- leading- 
counties (shi guau 
xian) 
double track system 
(chuan gui zhi) 
GDP 
GRPV 
GVIO 
ICMB 
fin 
Liang 
mu 
PRC 
SAR 
SOE 
TVE 
WTO 
yuan 
Chinese Communist Party 
A regional administrative system implemented since 1982. 
Under this system, counties are administrative subordinated 
to a prefecture -level city. 
A unique situation during China's era of economic reform. In 
general, it refers to the juxtaposition of state regulation and 
market forces and, planned and unplanned channels. 
Gross domestic product 
Gross rural production value 
Gross value of industrial output 
Industry and Commerce Management Bureau 
A unit of weight. One jin is equal to 0.5 kg. 
A unit of weight. Ten Liang is equal to 1 jin, or 0.5 kg. 
A unit of area. One mu is equivalent to 666.6 square metres. 
People' s Republic of China 
Special Administrative Region 
State -owned enterprise 
Township and village enterprise 
World Trade Organisation 
Chinese dollar. One yuan is equivalent to 8.2 US dollars. 
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Preface 
My concern with the social implications of local economic geography has drawn 
me to G. William Skinner's work. Being trained as an anthropologist, Skinner has 
demonstrated a great interest in traditional Chinese society and its changes. His 
studies on China's rural markets and urban systems raised heated discussions 
among geographers, anthropologists and sociologists during the 1960s and 1970s 
and exerted a tremendous influence on later research Employing a functional 
perspective, Skinner pointed out the significance of the rural marketing system in 
shaping social and economic structures. He stressed that China's rural market is not 
only a basic unit for commercial functions, but also a central place for social and 
cultural activities. His analysis of different levels of marketing places - standard, 
intermediate, central market towns - demonstrated how rural and urban areas were 
organised in functional terms. This challenged the conventional perspective which 
emphasises administrative hierarchy and its functions in organising Chinese 
society. Skinner's studies provided a prototype of traditional Chinese society. 
While city and countryside in China have experienced dramatic changes under the 
Communist regime and a planned economy, Skinner's studies show, in a 
systematic and innovative way, the underlying and unyielding requirements for 
rational marketing districts and networks that could not be constrained by 
administrative fiat. This explains why Skinner's studies are frequently mentioned 
and discussed. 
During the 1970s, Skinner further elaborated his thesis of rural marketing 
districts into a `regional -systems' theory. He argues that standard- market 
towns /systems were the basis of an economic hierarchy during Imperial China. 
These local systems were tied to higher -level systems. From bottom to top, there 
were a number of levels of central places /systems - intermediate, central market 
towns, local and regional cities, regional and central metropolises. These economic 
hierarchies formed eight macro -regions in Imperial China. The eight macro -regions 
were relatively independent and different from each other because their 
interregional activities were constrained by physical barriers and high transport 
costs. Accordingly, Skinner suggested that the macro -region should be used as the 
basis for historical studies. This perspective extended historians' analytical 
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horizons beyond the traditional practice of using administrative units such as the 
province and county, for understanding Chinese history. It also provided a clear 
distinction between China's administrative and economic hierarchies. 
Skinner's mid -1960s research has had considerable influence over the past 
decades because he introduced a systematic and comprehensive framework to 
explain Chinese society and its development. In particular, his employment of 
`central place theory' and `historical cycles' to analyse China's rural market system 
and social changes challenged the `theory -less' tradition of Sinology. This 
contribution has established Skinner as a `master' in China studies. 
This dissertation concerns the rural market - the basis of Skinner's regional 
systems. Skinner's series of papers on the topic - "Marketing and Social Structure 
in Rural China ", Parts I, II and III - are regarded as a classic in China studies. After 
these papers were published in the mid- 1960s, his models were widely discussed 
and were applied to Latin America, Africa and other developing areas (see Smith, 
1976a, h). However, applying this framework to study Chinese sites was delayed 
because of the Cold War during the 1960s and 1970s and political instability in 
China. This forced Skinner's followers in China studies to illustrate his models 
with reference to Taiwan, the largest Chinese community outside mainland China 
(Knapp, 1971; Crissman, 1976a, b; Sangren, 1980, 1985). Given Taiwan's 
historical and cultural context, Skinner's models hardly found any support there. 
For example, Crissman (1976a) discovered that the periodic market, as defined by 
Skinner, has never existed in the island. Sangren's (1980) study in central Taiwan 
further demonstrated that market growth did not necessarily follow the 
evolutionary process suggested by Skinner. 
The reforms in China since 1978 have provided the first opportunity for 
scholars to examine Skinner's original framework in the People's Republic of 
China. Recently, his mid -1960s work has been further analysed by Lin (1997a) and 
Wang, Mingming (1997). Lin uses Skinner's hierarchical framework to understand 
the function of China's small towns and their development. Wang, in contrast, puts 
Skinner into an historical context to explore the development of social 
anthropology in China. In 1998, Skinner's mid -1960s classic was translated into 
xii 
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Chinese for the first time by the Chinese Social Science Press (Zhongguo Shehui 
Kexue Chubanshe). This translation has spread Skinner's thesis among 
contemporary China researchers. 
Wang, Mingming's (1997) review of Skinner's contribution in China 
studies has given rise to discussions on the applicability of Western economic and 
social theories in China. This is because China was never a part of Western culture 
and its capitalist economy. This issue does not occur only in Skinner's work, but 
also in that of scholars who believe that China's social and economic processes can 
be explained by theories generated through Western experiences. The historical and 
cultural variations between the East and West have encouraged other contemporary 
scholars to rethink the validity of Western theories on non -Western societies in 
general and Skinner's framework in particular. 
This study provides perhaps the first detailed re- examination of Skinner's 
thesis of rural market development during the era of economic reform. I use 
Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b, 1977c, 1985a, b, 1994) studies on China's rural 
marketing during different time periods as the basis of my analysis. Unlike Skinner, 
whose studies were based heavily on documentary evidence, on -site fieldwork at 
two places was used in my research. The aim is to identify patterns that vary from 
Skinner's prototypes by providing detailed analyses of China's rural market 
development in different places. AIso, this study contrasts current market 
developments and their spatial distribution, patterns, hierarchy and underlying 
causes with Skinner's mid -1960s models and hypotheses. It provides an elaboration 
and rethink of Skinner's original thesis. 
This re- examination of Skinner's thesis takes place within the context of 
economic reform in China. Particular attention is given to China's changing 
political economy and its impact on local marketing activities. My findings aim to 
adjust the pure economic analysis adopted by Skinner and by economists. My 
emphasis on both political and administrative factors reflects the situation of China, 
which is politically dominated by one party and the persistence of a highly 
centralised administrative hierarchy. A distinguishing feature of this study is the 
illumination of variations between events in the real world - China - and an elegant 
theory. It aims to demonstrate the inadequacy of grand theories and to rethink their 
legitimacy in social science studies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
23 May, 1998, Deqing 
It was a big day for Mr Li, who had just seen his maize mature and 
was ready to sell at the rural market. Living on the edge of Xijiang 
River, Mr Li cultivated a variety of crops for his own consumption and 
sale. Taking advantage of the fertile alluvial soil and the dry season, 
he grew maize in the riverbed which is submerged during the rainy 
season. Good weather during the past few months had resulted in a 
high yield this year - about 300 jin - so Mr Li anticipated greater 
returns at the market. 
As on busy farming days, Mr Li woke up at day break. He cut some 
maize and put it in the bamboo basket hanging on his bicycle. Around 
seven o'clock in the morning, he arrived at Jiushi market which is 
situated 5 km east of his home. There were already dozens of peasants 
selling similar products in the market place but Mr Li was not 
surprised at this. He was confident about his products and set his price 
at 0.4 yuan per jin, which was quite low, expecting that this would 
attract customers. 
The rural market was not as busy as usual, even though this time of the 
year was generally regarded as the slack season in Deqing. While 
waiting for customers, Mr Li chatted with other peddlers. These 
conversations were probably the only way to exchange market 
information. Most customers - urban residents living in Jiushi town - 
government seat and peasants from nearby villages - came after nine 
o'clock. They liked to negotiate a lower price but not many of them 
accomplished a satisfactory deal. There were uniformed Industry and 
Commerce Management Bureau officials patrolling the market place 
and levying fees -a combination of administrative costs and rent - 
from peddlers. Occasionally, peddlers were asked to move if they 
blocked walkways. Peddlers, mostly peasants, were afraid to offend 
them because they had jurisdiction over the market place. 
During the afternoon the market was much quieter, despite the rain 
stopping. However, Mr Li did not leave until four o'clock. After nine 
hours in the market, only half of his maize was sold. After deducting 
the market fee, only 20 yuan profit was made. Looking at the unsold 
maize, Mr Li was a bit worried. After a couple of cigarettes, he 
decided to take the maize to Decheng Central Market the following 
day, the county's only daily market which is situated 20 km from his 
home. The longer distance and the presence of a toll station implied 
transport costs and toll fee would be higher. However, hoping that the 
maize would be bought by restaurant buyers and mobile traders, Mr Li 
said he did not mind paying if he could sell his products. 
This thesis investigates the relationship between the Chinese state and economic 
forces in shaping rural market development during the reform period since 1979. 
Economic reform has changed China's economy from a rigid, planned system to a 
more market- oriented one. Initially, China's economic reform was guided by the 
paradigm of the `birdcage economy' which emphasised the "planned economy as 
primary and the market system as secondary" (Yabuki, 1995). During the 1980s and 
1990s, this model was transformed into the `market adjusted planned economy' and 
the `socialist market economy' that placed more emphasis on market forces and 
guidance.' Tn rural areas, this shift resulted in peasants having more control over 
agricultural production and marketing. Consequently, agricultural performance and 
productivity have increased and the number of rural markets and their turnover 
value have grown markedly. 
Economic reforms, however, have not given free rein to market activities in 
the countryside, despite the rapid growth in the number of outlets. Rural markets are 
established and managed by government. Important crops, such as paddy, cotton 
and other special local products, are still subject to state procurement and price 
control. Although marketing channels have been opened, peasants still find it 
difficult to find outlets for their crops (Huang and Wang, 1993; Chen, 1997; Mei, 
1998). Further, the use of trade barriers to regulate commodity flows during the 
1980s, and the reissuing of grain coupons in big cities during the 1990s, 
demonstrates that government regulation still plays an active role in marketing 
See "The State to control the market, the market to lead enterprises" - Zhao, Ziyang's report to the 
13t' Party Congress, 1987 and "Decision on some issues concerning the establishment of a socialist 
market economy ", 1993. 
activities. Moreover, the Ievel of market liberalisation varies between places (Gong, 
1997; Ding, 1998; Xie, 1998). 
The considerable scholarly attention given to China's rural market 
development predates the Pacific War.2 In 1940, Spencer published probably the 
earliest paper in the western world on China's periodic markets. Focusing on 
Sichuan province, Spencer (1940) provided a detailed description of the area's rural 
market fair, its operations and schedules. Then, Yang (1944) produced another 
detailed study on Shandong province's periodic markets, and their relations with the 
regional economy, based on fieldwork conducted in the 1930s. The most marked 
advance followed Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b) application of central place theory to 
the rural market system in the Chengdu plain of Sichuan province. Particular 
attention was paid to the hierarchy of market places, their distribution, evolution, 
and relationship to the administrative system. Skinner's perspective on how rural 
China is organised and how the market system is supposed to change over time has 
become the classic work in geographical studies on China. 
Chinese historians have also demonstrated their great interest in rural market 
development. Based on over 400 Iocal gazettes and historical materials, Gao (1985) 
and Li (1989) have studied this system in Sichuan and Guangdong respectively. 
Gao carefully examined Sichuan's periodic markets and their characteristics - 
market days, pattern, hierarchy and functions - during the mid -Qing (1700 -1800) 
dynasty. He argued that periodic market systems, rather than rural households, were 
the basic components of Sichuan's regional economy. Li's (1989) study on 
z Rural market refers to market -place - the physical locus for goods and services exchange - in most 
of this thesis except when otherwise indicated. 
3 
Guangdong's markets between the mid -Ming (1500s) and mid -Qing dynasties 
highlights rural market development during different imperial empires. His detailed 
examination of changes in market numbers, taxes levied and local government 
management also shows the rise and fall of periodic markets in Imperial China. 
Other historical studies on this subject include: Wu's (1983) work of national 
market hierarchy during the Ming dynasty (1368 -1644); Cong's (1995) examination 
of specialised market towns between the late 1800s and 1930s; and Zhu's (1997) 
general analysis of rural markets and their relationship to modern transport 
technology during the early twentieth century, with a particular emphasis on 
railways. 
During the reform period, rural markets as an area of conflict between state 
control and market forces have also attracted the attention of scholars. Many of 
them have been concerned with the reforms and their impact on marketing activities 
in the countryside. Economists, notably Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993), have 
examined policy shift since 1978 and their impact upon the country's rural market 
activities. By analysing the state distribution system since 1978, Watson (1988) 
provides a detailed study of market changes during the reform era. Based on the 
distinct growth in rural market numbers and their turnover value, these studies have 
regarded the liberalisation of rural markets in 1983, the abolition of unified 
purchases and sales in 1985, and the decontrol of the price system in early 1990s, as 
a complete victory for market forces. Consequently, they argue that the traditional 
market system, driven by market forces, has been revived. Skinner (1985a, b) has 
also joined the post -reform discussions by making a similar contention in his mid - 
1980s papers, work which completed his study of rural market development during 
different periods of China's history. 
Despite this matter having been addressed over time, these earlier works 
have been unsatisfactory, Although studies by geographers have identified spatial 
structure and hierarchy in rural markets, they have been preoccupied with Imperial 
China. Liu (1991) and Shi's (1995) papers offer rare contributions on the reform 
period. Using Liucheng city of Shandong and Baoji city of Shaanxi as case studies, 
they examined market days, hierarchies and spatial patterns in detail. Despite their 
geographical perspective, their discussions focus on what Smith (1979:473) has 
termed "spatio- temporal synchronisation ". This notion assumes there is a positive 
correlation between market days and market location - the closer their site, the 
closer their schedules. Although the concept of spatio -temporal synchronisation 
deals with space, it focuses on the correlation between periodicity and market 
venue. The external relationships between rural markets and their socio- economic 
contexts are ignored. Also, variations generated by different rural market levels, 
size and functions have been oversimplified. Market densities have been 
overlooked. Moreover, the role of participants - traders, producers and consumers - 
and their interactions with rural markets have rarely been addressed. 
In contrast, the majority of post 1979 rural market studies employed an 
economic perspective, concentrating on the effects of policy changes on growth and 
examining the income and consumption power of peasants. Macro economists, 
notably Watson (1988) and Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993) have highlighted the 
connections between state policy directions and rural market development. 
However, they have omitted the impact of policy ignorance and distortion at the 
local level, and the role of local governments is inadequately acknowledged. Thus, 
5 
their assessment of rural market development is flawed. 
Most micro economic perspectives have been contributed by Chinese 
scholars, notably Jia (1999), Zheng (1999) and Jiang (1999). They have argued that 
the income of peasants and their purchasing power have been the key factors 
stimulating rural market development; accordingly, future market planning should 
focus on increasing such income. Still, they failed to recognise that income levels 
were not the only factors generating market development - transport costs and level 
of agricultural productivity were also important. 
G. William Skinner's mid -1960s economic perspective has provided a more 
comprehensive framework for studying China's rural markets. However, due to the 
Cold War between the western and communist countries and the political turmoil 
within China during the 1960s and 1970s, Skinner's notion on market hierarchy was 
tested in Taiwan and different results were found (Knapp, 1971; Crissman, 1976a, 
b; Sangren, 1980, 1985). Economic reform since 1979 has given scholars the first 
opportunity to justify Skinner's theories in China. Nevertheless, new challenges to 
the validity of his thesis have resulted from changes in social, political and 
economic sectors since reform which have modified the relationship between rural 
market development and its local context. 
One of the most distinct characteristics of China's reform era has been the 
decentralisation of economic decision- making power. Indeed, this process has 
transferred the state's command structure to local government (Chung and Tang, 
1997). The decentralisation of power has increased the role of local government 
which, in turn, has had important repercussions for China's political economy and 
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regional development. Initially, greater autonomy enabled local government to play 
a more active role in economic development. Economic strategies were formulated 
and a variety of models devised, such as the Sunan and Wenzhou models. Local 
government involvement in economic growth has increased diversification between 
places, while at the same time decentralisation has created local protectionism (Lee, 
1998). Consequently, trade barriers and `commodity wars' between provinces have 
been witnessed during the 1980s and early 1990s. Protectionism has challenged the 
paramountcy of the markets, suggesting that a complete dismantling of state control 
has not occurred in post -reform China. 
What has been the impact of the above political and economic changes on 
rural markets, their patterns, and development during the reform era? These issues 
are examined here. Particular attention is given to the dynamics of China's political 
economy and the effects on market formation and patterns. Unlike previous studies 
of the policy implications of market development, this work concentrates on 
peasant -market interactions. Peasants are the major participants in rural markets, 
thus, their behaviour and preferences have been decisive in shaping rural market 
activities and their growth. The other objective of this analysis includes examining 
market development at locations with different economic and social structures. 
1.1 Space and context in the study of China 
My concern with China's changing political economy and its impact upon market 
development underlines the importance of adopting a contextual approach. This 
method criticises the theoretical oversimplification of most studies and suggests that 
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an analysis of economic activities should not be divorced from their political and 
social factors (Cox, 1995; Sunley, 1996). Indeed, these factors are "embedded or 
incorporated into surrounding social and institutional conditions" (Sunley, 
1996:338). Accordingly, abstract theories cannot explain the specific social, 
economic and political characteristics of places because they are "unique 
combinations of attributes" (Cox, 1995:308). Any understanding of the geography 
of China's rural marketing system must recognise specific local contexts, 
particularly the characteristics of the planned economy and the changes that have 
occurred during the reform era. 
The contextual approach not only reminds geographers to consider other 
causal mechanisms, but also highlights the importance of space. Recent studies on 
rural markets have addressed their uneven development between inland and coastal 
regions and, between rural and urban areas. Drawing different examples from 
Chongqing, Beijing and other places, Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993), for 
instance, have discovered that wholesale markets play dissimilar roles in urban and 
rural areas. Huang and Rozelle's (1998) study of rural consumption markets 
highlighted their irregular growth across China. Rarely have spatial differentials 
been examined. Space has always been seen passively as the outcome of other 
major causal mechanisms, notably transport costs and consumption levels. 
Generally the explanatory power of space has been ignored. 
This argument for paying more attention to space should not lead to spatial 
determinism. Despite dissatisfaction with the spatial amnesia of most economic and 
sociology theories and the acceptance of the notion that space makes differences, 
most studies have only mentioned it in passing. Tang's (1997) review of the 
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literature on China's urbanisation illustrates this point. According to Tang, current 
studies have acknowledged differences between inland and coastal areas, urban and 
rural areas, and within cities. However, the `anti- urbanism', `class -struggle' and 
`economic imperative' perspectives used have failed to understand the importance 
of variations in spatial differentials, and how they relate to a particular context. As 
noted by Tang (1997:32), most studies have "concentrated on the causal 
mechanisms of the economy but not on the spatial contingent effect ". Given this 
dissatisfaction, it is imperative to theorise space and its effects on social and 
economic development in a more sophisticated way, while avoiding spatial 
determinism. 
Current discussions of space have provided significant insights. Generally, 
the concept of `absolute space' - an independent entity with its own effects - has 
been rejected (Urry, 1985; Sayer, 1985, 1992; Sheppard, 1995). In contrast, 
according to Duncan (1989a:132), space: 
only exist[s] as a relation between objects (such as planets, cities or people) 
which have substance. Space itself does not have substance - there is 
nothing there - and without objects which do have substance there is no 
spatial relation. 
Causal powers are thus "embodied in societal mechanisms, and it is those 
mechanisms that give life to space" (Sheppard, 1995:291). 
Massey (1985:11) asserts that "there is no such thing as purely spatial 
processes; there are only particular social processes operating over space ". When 
geographers discuss the `friction of distance', they are, in fact, referring to land 
rents or transport costs and their effects on spatial zones. As a result, land rents and 
transport costs are functions between landowner and labour, and truck owner and 
consumer respectively. Obviously, it is social objects which interact, not the space 
9 
or distance. Thus spatial relations are, in fact, relationships between objects (Urry, 
1985; Sayer, 1985, 1992; Duncan, 1989a, b). Moreover, Sayer (1985:52) suggests 
that space makes a difference: 
in terms of the particular causal powers and liabilities constituting it. 
Conversely, what kind of effects are produced by causal mechanisms 
depends inter alia on the form of the conditions in which they are situated. 
It is the difference that space makes which defines the particular context of places. 
Sayer (1985) believes that this is the contingent effect of space. Unlike causal 
effects, which bring changes to other objects, contingent effects do not have any 
causal power. However, they make up the contextual conditions which affect the 
operation of causal powers. 
Space, according to Duncan (1989a, b), makes a difference in three ways. 
The first is the spatial contingency effect. Given that space is not an object and has 
no causal power, it will not cause things to happen but it will "influence how, and to 
what degree, primary causal objects interact, and hence how processes work" 
(Duncan, 1989a:138 -139). While space itself has no causal power, causal 
mechanisms do operate under the influence of spatial contingency. This implies 
such mechanisms are not universal. They are `spatially- bounded' and occur in a 
particular time and space. Duncan (1989a, b) has categorised this as the spatial 
boundary effect or local causal process, a second level of spatial variation. The 
difference between spatial contingent effects and spatial boundary effects, as 
highlighted by Tang (1997:26), is that the former "affects how changes occur" 
while the latter "causes changes to happen ". Another difference is that spatial 
contingent effects usually refer to universal mechanisms and spatial boundary 
effects pointing to locally specific causal mechanisms. 
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Finally, there is a third level of spatial variation: locality effects. As stated by 
Duncan (1989b:247), they are: 
[t]he contextual effects of local causal powers and spatial contingency may 
be so significant as qualitatively to alter the nature of social structures in a 
particular place and hence social action. 
Although locality effects have been identified, they are rarely significant. This is 
because a "spatially specific system of causality can[not] be implied from the 
spatial boundary effect" (Tang, 1997:26). The significance of locality effects, 
according to Duncan (1989b), has to be demonstrated empirically, and he warns that 
they may not exist even though a significant spatial variation is observed. 
Consequently, such effects can almost be ignored (Tang, 1997:26). 
The above three concepts provide a useful framework for understanding 
China's social economic development and the country's highly diversified local 
situation. At a higher level of abstraction, `socialism with Chinese characteristics' 
reminds scholars that China is different from other socialist countries and has its 
very own context. Although China adopted the Soviet development model in the 
pre -reform period, it was not a pure duplication. After the first Five Year Plan 
(1953- 1957), China began to develop its own distinctive road toward socialism 
(Seldon, 1989; Liao, Gao and Zhou, 1991; Gregor, 1995; Nathan, 1997). China's 
system under Mao, as suggested by Nathan (1997:54), was a: 
hybrid between the original half- realised Stalinist pattern and various other 
patterns, some drawn from the [Chinese Communist] Party's Yan'an 
experience, some from the KMT [Kuomintang] and Japanese tradition, 
some developed as experimental, on- the -spot adjustments to immediate 
economic or political problems. 
In the agricultural sector, for instance, the redistribution of farmlands, aimed at 
eliminating exploitation of peasants by landlords, was an important measure based 
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solely on Chinese experience (Se'den, 1989). The Chinese model also had a more 
decentralised planning and administrative system than its Soviet counterpart. Under 
the principle of `unified planning, subordinated management (tongyi jihua, fenji 
guanli)', a hierarchical administrative system was established and authorities at 
different levels were endowed with certain degrees of power over decision making, 
material allocation and personnel assignment. The number of enterprises which 
operated directly under central control and administration was fewer than in the 
Soviet model. Moreover, the practices of self -reliance, self- sufficiency and high 
accumulation in the industrial sector were also without a Soviet precedent. These 
variations were derived from the country's context, in particular its huge and poor 
population, and international isolation when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
came to power. 
Differences between China and other socialist countries persisted in the 
reform era. This is underlined by current debates on the transformation of socialist 
societies./ Economic reform in the Soviet Union and other eastern European 
countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, has quickly destroyed the 
old administrative apparatus and systems. Liberalisation and privatisation have been 
implemented rapidly to construct a capitalist economy within a short period. In 
contrast to the `big bang' approach, reform in China is more cautious. Economy and 
society have been protected by the gradual liberalisation of prices, material supplies 
The debate on the approach of transformation is made between `big bang' and `gradualism' 
theorists. Scholars such as Rawski (1999), Lees (1997) and McMillan and Naughton (1992) 
generally agree that the gradualism has contributed to the success of China's economic reform. For 
an overview of the arguments, refer to Murrell (1992). 
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and markets. Politically, the administrative apparatus and systems remain 
unchanged. Although China's reform has always been criticised for its tiny steps, 
the outcome, when compared with Russia and other eastern European socialist 
countries, has surprised many observers. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
address why China has been more successful in reforming its economy than Russia 
and other eastern European socialist countries.4 These variations stem from spatial 
discrepancies between China and other socialist countries. Their spatial contingent 
conditions have created disparate outcomes. Initially, socialism was developed 
differently in China and the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries. 
Since the reform era, these socialist, or formerly socialist, countries have adopted a 
number of approaches to reforming the economy and the results have varied. 
China's divergent transitory process has formed a special context, or contingent 
conditions, that triggered off other causal mechanisms. 
At another level of abstraction, regional variations between north and south, 
inland and coastal regions, and between different provinces and counties, have 
provided spatial boundary effects. Regions have unique economic backgrounds, 
local histories and social characteristics. For example, rural markets have a number 
of names because of cultural and language variations within China. In the middle 
and lower courses of the Yellow River they are known as V. However, rural 
markets are known as 'shi' and `xu' in the Yangzi River Valley and southern China 
respectively, and in south -western China, they are known as 'chang' or 'fie'. 
4 For a distinct study on the issue, see Nolan (1995). 
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Social and economic processes operating under the influence of contingency 
effects also created locality effects, including: (a) the role of local government; (b) 
the local economic structure; (c) the relationship between rural and urban sectors; 
(d) accessibility; and (e) the extent of foreign investment. Por example, the district 
of Buji in Shenzhen city possesses one of the most successful wholesale markets. 
Since its establishment in 1989, the market has expanded due to the development of 
agricultural activities within the Pearl River Delta, the presence of a huge urban 
population, a well -developed transport network, preferential policies enjoyed by 
Shenzhen's special economic zone, and the strong support of the local government. 
Another good illustration of locality effects is Shandong province's wholesale 
vegetable market and Shaoxing city's specialised textile market. The former is 
supported by the area's specialisation on high -yielding vegetable production; and 
the latter is bolstered by collective -owned enterprises and private dealers. In turn, 
these various patterns of development, or models, affect both local and national 
contexts and hence spatial contingency. In China, this is further complicated by the 
widespread propagation of purportedly successful models. Good examples are the 
national movement of `learning agricultural practice from Dazhai (nongye xue 
Dazhai)' in the 1960s, and promotion of the household responsibility system during 
the early 1980s. Both were local experiences which influenced central policy and 
led to their implementation throughout China. 
The above discussion highlights the importance of establishing connections 
between rural market development and national and local contexts. This is 
particularly true when scholars have to cope with China's extraordinary scale and 
extreme local diversity. Concepts, such as spatial contingency effects, spatial 
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boundary effects and locality effects, which comprise the `context' of particular 
places, are useful tools for this purpose. The former refers to the changes in the 
country's political economy with the shift from a command to a market economy 
during the reform era. Distinct characteristics include the decentralisation of 
economic decision -making power, the blending of local government administrative 
and entrepreneurial roles, and the rise of an administrative -zone economy. The latter 
- the local context - refers to the socio- economic, political, historical and cultural 
structures of a specific place, which are demonstrated in the following chapters. 
1.2 Themes of the study and research questions 
Four key themes covering all major research issues in both theoretical and empirical 
aspects are identified in a conceptual framework to guide the direction of research. 
They are (a) local contexts; (b) rural market changes; (c) peasant- market 
interactions, and (d) the roles of local government. 
(a) Local contexts 
The establishment of local contexts is through the identification of political, 
economic and social characteristics at national and local levels. At the first, 
the focus is on China's communist background, and political and economic 
changes during the reform era. The second concentrates attention on the 
economic, social, historical and environmental settings of the study areas. It 
covers (a) population, its distribution and size; (b) living standards; (c) overall 
economic performance and structure; (d) non -agricultural activities, 
particularly rural industrialisation; (e) agricultural development; (f) 
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transport routes and infrastructure; and (g) extent of foreign investment, 
Particular interest is centred on factors which have great influence on rural 
market development such as rural industrialisation and transport routes. 
(b) Rural market changes 
Rural market development, as noted, is not regarded as a separate process. 
Thus, attention is focused on how the local political, economic and social 
settings contribute to rural market shifts. This contribution to change will be 
examined by analysing variations in the number of markets, their locations, 
distribution, hierarchy, market days and their functions at the county level. 
Special attention is paid to factors that affect market location. The study not 
only exposes how rural areas have been organised during the reform era, but 
also demonstrates how the present pattern is different from that described by 
Skinner (1964, 1965a). 
(c) Interactions between peasants and rural markets 
The aim of concentrating on peasant -market interactions is to show how the 
changing patterns of rural markets influence their interrelationship with their 
customers. Although peasant -market interactions are represented by flows of 
labour, money, vehicles and commodities (Unwin, 1989), attention is focused 
on (a) movement of people to particular markets, and (b) commodity flows 
between peasants and rural markets. This is because reliable information on 
the other topics is difficult to find. 
Movements of people are examined by observing the marketing and 
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shopping patterns of local residents. The former is investigated by considering 
commodity flows between producers (i.e. peasants) and rural markets. The 
aim is to study (a) how different channels are used to market crops; and (b) 
how administrative parameters affect market activities. 
This examination of commodity flows is investigated by reviewing the 
study area's agricultural activities which are regarded as the local causal 
effects. After identifying the nature and productivity of major crops, 
marketing patterns of different agricultural products are explored, but only 
one or two major commodities are analysed in detail. Shopping patterns are 
then investigated by noting the choice of rural markets, frequency of visits, 
and mode of transport used. 
(d) Roles of local government 
The influence of administrative parameters is also examined through 
discussions with local government authorities. Dialogue is concerned with 
how authorities carry out central government policies and formulate local 
policies related to market development. The special role of local governments 
in managing and participating in market activities is also investigated: county - 
level and town -level authorities are of part icular interest. Attention is paid to 
the management of rural markets, their administrative hierarchies, and taxes 
and payments imposed on trading. 
These four themes address China's rural market development at two spatial 
levels: national and local (i.e. county). At the national level, China's changing 
political economy and its impact on rural market development is investigated. At 
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the county level, the local context of a place and overall market development, 
locations and hierarchies are addressed. A certain number of villages are selected 
for detailed study, and the interactions between peasants (both as producers and 
consumers) and rural markets, and the roles of local government are considered. 
This study adopts a different approach from Skinner, who investigated the topic by 
comparing the patterns of both economic and administrative central places. Case 
studies are used for illustrative purposes in an attempt to show linkages between 
rural market development and a specific area's local setting, and how such 
connections generate spatial variations. Through this framework, the underlying 
causes that contribute to the pattern of current market development are addressed to 
provide a picture of how the countryside has been reorganised during the reform 
era. New complexities have been exposed. Accordingly, this thesis has revisited 
Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b, 1985a, b) classical work, particularly his hypotheses on 
transport improvement and marketing development, administrative and economic 
systems, and the logic of rural market distribution and system operation. 
1.3 Deqing and Dongguan: The study area 
This study focuses on Deqing and Dongguan with major attention being given to 
the former. The choice of these two places was determined by a desire to compare 
poverty and prosperity, and primitive and advanced rural market systems. Deqing 
typifies the non -Delta face of Guangdong province with its limited amount of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, coexistence of old and new marketing systems 
and relatively poor development of transport facilities. Economic development has 
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been slow and steps towards reform have been conservative. In contrast, Dongguan 
is well known for its rapid growth and progressive strides in economic reform. Its 
economic performance has led not only the Guangdong province, but also the 
country. The choice of Dongguan shows how rural markets develop in an open and 
relatively advanced economy within a very different local context. 
Apart from location, another motive for choosing Deqing and Dongguan is 
the availability of information on their market towns. Deqing County Gazetteer 
(fangzhi) provides a surprisingly detailed description of market days and their total 
trading value within its administrative boundaries. The accessibility of these sources 
demonstrates that records are not only available but also well -organised. This 
information suggests that rural markets still play an important role in their 
economies. Moreover, county records also provide valuable information in 
establishing the study area's local context. Although Dongguan has not published 
its accounts of county gazette, specific materials on its commercial, agricultural and 
trading activities sketch the picture of Dongguan's market development. Further, 
Dongguan's rapid development in the reform period has attracted detailed studies of 
its socio- economic changes. Moreover, the availability of Dongguan Statistical 
Yearbook also provides further detailed information between 1949 and the mid - 
1980s. 
Another reason for choosing Deqing is that several road projects are under 
construction which will link up several major towns. This development provides an 
opportunity to study local expectations of new roads, particularly their likely 
influence on marketing activities. Although these projects were not completed 
during the study period, they provide a good benchmark for future comparative 
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studies. Finally, the author's Cantonese speaking background and well -established 
connections through Deqing and Dongguan have facilitated research. 
Both Deqing and Dongguan are located in Guangdong province, one of 
China's most prosperous areas (Fig. 1.1). Although Deqing and Dongguan are 
similar in size, 2,256.7 km and 2,465 km respectively, there are remarkable 
differences in topography, administrative establishment, population numbers and 
levels of development. Deqing county is located on the north -western border of 
Guangdong province and has long been regarded as one of the 50 most hilly or 
mountainous (shahn qu) counties in Guangdong province. These counties have four 
common characteristics: (a) over 70 per cent of the county's territory is hilly; (b) an 
interior location; (c) poor development of transport and communication facilities 
and (d) a closed or semi- closed economy. In contrast, Dongguan is located on the 
alluvial plain of the Zhujiang Delta, where abundant arable land is available and is 
served by a well developed transport system. Thus, Deqing and Dongguan typify 
the contrasting landscapes which are described in Skinner's (1964) model of rural 
market structure. 
Variations in topography are not the only differences between Deqing and 
Dongguan; there are also contrasts in their administrative structure. Deqing is 
subordinate to the prefecture -level city of Zhaoqing whereas Dongguan is a 
prefecture -level city in its own right. Before 1985, Dongguan was a county like 
Deqing. Recognition of Dongguan's rapid growth led to its promotion to a county- 
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level city in 1985 and then to a prefecture -level city in 1988.5 Promotion in the 
administrative hierarchy enables Dongguan to have more control over local 
development projects and greater flexibility in the way it implements central 
Fig. 1.1 Location of Deqing and Dongguan in Guangdong Province 
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government policies. 
There are also marked differences in population size and levels of economic 
development between Deqing and Dongguan. In 1998, the former had a population 
5 The Chinese administrative status of `shi' (city) is misleading in English. Much of Dongguan 
remains an area of villages with agricultural activities. Accordingly, Dongguan is still referred as a 
rural area. 
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of 342,846, of whom over 81 per cent were rural (DQSB, 1999:78). At the same 
date, the population in the latter was 3,478,816 - almost ten times larger than 
Deqing - but only 38 per cent of its population was classified as rural 
(DGSB,1999:73 -4). While Deqing organised 15 designated towns, Dongguan 
controlled 33 designated towns. In 1998, Deqing's gross domestic product (GDP) 
was 2,97 billion yuan, which ranked the county last among the six counties in 
Zhaoqing city and forty -sixth out of 79 counties in Guangdong province as a whole 
(GDSB, 1999:633 -4). Dongguan's GDP was 35.56 billion yuan, eleven times that 
of Deqing, ranking it third out of all administrative zones in Guangdong province 
and eleventh among the 21 prefecture -level cities (GDSB, 1999:104, 633 -4). 
Table 1.1 Deqing and Dongguan, 1998 
Deqing Dongguan 
Area (km2) 2,257 2,465 
Population 342,846 3,478,816* 
GDP (in billion yuan) 2.26 35.56 ** 
Gross value of agricultural 
output (in billion yuan) 
5.43 2.55 
Gross value of industrial 
output (in billion yuan) 
0.92 59.69 
Total foreign capital used 
(in million USD) 
30.56 1338 
Per capita peasant income 
(in yuan) 
3,435 5,534 
Note: * Including migrant workers; ** Current prices 
Source: DQSB (1999), DGSB (1999) 
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Given their different levels of economic development in Deqing and 
Dongguan, the lives of people have varied markedly. Many are dubious about 
Deqing's government propaganda regarding their improved well- being. In 1998, the 
monthly salary of a government employee averaged 700 yuan in Deqing. For those 
in joint ventures, the monthly salary was 1,000 to 1,500 yuan. They accounted for 
less than 5 per cent of the county's working population. Most people, in fact, are 
small farmers who cultivate several mu of land to support their livelihood; only a 
few engaged in specialised farming, and the level of specialisation in local markets 
is still minimal Their tiny income suggests low levels of consumption in rural 
markets. 
In sharp contrast to Deqing, few people have questioned the well -off status 
(xiao kang shui ping) granted to Dongguan in 1995.6 Indeed, the lives of peasants in 
Dongguan have improved significantly during the reform era. Many have rebuilt 
their houses in concrete and added one or two storeys (Plate 1.1). Colour 
televisions, refrigerators and washing machines are now found in their homes. 
Some wealthy families also have air conditioning and satellite television. Although 
bicycles have been widely used, motorcycles are equally popular. According to 
official figures, the average annual income per capita of peasants was 5,534 yuan in 
1998, which compared very favourably with the provincial average of 3,527 yuan 
6 The well -off status is a comprehensive index that is determined by 16 indicators, such as per capita 
income, gini coefficient, life span, education level, per capita energy absorption, expenditure on 
clothing, and others. Amongst these indicators, income per capita is the most crucial one. According 
to Fan (1996), the rural and national standards of income per capita are 1,100 and 2,400 yuan, 
respectively. For details of all indicators and the estimation method, please refer to the SSB -Well -off 
Study Group (1992). 
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(DGSB, 1999:295; GDSB, 1999:261). This larger per capita income suggests 
people have more money to spend in rural markets. 
Most Deqing peasants have poor living standards. Despite the recent 
construction of new houses in rural areas, many still live in old mud -brick houses 
with tile -roofs which requiring frequent maintenance (Plate 1.1). This is particularly 
the case in hilly areas. Houses are equipped with old and simple furniture. Usually, 
living rooms are decorated with posters of Chinese revolutionary leaders or Hong 
Kong movie stars. Although electricity is available, people seldom turn on lights 
and fans because they cannot afford the high electricity bills. Few have television 
sets and colour television is even rarer. Telephones, washing machines and 
refrigerators are regarded as luxury goods and rarely found. 
Many peasants in Dongguan are now divorced from agriculture. Some are 
working in local publicly -owned factories and others have their own small 
businesses. Those still involved in agriculture are specialist farmers. Only a minor 
proportion of peasants still exist in Dongguan. The robust village -owned enterprises 
have not only absorbed surplus labour, but have also reduced tax burdens. Unlike 
Deqing, all taxes are paid in cash by village enterprises. Consequently, peasants no 
longer have to depend on cultivation and farm income for their survival. 
Conversely, peasants in Deqing still depend on farming for their livelihood. 
As in most small -scale rural economies, all family members are involved in 
cultivation. School holidays are co- ordinated with the farming schedule. In Deqing, 
wet rice is the major crop and the sub -tropical climate allows double cropping. 
However, taxes account for half of the yield: essentially, one crop is produced for 
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Plate 1.1 Peasants houses in Deqing and Dongguan 
Deging 
Wangniudun, Dongguan 
the tax collector. The remaining products have to be consumed by peasants and are 
not for sale. Although sidelines, such as vegetables and pigs, supplement their 
income, the increased production costs have wiped out profits and incentives. As 
those surpluses sold in the market produce only a small return, sideline agricultural 
products are largely used by the producers. 
During the slack season, there are various ways to supplement their incomes 
from a range of ad hoc activities. Fish are caught in the river and wild boars or 
hares in the forest, and these are sold at local markets. Sometimes people will go to 
neighbouring villages to see if there are any temporary jobs available. As 
construction workers, peasants can earn up to 20 yuan per day. However, wage 
arrears are common and `white slips (bai tiao)' - debt bills - are often given instead 
of money. The worse case scenario is that they will have worked all day but leave 
with nothing. 
Like most areas of China, many households in Deqing have family members 
who are migrant workers. Discussions with peasants suggest that very few of them 
are lucky enough to have permanent jobs. Many are `odd -job workers', who carry 
out a variety of tasks such as labouring, bricklaying and carpentry. In many cases, 
remittances are much lower than anticipated. Some migrant labours have even 
asked their family for financial assistance. Still, there are some hard -workers who 
have saved enough money to build themselves a concrete house within several 
Odd -job workers are regarded as `three withouts (sanwu)' population, who are without fixed jobs, 
without fixed abodes and without valid documentation 
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years. In 1998, numerous peasants did not want to be migrant workers. Some of 
them had been cheated by employers and so discouraged from further work. Others 
said that it was too difficult to find a temporary job in an economy that was not 
thriving and they preferred to stay at home. Whether this phenomenon was the 
result of the Asian economic crisis was difficult to verify. Urban unemployment 
made it more difficult for migrant workers to find work. 
Attention in Deqing is focused on the neighbouring town of Huilong and 
Guanxu and some districts of Jiushi. Huilong is situated at the western border of 
Deqing. Since the town is dominated by hills, the population is relatively sparsely 
distributed. Road transport is poor developed and there is only one paved road 
between Huilong and the other towns (Plate 1.2). Some villages are very remote and 
are connected to the outside world only by small footpaths. These characteristics 
explain why Huilong has been regarded as a `corner' of Deqing. In 1998, the town 
had a population of 20,321 and gross rural production value (GRPV) of 167 million 
yuan, ranking it eighth and twelfth among Deqing's 15 towns (DQSB, 1999:78, 84). 
Guanxu, in contrast, is located in the mid -west of the county, where flatland 
and population are concentrated. It was the sixth largest town in Deqing with a 
population of 23,867 in 1998 (DQSB, 1999:78). Guanxu has been one of Deqing's 
major grain -production areas, and yields have always topped all towns in the 
county. Guanxu rural market is one of the busiest. It is known as `home of officials' 
because many county government bureaucrats are from Guanxu. 
Jiushi is situated along the Xijiang River on the eastern edge of Deqing. In 
1998, population in the town was 29,148, ranking it fourth of the county's 15 towns 
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(DQSB, 1999:78). It has Deqing's major silkworm cocoon area, producing 140 
tonnes in 1998 (DQSB, 1999:116). Jiushi was regarded as another `corner' of 
Deqing county before a new road was opened during 1990s. The transport 
improvements have significantly improved the town's accessibility and this is a key 
factor in choosing the town as a case study. 
In Dongguan, attention is concentrated on Wangniudun, which is one of the 
33 designated towns, situated 10 km on the south -west of the city government seat. 
It has experienced tremendous changes during the reform period. A huge amount of 
farmland has changed to industrial use. Township and village industries have 
flourished and the incongruous scene of factories surrounding by paddy fields is all 
too familiar (Plate 1.3). By 1997, the town had more than 10 cement plants, 18 
papermaking plants and 35 brickyards. In 1998, these factories, together with 
Wangniudun's agricultural sector, contributed 292 million yuan of GDP (DGSB, 
1999:66). 
1.4 Methodology 
This study is based on data collected over 10 months of intensive fieldwork in 
Deqing and Dongguan, supported by library research in Hong Kong. Unlike 
Skinner, whose research depended heavily on documents, my fieldwork provides an 
in -depth understanding of China's rural marketing activities and their operational 
structure. First -hand data were collected through observations, interviews and 
household surveys. Dozens of photographs were taken and field notes written to 
document observations. I visited all 15 towns /townships in Deqing county and most 
villages in the Wangniudun town of Dongguan. As well, I visited all rural markets 
in both areas. In Deqing, regular visits were made to Guanxu, Huilong and Jiushi 
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Plate 1.2 Transport in Deqing and Dongguan 
A rural road in Deqing 
Cross -border bus to Hong Kong -- A well developed road network makes long 
distance travel possible in Dongguan 
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Plate 1.3 Farmlands in Deqing and Dongguan 
Deging 
Wangniudun, Dongguan 
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rural markets to observe the activities of peasants and trading situations during 
market and non -market days, and in both the farming and slack seasons. 
Household surveys were conducted in Deqing and Wangniudun to examine 
interactions between peasants and rural markets. The number of interviews was not 
pre -determined and visits continued until a complete picture of peasant life was 
exposed. In Deqing, 40 villages in different locations were visited and over 50 
households were interviewed (Fig. 1.2). There were three criteria in choosing 
villages. They had to be: (a) located close together, but under the control of 
different administrative jurisdictions; (b) served by roads; and (c) situated far away 
from trunk roads.A similar exercise was also conducted in Wangniudun, with 3 big 
villages being visited and 10 households being interviewed. 
While villages were selected by their location, households were basically 
picked at random. I was given a free hand in conducting interviews in both field 
areas, and was assisted by my drivers /interpreters in Deqing and Dongguan -a local 
road maintenance worker and a teacher respectively. I was well received by the 
peasants. On occasions, however, my approach was rejected because some peasants 
were suspicious about talking to strangers. Also, some thought I should interview 
the village head (cun zhang) not them because he represents the local community. A 
questionnaire that covers enquiries on the daily lives of peasants and their 
connections with rural markets was used as a guideline (see Appendix III). 
However, dialogues with peasants often went beyond these pre -set questions. The 
interviews were conducted voluntarily, though imported cigarettes were given to the 
respondents afterwards. Generally, people were simple and honest, and were 
desperate to talk about their lives. Once the conversation started, they readily 
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Fig. 1.2 Fieldwork sites in Deqing 
discussed their life experiences, difficulties and expectations. However, some 
peasants in Wangniudun were more cautious when talking about their lives. This 
was particularly the case when sensitive issues were mentioned such as purchase 
prices and tax burdens. The length of interviews averaged from two hours up to a 
day. Particular households were revisited to follow up on their marketing activities. 
Government officials in towns and counties were also interviewed. This was 
the prime method for obtaining the most up -to -date and detailed information on 
rural market development. Also, it was the best means of examining the role of 
local government in rural market growth. Connections were established through 
banquets organised by the Roadway Bureau, the institution with which I was 
affiliated. The head of the Bureau introduced me to his colleagues in the ICMB and 
other government authorities. Despite connections being established, telephone calls 
had to he made to verify my identity before interviews took place. No questionnaire 
was used and dialogues concentrated on three aspects: (a) the history and current 
situation of the local markets (see Appendix I); (b) the way in which the 
government managed local market places; and (c) the future development of rural 
markets. Unlike chatting to peasants, interviewing local officials was usually 
undertaken in a solemn and uncomfortable atmosphere. As anticipated, they spoke 
about the perspectives of their institutions and vigorously defended state policies. 
Sensitive questions were sometimes ignored. 
Many data from secondary sources, such as statistics and documents, were 
collected to supplement first -hand data. These materials provided the major sources 
for sketching macro economic development in the chosen study areas. Moreover, 
they were important for cross checking information obtained through interviews. 
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Data were obtained mainly from both published and unpublished statistical 
yearbooks. Published yearbooks were not difficult to find in local bookshops and 
libraries. With the assistance of the Roadway Bureau, I was able to collect 
unpublished materials in Deqing, which are regarded as `internal references' and 
distributed to people with appropriate authorisation. However, I was warned not to 
take the materials outside China, not even into the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR). A similar situation was experienced in Dongguan, 
but there were no restrictions on carrying the materials abroad. Supplementary data 
were also located in local gazettes, newspapers, government documents and even 
investment brochures. 
Library research in Hong Kong allowed me to collect a large number of 
Chinese books, journal articles and monographs published during the 1990s. These 
provided valuable information on the different research perspectives of Chinese 
academics on rural market development. 
It is worth mentioning the reliability of statistics used in this thesis. The 
legitimacy of Chinese data has always been questioned by researchers. This is 
because cheating always occurs at different levels of local government. In Deqing, I 
was able to access different data sources but local officials suggested that I 
inflate some economic figures by 20 per cent for publication. Obviously, such 
practice is driven by their desire to show off economic achievements. These 
problematical figures are not used in this thesis. Occasionally, a similar set of data 
was found in other sources, such as newspapers and government reports, hut they 
were equally unreliable because the source was unknown. Moreover, given limited 
fieldwork resources, it was impossible to conduct large -scale social and economic 
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surveys like the Statistical Bureau. Thus, this thesis uses official figures published 
in the statistical yearbooks because they are the only complete and comparable data 
available. 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter Two reviews Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b, 1985a, b) classic thesis on China's 
rural market development. Skinner's (1977, 1994) regional approach is also 
presented. His major arguments on rural market growth, intensification, 
modernisation and its development during different time periods are highlighted. 
Also, the literature on China's post -reform rural market development is reviewed. 
This establishes the conceptual framework of the thesis. 
Chapter Three investigates China's changing political economy during the 
reform era and its impact on rural market development. This is done by identifying 
spatial contingent effects associated with China's national level. Particular attention 
is placed on the decentralisation of power and the formation of an administrative 
zone economy. By examining the state's role in market development, this chapter 
argues that the traditional market system - seen by Skinner (1964) as a `natural' 
system based on market forces - has not been revived during the reform era. 
Chapter Four analyses rural market development at a local level. Deqing and 
Dongguan are used as case studies. Particular attention is given to spatial boundary 
effects on different localities and their impact on rural market distribution, hierarchy 
and functions. It shows how variations in local socio- economic, political and 
environmental structures have generated different levels of market development in 
Deqing and Dongguan. This chapter also examines the relationship between 
population and market growth in the two places. Comparisons are made not only 
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between Deqing and Dongguan, but also between them and Skinner's (1964, 1965a) 
hypotheses and models. 
Chapter Five further analyses Deqing and Dongguan's marketing pattern by 
examining locality effects and their impacts on peasant -market interactions. 
Specific attention is given to economic factors such as the level of self- sufficiency, 
income and transport improvement. By examining these elements and contrasting 
them with Skinner's equation of market evolution, this chapter demonstrates the 
more complex situation that has developed during the reform era. The findings in 
this chapter also elaborate and supplement Skinner's mid -1960s thesis. 
Chapter Six extends discussions by focusing on administrative aspects. 
Administrative principles, government regulations, toll stations and administrative 
boundaries and their impact on Deqing and Dongguan's rural marketing activities 
are examined. Canvassing these factors demonstrates that Skinner's (1985b) policy - 
cycle theory is not sufficient in itself to explain changes in the political economy of 
the reform era. 
Chapter Seven elaborates the findings of previous chapters and examines 
whether these variations are sufficiently explained by Skinner's (1977, 1994) 
regional framework; his core -periphery concepts and classification of macroregions 
are discussed. While demonstrating the inadequacy of these concepts, this chapter 
suggests a broader urban -rural perspective to understanding development. 
The last chapter - Chapter Eight - concludes this dissertation by discussing 
the extent to which Skinner's thesis applies to post - reform China. Future 
developments of the country's rural market and its reform are reviewed. Finally, 
future directions for research are outlined. 
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Chapter 2 
China's rural market district: 
The central place theory and Skinner 
Administrative parameters have exerted a strong influence on China' s regional 
economic development. As a centrally planned economy, the role of the state and 
its policy implications for regional economic development have always been a 
major concern. During the pre -reform period, a rigid governmental system was 
implemented and China was thus divided into different `areas' (kuai kuai) by 
administrative boundaries. Urban and rural areas were organised by different 
administrative units. Lateral connections were prohibited, and a social system was 
established which separated China's population into urban and rural classes. This 
system determined an individual's educational chances, work opportunities, 
marriage prospects and other social benefits. 
In 1978, economic reform altered most of these radical policies. Whether 
China's social economic development has broken away from administrative 
influence, however, is debatable. Some studies show that economic development 
has integrated different regions (Zhou, 1991; Wang, 1995; Marton, 1996). Others 
demonstrate that the administrative boundaries are acting as `invisible walls' and 
have constrained economic integration (Huang, 1993; Liu and Shu, 1996; Chung 
and Tang, 1996, 1997). In fact, economic reform has not changed the practice of 
using administrative measures to manipulate economic development. Cities are still 
being regarded as administrative organisations rather than central places within a 
purely economic system (Chung and Tang, 1997:3). 
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That matter of administrative boundaries in China is forcefully illustrated 
by Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b, 1976, 1977c, 1985a, b) studies on China's rural 
market system. His research provides an historical framework for understanding 
China's marketing structure and its relationship with the administrative system 
from the late imperial period to Mao Zedong's China. Before discussing and 
reviewing Skinner's work on critical periods in the development of market districts, 
it is important to review his development of earlier explorations on central place 
theory by Christaller and Lösch. 
2.1 Central Place Theory: Skinner, Christaller and Lösch 
G. William Skinner graduated with distinction in Far East Studies at Cornell 
University in 1947. Subsequently, he undertook a Ph.D. in anthropology on `A 
Study of Chinese Community Leadership in Bangkok together with an Historical 
Survey of Chinese Society in Thailand' (Skinner, 1954). Since then, he has 
extended his interest in cultural anthropology, historical anthropology and 
comparative agrarian society in Asia, with particular reference to Chinese 
communities overseas. Field research has been conducted in Borneo, China, Japan, 
Java and Thailand. During the late 1950s, Skinner published his findings on the 
Chinese overseas in Chinese Society in Thailand (1957), and Leadership and 
Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (1958) which were based on his 
Ph.D. thesis. 
Since the late 1950s, Skinner has concentrated on the People's Republic of 
China. He has written about China's rural marketing system (Skinner, 1964, 
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1965a, b), Chinese society (Skinner, 1951, 1971, 1973a, b, c), China's urban and 
regional systems (Elvin and Skinner, 1974; Skinner, 1976, 1977a, b, c), and 
China's history (Skinner, 1982, 1985c). In 1994, he presented a theoretical 
framework for comprehending China's regional differentiation (Skinner, 1994) (see 
Appendix II for a selected bibliography on Skinner's work). 
Skinner's (1964, 1965a, b) most significant contribution, however, was 
arguably his series of papers on China's rural marketing and macro trading 
systems. As these papers employed central place theory to study the distribution of 
China's rural markets and their relationship to the administrative system, the 
discussion is centred on Skinner's debt to Walter Christaller (1933 trans 1966) and 
August Lösch (1940 trans 1954), who were originally responsible for developing 
the underlying concepts. Undoubtedly, their formulations appealed to Skinner's 
meticulous nature (Unger, pers. comm.). 
Skinner elaborated Christaller's 1930s work on economic central places to 
seek "a general explanation for the sizes, numbers and distribution of towns" 
( Christaller 1933 trans 1966:2). Christaller argued that the demand threshold for the 
supply of high -order goods determined its marketing area, which was usually 
hexagonal in shape. The marketing area also determined the commodity's 
minimum price. This process was the same for second -order and third -order goods 
which produced different levels of centres. Each central place served an optimal 
pattern of settlement which was hexagonal in form. Small hexagons (i.e. low -order 
centres) were nested in the larger one (Fig. 2.1). 
Also Skinner drew on Lösch's (1940 trans 1954) location theory of 
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Fig. 2.1 Regular central place hierarchy 
Small and large hexagons represent central places at low and high levels respectively. 
scattered farms, despite its assumption of pure competition and its `bottom -up' 
approach. Under the assumption of pure competition, suppliers would locate 
themselves in such a way as to prevent excess profits being earned. The `bottom - 
up' approach assumed that small centres would be established first, while larger 
ones would stem from demand intensification. Further, Skinner elaborated Lösch's 
(1940 trans 1954) notion on the indissoluble connection between transport routes 
and the spatial patterns of central places. He stressed the significance of road routes 
in shaping rural market development and its service areas. Obviously, his 
perspective reflected the booming interest in transport and development studies 
during the late 1950s and 1960s (Owen, 1959; Green, 1958; Berry, 1959; Garrison 
et al., 1959; Fulton, 1969). 
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Skinner used the contributions of Christaller and Lösch "to explain the 
distribution of retail market centres, the purest examples of which are periodic 
`peasant' marketplaces" (Smith, 1974:171). Several studies applied his hypothesis 
of marketing evolution and the relationship between marketing and social systems 
and produced fruitful results (Smith, 1976a, b). 
Unlike Christaller who began with high -order goods and urban centres, 
Skinner adopted a `bottom up' approach to develop his central place arguments. 
Initially, his analysis centred on small, rural periodic markets. Population growth 
raised the demand for agricultural commodities and the level of specialisation. In 
addition to transport development, markets experienced a cycle of intensification 
which eventually led to the formation of urban centres. Accordingly, urban centres, 
in Skinner's thesis, are formed as a result of rural intensification. By adopting this 
perspective, Skinner has overcome the most trenchant criticism of central place 
theory - its static nature. Simultaneously, he developed a "complete model of 
central -place evolution" which Christaller and Lösch did not work out for 
themselves (Smith, 1976a:46). Skinner's evolutionary concept is regarded as an 
important anthropological contribution to geographical studies. Besides, providing 
a systematic framework for anthropologists to study marketing systems, his peasant 
marketing model has also contributed to debates among geographers (Marshall, 
1964; Berry, 1967; Berry and Horton, 1970). 
In recasting central place theory, Skinner's thesis also modified some of its 
unrealistic assumptions. His model overcomes the need for (a) homogeneous 
topography; (b) uniform demand density and purchasing power; (c) equal transport 
facilities and services; and (d) indefinite extension of the same development pattern 
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in all directions (Skinner, 1977c:281). Tnstead, he has proposed a range of systemic 
variations (Skinner, 1977c:283 -5). Demand density varies as a function of 
population density and distance, and is reflected in transport costs. In sum, Skinner 
is concerned with the contribution of topography and socio- economic parameters. 
Skinner's use of central place theory to articulate market systems also 
attracted the attention of anthropologists. Heated discussions took place on this 
topic during the 1970s, particularly among Stanford anthropologists. Indeed, 
central place theory, according to Smith (1974:167 -168), provided Skinner with a 
systematic perspective for understanding the marketing behaviour of peasants 
which was much broader than the usual anthropological view of peasant 
communities. Subsequently, five aspects of the central place theory have attracted 
the attention of anthropologists: (a) the delimitation of a village or city as a 
research unit; (b) the measurement procedures for identifying development at a 
regional level; (c) the framework for describing trade articulation; (d) the 
framework for understanding peasant communities; and (e) the ability to tackle 
economic and social relationships (Smith, 1974:170). As a result, anthropologists 
"need less modification for the analysis of agrarian marketing ", unlike economists 
and geographers who have to modify the theory's simple assumptions to 
understand economic activities complicated by modern transport and localised 
production (Smith, 1974:169). This finding demonstrated central place theory's 
potential for further elaboration and application in studying China's marketing 
systems. 
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2.2 Market Districts Pre -1949 
The pre -1949 market districts in rural China were regarded by Skinner (1964) as a 
traditional system, comprising three levels: standard, intermediate and central. The 
`standard market' was the core, as it was "the starting point for the upward flow of 
agricultural products and craft items into higher reaches of the marketing system, 
and also the termination of the downwards flow of imported items destined for 
peasant consumption" (Skinner, 1964:6). It was the first place for peasants to sell 
their products and to purchase daily necessities. In contrast, the `central market' 
was the upper reach of the market hierarchy and located at a key urban node in the 
transport network. It had important wholesaling functions and served as a high - 
level market for exchanging local and imported commodities. As regards the 
`intermediate market', Skinner (1964:7) does not define it precisely but regards it 
as having "an intermediate position in the vertical flow of goods and services both 
ways ". The settlements in these market towns were denoted as either a 'standard 
market town', `central market town' or `intermediate market town' respectively. 
These three levels of market towns and cities reflected another order of 
central places in Imperial China. Unlike the marketing system, which was formed 
by `natural' economic activities, this was shaped by administrative and political 
transactions and regarded by Skinner (1964, 1976, 1977c) as an `official' or 
`artificial' system. This highlighted an important issue in Skinner's research: the 
relationship between the market and administrative hierarchies. Skinner (1977c) 
emphasised the primacy of the market structure characterised by central economic 
functions. This is because economic activities, notably resource allocation, profits 
and extraction, raised the need for governmental regulation and control. Thus, 
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economic central places were the logical sites for administrative institutions 
(Skinner, 1977c:276). Accordingly, when considering the relationships between the 
market and administrative systems, Skinner (1964:9) stated that: 
The extent to which the two hierarchical series of administrative and 
economic centers overlap or coincide can be determined ...... only through 
an analysis of marketing structures in a given region. 
Given the primitive transport linkages and a 'closed' agricultural system, 
the traditional market structure was characterised by its periodicity and the 
participation of mobile traders. Periodicity reflects China's extraordinary scale and 
local cultural variations. Different parts of China followed their own scheduling 
arrangements determined by the lunar decade (ten days), independent decade and 
independent duodenary (twelve days) (see Skinner, 1964:10-16 for details). 
Generally, though, market cycles followed the lunar calendar used by Chinese 
peasants for thousands of years. A two-per-lunar decade schedule was most 
common (Skinner, 1964:14). While neighbouring standard markets often had the 
same schedules, other levels had different timetables. This prevented standard 
market days from conflicting with intermediate market days. These arrangements 
allowed vendors and villagers to visit markets at different levels without any time 
clashes. 
As argued by Skinner (1964), China's pre-modem rural market system 
could be explained by Christaller's (1933 trans 1966) regular hexagonal pattern. 
Based on data from local gazettes and records, Skinner (1964:18) maintained that a 
standard market generally had a service area of about 18 villages. After considering 
China's topographical differences, he developed two models to explain market 
patterns and their spatial expression in both plains and mountainous areas (Skinner, 
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1964, 1965a) (Fig. 2.2). 
The differences between these models were expressed by reference to 
Sichuan province. In the plains of Sichuan province, typified by abundant arable 
land and high accessibility, each standard market town, on average, depended on 
three intermediate markets. Conversely, each standard market town in Sichuan's 
mountainous areas, which had fewer possible transport routes and limited arable 
land, depended on two higher -level market towns (Skinner, 1964:21). The 
marketing territories in mountainous areas were also larger than in the plains, as the 
population was more scattered. According to Skinner (1965a:205), a complete 
intermediate market covered an average area of 235 km2 in mountainous areas, 
while only 105 km2 in the plains. 
Fig. 2.2 Skinner's models of different topology 
Mountain model (Model A) Plains model (Model B) 
Source: Skinner (1965a:203) 
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Skinner (1965a:206 -211) suggested that the local market system will pass 
through an intensification cycle during its evolutionary process, despite the 
differences in patterns between the plains and mountain models. This process is 
brought about by a rise in rural population and an increase in the degree of 
household participation in the market. The intensification cycle is triggered by an 
increase in market size measured by its physical area or number of participants. 
Any expansion is followed by a rise in the number of trading days and eventually 
an increase in the number of markets. Initially, according to Skinner (1965a:206), 
village -to- market ratio might rise to 40 to 50 villages per market in mountainous 
areas where the transport network was poorly developed. An increase in the 
number of market days was accompanied by a rise in higher -level functions, such 
as wholesaling, and the eventual setting up of new standard markets. Once these 
were established, the village -to- market ratio reverted to the normal level (i.e. one to 
eighteen). 
The intensification cycle was accompanied by a process of modernisation 
which was characterised by greater commercialisation. It was reflected in a rise in 
the number of permanent traders and facilities, and in the degree and scope of 
specialisation at the expense of peasant self -sufficiency (Skinner, 1964:211 -3). 
However, this did not necessarily entail modernisation, as Skinner (1964:216) 
argues: 
True modernisation occurs only when a modern transport network is 
developed within an already commercialised central marketing 
system By contrast, commercialisation without intrasystem transport 
improvement amounts to a kind of false modernisation. 
The development of a modern transport system also has a positive effect by 
46 
speeding up the intensification cycle. It is regarded as a dominant factor shaping 
both rural market intensification and modernisation. Generally, the market towns 
which are connected to the central markets by new transportation routes are the 
first to be modernised. Conversely, those bypassed by the new facilities are 
unlikely to be modernised and may even cease to exist. According to Skinner 
(1965a:220): 
[I]n the ideal case all traditional standard markets will have died while all 
traditional higher -Ievel market towns will have been transformed into 
modern trading centres. At this point, the basic economic unit may be 
designated a modern trading system as opposed to a traditional marketing 
system. 
By drawing examples from different parts of China, such as Shanghai, Nanjing and 
Ningbo, Skinner (1965a:221 -6) concluded that `true modernisation' had progressed 
very little before 1949. Although transport improvement and agricultural 
commercialisation had permeated east China's entire agrarian economy, 
modernisation of markets had only: 
proceeded to the point where standard markets were extinct often only 
to the extent of [a] city's own intermediate marketing 
system sometimes to the extent of [a] city's own central market 
system (Skinner, 1965a:222). 
The influence of the administrative system on that of the market structure was rare 
before 1949. 
2.3 The marketing hierarchy and regional approach 
China's rural market system is regarded by Skinner (1964:32) as the basic Iocus of 
a peasant community. It is connected to similar local market structures horizontally 
and aligned to a higher level system vertically. Skinner (1977b) identifies eight 
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levels in the regional hierarchy during Imperial China. In ascending order, these 
levels were: (a) standard market; (b) intermediate market; (c) central market; (d) 
local city; (e) greater city; (f) regional city; (g) regional metropolis; and (h) central 
metropolis. Low -level systems were "nested within [higher lever systems, and so 
on in the manner suggested by central -place models" (Skinner, 1977c:286). Each 
system's hinterland was defined by population density and transport networks and 
was not constrained by administrative boundaries. These systems finally made up 
eight macroregions in China, they are: North China, Northwest China, Upper 
Yangtze (yangzi), Middle Yangtze, Lower Yangtze, Southeast Coast, Lingnan 
(where I conducted fieldwork research) and Yun -kwei (yungui) (Fig. 2.3). Each has 
a core, centring on one or more major commercial cities, and peripheries 
comprising far less commercialised outer hinterlands. 
2.4 Market Districts After 1949 
Local rural market systems underwent marked fluctuations after the establishment 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. As demonstrated by Skinner 
(1985b), these were caused by a persistent cycle of policy changes comprising 
liberal, radical and crisis phases. The cycle began when policies favouring market 
development were implemented during a liberal period. When the economic 
situation improved and enthusiasm grew, policies were radicalised. Invariably, 
these reforms triggered a crisis stage when production declined and peasant 
alienation increased. To tackle the impending crisis, liberal policies had to be re- 
implemented, and another cycle started. Between 1949 and 1977, Skinner 
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Fig. 2.3 Skinner's macroregions and metropolitan cities of Imperial China* 
Macroregions 
*Shadings indicate regional cores 
Source: Skinner (1977c:214) 
Metropolitan cities 
Source: Skinner (1977c:215) 
(19856:397) identified 11 cycles during which shifts in policies accounted for the 
recurrent repression and revival of China's rural markets. 
The first few years after the establishment of the PRC were regarded as a 
`liberal period'. No significant drawbacks were experienced by the traditional 
marketing system despite: (a) the establishment of state agents, such as state 
trading companies and supply and marketing co- operative, to plan and socialise 
rural trade; (b) the implementation of `unified purchase, unified sale' - state 
monopoly of the trading of all agricultural products; and (c) the dominance of state - 
owned enterprises in the wholesale market which led to the schedules for various 
types of markets being rigidly retained (Skinner, 1965b). Similar meeting patterns 
persisted and mobile traders maintained their standard market circuits. Intermediate 
markets and central markets continued their respective wholesale functions, though 
most firms were taken over by state companies (Skinner, 1965b:364). Although a 
more efficient transport system linked up industrial centres and central market 
towns, "efficiency within intermediate and standard marketing system was little 
improved" (Skinner, 1965b:366 -7). As argued by Skinner (1985b:395), it was 
during liberal phases "that China most closely resembles a traditional agrarian 
society going about its usual peasant business ". In other words, rural markets 
during the early years of PRC remained the same as those during the traditional 
period. 
Instead of growth and development, the market system suffered when hard- 
line policies were implemented during radical phases such as the Great Leap 
Forward (1958- 1961). People's Communes were established to organise 
agricultural production and consumption in a single department under the direct 
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guidance of state policies and trading organisations. Simultaneously, a series of 
anti -market measures was instituted such as the elimination of rural free markets, a 
prohibition on peasants marketing their surplus, and the prevention of peasants 
having private plots. Consequently, periodic markets were closed down, rural 
marketing activities were halted and commodity exchanges and distribution in most 
parts of China experienced "quickly induced near paralysis" (Skinner, 1965b:372). 
The attempt to use administrative measures to reorganise marketing 
activities was a total failure Skinner (1965b) maintained that the integration of the 
People' s Communes and the market structure failed because the new administrative 
unit was not aligned with the natural rural trading order. This was attributed to the 
function and size of communes. The reorganised marketing system together with 
the new administrative model, the People's Commune, had destroyed the natural 
mechanism of the marketing practice. As argued by Skinner (1964:31), "marketing 
structures, unlike administrative structures, take the form of interlocking 
networks ". In other words, "whereas administrative units are discrete throughout 
the hierarchy, each Iower -level unit belonging to only one unit at each ascending 
level, marketing systems are indiscrete at all levels except that of the standard 
market" (Skinner, 1985b:401 -402). By attempting to align the market system to the 
administrative hierarchy, the rural commercial exchange organisation was 
eliminated under the People' s Commune with ruinous effects. 
The size of People's Communes was driven by revolutionary zeal and the 
desire of local cadres for personal achievement. Consequently, most communes 
were `over- sized' because they exceeded the upper -limit of the standard market 
system. This led to an inefficient distribution of commodities and an overloading of 
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transport and storage facilities. At the same time, the formation of the People's 
Commune stimulated localism, or, in Skinner's (1965b) term, "local particularism ". 
Conflicts occurred between the various collective brigades formed by different 
villages. Together, these events demonstrated that the People's Commune had 
interfered with the normal mechanism and operation of China's rural marketing 
system. Also, the new structure failed to take into account variations in the 
character of different villages. The result was a complete breakdown of the natural 
rural market and the spatial division of labour. 
The influence of administrative factors on rural market development was 
much greater in socialist China. This stemmed from the state's attempts to use 
regulatory measures to manipulate economic activities. In fact, China, as a planned 
economy after 1949, had established a centralised administrative framework to 
manipulate every single aspect of the economy. Although Skinner (19856) did not 
mention administrative factors in his analysis of the policy cycle, different phases 
in the cycle can also be interpreted as different degrees of government control. 
Accordingly, in the radical phase, when the state's control was tight, market 
development was suppressed. Conversely, rural markets revived in the liberal 
period when state control was less secure. 
During the early 1960s, rural markets re- opened and the size of People's 
Communes was reduced so as to retrieve the `natural' standard market district. The 
marketing system, however, developed at a slower rate. This was because the re- 
opened markets were under the strict control of various committees formed by local 
cadres and other authorities (Skinner, 1965h:373). As a result, the commodities, 
prices, participants, and marketing practices were restricted. Owing to political and 
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social instability, the development of the rural market system during the mid -1960s 
and early 1970s was difficult to investigate. Repression of rural marketing for 
ideological reasons was the general trend during Mao's era (1949 -76) which led to 
an overall decline in numbers. Skinner (1985b:405) concluded: 
The replacement of periodic marketing in rural China by an efficient 
modern distributional infrastructure is, of course, a perfectly reasonable 
policy objective. The fundamental error of the radical programme for rural 
commodity distribution during the Maoist era was the persistent attempt to 
restrict, impair or eliminate rural periodic markets before a viable modem 
infrastructure was in place. 
State control, therefore, had repressed the development of rural markets, their 
evolution ceased and modernisation progressed extremely slowly throughout Mao's 
era. 
2.5 Market Changes Since 1978 
Economic reform since 1978 can be regarded as another liberal phase, when a 
"steady and methodical deradicalisation" occurred (Skinner, 1985a:32; 1985b:405). 
This period has witnessed the de- collectivisation of the farming system, the 
abolition of People's Communes, the relaxation of controls and the re- introduction 
of the household farming system; changes which have resulted in restimulation of 
peasants' incentives in agricultural production and brought positive effects to the 
rural market system. As argued by Skinner (1985b:410): 
[T]he transformation of higher -level periodic market towns into modern 
trading centres, described in my 1965[a] article as having begun in China 
after 1895 in the cores of China's most advanced regions, is under way 
once again. Even as traditional dynamics are playing themselves out in the 
reconstitution of marketing systems and their further extension into 
regional peripheries, modern change is at work in the cores of the more 
developed regions. 
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Whether the traditional marketing system has re- emerged in rural China is 
open to debate. Scholars, such as Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993) and Watson 
(1988, 1996), agree that rural markets have re- emerged. They have argued that 
reform measures, particularly price reform and the withdrawal of state 
interventions in commodity allocation, have stimulated their growth. According to 
Watson (1988) and Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993), the number of free markets 
doubled between 1978 and 1991, and their trading value increased from 125 
million yuan in 1978 to 838 million in 1989. Further, Watson (1988:17) argues that 
the interlocking hierarchy of the pre -modern Chinese marketing economy re- 
emerged in the reform era. However, despite the dramatic increase in the number of 
free markets and their trading value, a recent World Bank (1994:69 -99) report 
highlights that the state still plays a surprisingly dominant role in commodity 
distribution. It is, therefore, debatable whether the marketing system has been fully 
reconstituted, given the special political and economic contexts of the reform era in 
which the state and market mechanisms have been juxtaposed. 
Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993) state that the rural market system during 
the reform era has several distinctive characteristics. First, the juxtaposition of state 
intervention and market forces or, in general, a double -track system (shuang gui 
zhi), has emerged from the persistence of state intervention. State institutions, for 
instance, continue to play an important role in the agricultural marketing system. In 
some cases, they are both organiser and participant in the same market place (see 
Watson (1988) for examples). Consequently, although state units, collective units 
and individuals participate and compete in the market, competition is not 
necessarily even. Further, the state marketing and free marketing systems not only 
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coexist in retail markets, but also in wholesale ones. 
Secondly, the emergence of long- distance and specialised markets through 
the development of transport networks - particularly railway and road 
transportation - has fallen considerably behind economic growth during the reform 
era (World Bank, 1994). This new direction has placed extra pressure on existing 
transport networks and pushed governments at all levels to improve them. In this 
case, the rapid growth of different types of markets has accelerated modern 
transport development -a causal relationship different from Skinner's hypothesis. 
Finally, the function of the market has changed as rural markets are no Ionger 
places where peasants merely exchange their surplus (Watson, 1988; Findlay, 
Watson and Martin 1993). The market is regarded as a place to rise the income of 
peasants, to absorb rural surplus labour, to stimulate competition among different 
parties, and to increase domestic demand so as to maintain overall national 
economic growth (Watson, 1988; Renmin Rebao (People's Daily), 1998 October 
19). All of these features imply the emergence of a new marketing system which is 
very different from the traditional one. 
Another feature of China's market development during the 1980s has been 
the `commodity wars' between different regions which occurred at both viIIage, 
county and provincial levels. Local governments used various trade barriers, such 
as fees, fines, roadblocks or even force, to stop the 'export' of primary products so 
as to ensure the local processing of these products (World Bank, 1994:38). 
Throughout the 1980s, commodity wars, such as the `wool war', the `tea war' and 
the `grain war', and other small -scale interregional trade conflicts, were reported in 
different parts of China (Watson et al., 1989; Forster, 1991; mang et al., 1991; 
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Watson and Findlay, 1992; World Bank, 1994). These observations imply market 
development is constrained by unstable factors brought about by reform. As long as 
trade barriers exist, it is misleading to conclude that an integrated market system - 
like the traditional system described by Skinner - has revived in China. 
Skinner's (1985b) model is therefore only partly applicable in the reform 
era, despite his argument that the market development process described in the 
mid -sixties articles has been reactivated. Most of Skinner's (1964) contentions 
were based on the analysis of a closed rural system within a small -scale peasant 
economy. As noted, his assertions highlighted (a) the importance of demand 
density in determining the size of market systems; (b) the three functional levels of 
market towns; and (c) the dominant role of transport in market modernisation. In 
the traditional system, peasants were self- sufficient rather than dependent on pure 
commodity exchanges. Markets, for instance, were places they could exchange 
agricultural surplus, and specialisation only occurred within a very narrow range of 
crops. As anticipated, once the closed system was broken down by the development 
of industrialisation, urbanisation and inter- regional trade, a new market structure 
was formed with very different functions and mechanisms. Apart from transport, 
other factors, such as population growth, commodity specialisation and trading 
which played a minor role in Skinner's (1964, 1965a, h) analysis, now play a more 
active role. 
Another major concern of Skinner's study of rural markets is the impact of 
the administrative system. Although administrative centres were closely integrated 
with market towns in pre -communist China, the role played by the state was very 
minor (Skinner, 1985a). An extreme development in the state's role was witnessed 
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in Mao's era when the People's Communes were established, paralysing rural 
marketing activities. Two key questions arise: to what extent do government 
regulations or administrative factors exist in the era of economic reform; and what 
have been their impact on rural market development? 
One reason for the failure of the People's Commune was its attempt to 
control everything. The extent of state control in China has always captured the 
attention of academics and heated discussions have arisen. While some scholars, 
such as Naughton (1995b), have argued that economic reform has weakened the 
state's power, others such as Zweig (1992) and Shue (1988, 1995) have contended 
that state authority has remained unchanged. Economic reform has contributed to 
the combination of the administrative and entrepreneurial roles of local 
governments (Oi, 1992, 1995; Unger and Chan, 1996). Also, administrative 
measures have been used to facilitate local economic growth (Blecher and Shue, 
1996; Marton, 1996). Further, Chung and Tang (1997) have asserted that local 
governments have used administrative boundaries to protect their own interests. 
Two further questions are raised: what has been the impact of administrative 
factors on the marketing system; and is it any different from that of the Maoist era? 
This is analysed in subsequent chapters. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Skinner's thesis of market development has been challenged by a number of new 
features during the reform era. As noted, the new features include: (a) juxtaposition 
of the market mechanism and state intervention; (b) the growth of markets despite 
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state intervention; (c) the changing functions of rural markets; (d) regional trade 
conflicts and barriers; (e) the new causal relationship between market and transport 
development; (f) the influx of foreign investment; and (g) the rapid development of 
rural industrialisation. Although some of these have been addressed by Watson 
(1988, 1996), and Findlay, Watson and Martin (1993), their studies are dominated 
by economic perspectives. Accordingly, they focus on the growth of various kinds 
of markets and their relationships with the state apparatus to sketch the 
development of the market economy in the reform era. Like most economic studies, 
they neglect spatial factors and their effects on market development during this 
period. A detailed study of the market system, its spatial distribution, hierarchy, 
and relationships with the administrative hierarchy has still to be undertaken. 
In short, Skinner's studies provide a useful framework for understanding 
market development. However, the complexity and rapid changes in political 
economy during the reform era have created a new context and generated a 
different set of spatial contingencies and causal effects. Consequently, the 
explanatory power of Skinner's model, which was established during the 1960s, 
has to be re- examined through new research on China's rural marketing system, its 
patterns and problems during the transformation from a hard -line planned economy 
to a `socialist market economy'. 
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Chapter 3 
China's rural market development since Skinner: 
Has the traditional market system been revived? 
Economic reform since 1979 has been regarded as a `third revolution' in China's 
countryside (Garnaut and Ma, 1996). The abolition of the People's Communes and 
the re- implementation of household fanning systems gave peasants more control 
over production and boosted agricultural output. Grain and cotton yields reached a 
record high in 1984. Other major crops, such as oiI crops, beets and sugar cane, also 
recorded over 10 per cent growth between 1978 and 1984. This substantial 
expansion created huge surpluses and pushed the state to liberalise trading and 
marketing activities, which had been attacked as the `tail of capitalism' during 
Mao's era. 
The revival of China's rural markets in the reform era is attributed by some 
scholars to the unleashing of market forces following the withdrawal of state 
control. This argument is unconvincing because it oversimplifies what has 
happened in China. Economic reform should be regarded as a redistribution of 
political power between the state and local governments, with more control 
decentralised to the local level; a process which has changed the inter -relationship 
between state and local governments and created a new context during the reform 
era. Since many studies have overlooked this changing political economy, they fail 
to explain why the extent of market liberalisation has varied between and within 
different regions and why market problems have arisen in some areas and not 
others. Moreover, given the tradition of intervention in socialist economies, it is 
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doubtful that a traditional system - driven by market forces - would be entirely 
revived. 
This chapter examines China's rural market development during the reform 
period by employing the contextual approach and spatial concepts discussed in 
Chapter 1. The changing political economy since 1979 and its impact on rural 
market growth and development is examined, as is the government's role in 
establishing rural markets, and their subsequent operation and development. This 
chapter argues that the current market system is different from the traditional one as 
described by Skinner. 
3.1 The spatial contingent effects: China's changing political economy 
China's economic reform, which is regarded as the most "significant global event 
in the final quarter of this century" (Lees, 1997:11), began in 1978, two years after 
Mao Zedong's death. It is now understood as a process rather than a single event. 
At that time, China's economy had been plagued by low productivity, inefficiency, 
and shortages for decades. Between 1950 and 1979, industrial productivity had 
declined by an average annual rate of 2.75 per cent (Lees, 1997:16). In the 
agricultural sector, grain production fluctuated between 250 and 282 million tonnes 
during the period 1971 and 1976 (SSB, 1989: 367 -8). Initially, a series of 
adjustments was made to correct the distortions that prevailed under the Maoist 
development model, namely, an autarkic system ideologically hostile to the western 
world. As noted, these adjustments included the abolition of the People's 
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Communes and implementation of the household responsibility system. At this 
stage, a master plan and set of objectives had not been formulated. As reflected in 
Deng Xiaoping's slogan `mo zhe shitou guohe (crossing the river by groping for 
stepping stones)', a clear goal - the bank of the river - was lacking. 
The early economic restructuring was successful (Ash, 1996; Huang, 1998). 
Between 1976 and 1984, grain production increased from 282 to 407 million tonnes 
- an average annual growth rate of 15 per cent (SSB, 1989:368). By 1985, the 
number of rural markets had doubled. Between 1978 and 1985, market turnover 
value soared from 12.5 billion yuan to 63.2 billion yuan (SSB -GMSD, 1999:233). 
In the industrial sector, the annual growth rate of gross industrial output value 
(GVIO) also expanded from 2 per cent in 1976 to 16.3 per cent in 1984 (SSB, 
1989:376). Significantly, economic development had not only increased 
productivity and incentives in rural areas, but also reshaped individual attitudes and 
expectations at all levels of society. In turn, these outcomes encouraged the state to 
extensively restructure other sectors of the economy. Although these reforms were 
initiated by a series of ad hoc adjustments, since the early 1990s, measures have 
been introduced to resolve specific issues, particularly the need to intensify 
competition, increase efficiency, combat corruption, eliminate trade barriers and 
protect property rights. 
The reforms, as discussed by Rawski (1999:142), have involved "an 
extended process and replete with interaction and feedback" between the central 
and local states, government authorities and civil society, enterprises and workers, 
and distributors and consumers. The process is dynamic, with frequent changes in 
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the relationships between actors, and different causal mechanisms and contingent 
effects being generated. These are subjected to further change when new measures 
are introduced. Rural markets, therefore, have been developed in a complex and 
dynamic environment. Before addressing China's rural market development, it is 
imperative to have a clear understanding of the country's changing political 
economy. 
The Chinese state during the pre- reform period was generally regarded as a 
`police state', characterised by state intervention in economic, social and other 
realms of life through "techniques of hierarchical observation, normalisation and 
examination to produce governable socialist persons" (Tang, 1995:5). 
Economically, the state owned almost all productive enterprises and administered 
their investment, output, use of technology, distribution of commodities, 
appointment of personnel and the salaries of workers, through a multi -level 
administrative hierarchy. The supply, demand, price, and flow of commodities were 
concomitantly manipulated by the state. Socially, the household registration system 
was implemented to control population size and mobility. An individual's 
education, social welfare, work opportunities, marriage, allocation of grain and 
other daily necessities were all controlled through this system.' In short, every 
aspect of life was covered by centrally imposed policies. 
Whether this `police state' has continued to exist in the reform era is 
See Guo and Liu (1990) for a detailed study on the issue. 
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debatable. Economically, the success of rural reform, the rapid economic growth of 
core rural areas, and the shrinkage of the planning system have diminished the 
state's capacity for economic control (Naughton, 1995a, b). Price control has been 
relaxed and distribution channels have been opened to include private agencies. 
Gradually, the allocation of goods has been removed from the planning authorities, 
and special agricultural and industrial products markets have been established. A 
study by the World Bank (1994:xiii, 193) shows the state was responsible for less 
than 21 per cent of retail sales in 1991, in 1993 only 10 per cent of industrial goods 
were subjected to state allocation. As well as the dramatic growth of rural markets, 
special wholesale markets for grain, rice, sugar and poultry were established in 
Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Yujian and Wuxi cities respectively (World Bank, 
1994:102). Further, state control over personal freedom and community life has 
diminished (Shue, 1995). The household registration system no longer constrains 
an individual's education, career choices, and movements (Gu and Li, 1995; 
Mallee, 1995). Peasants are permitted to migrate to the cities as long as they 
provide their own food. University graduates are also allowed to work in rural 
enterprises without losing their urban residence and privileges. 
Despite the above changes, some scholars argue that state control has not 
altered during the reform period (Shue, 1995; Huang, 1996a; Zweig, 1997; 
Muldavin, 1998). Examining the central -local relationship, Chung (1995:502) 
argues that decentralisation of power has not "necessarily and automatically" 
weakened the state's control. These scholars point to its hold over major heavy 
industries, intimate ties with some enterprises, control over import and export 
licences and quotas, and monopoly procurement of cotton, tobacco and some local, 
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special agricultural products. Mastel (1997) even regards the continuation of five - 
year planning -a unique product of the socialist economic system - as an indicator 
of China's uncompromising stance against economic liberalisation. The one -child 
policy is a good illustration of the state's control over social matters, and 
politically, it still manipulates personnel appointments in key governmental 
positions. Thus, though state control has diminished in certain economic and social 
areas during the reform era, state intervention has not been totally withdrawn. 
Essentially, the government has shifted from direct to indirect surveillance 
(Tang and Chung, 2000). Although privatisation has been promoted in most state - 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the industrial sector, ownership is retained in joint 
ventures and private companies with intimate ties to the state. For instance, the 
Ministry of Chemical Industry owns and operates a number of chemical plants 
which have been granted import and export licences, and assigned quotas (Mastel, 
1997:68 -9). Through this mechanism, the import and export of particular chemical 
products have been manipulated by certain plants with close state connections. 
Also, distribution channels have been freed but the state's control still persists 
through joint- venture arrangements, and it continues to play a crucial role in the 
allocation of commodities, particularly producer goods. Moreover, state authorities 
continue to intervene in the economy through the control of the banking system, 
taxation and loans. A double track system (shuan gui zhi), which refers to the 
juxtaposition of state control and market forces and planned and unplanned 
channels, has emerged. In the agricultural sector, all rural markets are operated and 
organised by the Industry and Commerce Management Bureau (ICMB). Peasants 
are allowed to sell most of their products in the market at prices set by supply and 
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demand. However, special products, such as cotton, tobacco, silkworm cocoons, 
and pine resin, cannot be sold through rural markets. 
Although reform has not dismantled the state's control over the economy, a 
`localisation' process has occurred in which the government's command structure 
has been decentralised to local government (Chung and Tang, 1997). Reform 
measures, such as the delegation of decision -making power and fiscal responsibility 
systems, have redefined relationships between: (a) central and IocaI governments; 
(b) between local governments at all levels; and (c) between different local political 
and economic institutions. Local government is no longer the state's sole 
redistribution unit which involves either collecting commodities from the local 
areas or allocating them from a central agency. Clearly, the reforms have re- 
interpreted local government's tax revenues, the ability to retain profits, property 
rights and authority to allocate resources. Consequently, a considerable number of 
plants and properties have been transferred to local control. Local government 
investment and financial management powers have been reinforced through the 
fiscal responsibility system, local banks and other credit unions are now under their 
control. Moreover, local government administrative territories and economic 
hinterlands have been expanded by the implementation of city -leading- counties (shi 
guan xian) (Chung and Tang, 1996). These arrangements have not only reinforced 
local government administrative powers, but also stimulated them to expand into 
activities previously constrained by capital and material shortages during the pre - 
reform period. While these reforms have prompted local governments to improve 
their revenues, they have also increased their desire to intervene in local economic 
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affairs. 
Intervention has been spurred by both economic and social factors. 
Economically, decollectivisation has stripped local government revenues and 
reduced the salaries of cadres provided by the People's Communes. The budgets of 
local governments have been further constrained by reforms, forcing them to seek 
other financial sources to meet budget needs imposed by higher levels of 
government. As any profit and revenue over the assigned amount is retained by 
local government, maximising the returns of district enterprises offers an 
opportunity to boost income. Socially, local government also depends on these 
businesses to contribute towards community employment, social welfare and 
housing. All of these have been sensitive factors during the reform era. Social and 
political unrest will result if these objectives are not attained. 
Although the autonomy of firms has been increased by the decentralisation 
of economic decision- making power, their subordinate relationship with 
government remains unchanged. A mechanism for government intervention still 
persists. As enterprises depend on the state for markets, supply of resources, 
investment and subsidies, they do not necessarily resist intervention by local 
government. A `dual dependence' association between the two has developed 
(Walder, 1995; Jiang and Hall, 1996). By intervening in the affairs of local 
enterprises and other aspects of the economy, local government has developed a 
dual role as administrator and entrepreneur (Oi, 1992, 1995, 1999b; Nee, 1992). 
The term `local corporatism' has been coined to describe this development (Oi, 
1992). 
66 
Several studies have discussed local corporatism. Nee and Su's (1996) 
study of Xiamen city - one of the 14 coastal open cities - details this concept. In 
the 1990s, Xiamen's government and 3 local, collectively -owned firms established 
a joint investment company to promote exports. The government not only 
contributed 60 per cent of the company's capital investment, but also appointed the 
board of management. According to Nee and Su (1996:120), the Xiamen city 
government's share in these `window companies' has ranged from 10 to 100 per 
cent. Moreover, the Xiamen city government insists that local banks grant loans to 
these businesses and acts as a guarantor to raise capital in both domestic and 
international capital markets. 
The overlapping of administrative and economic roles is more obvious at 
lower levels of governmental administration - township and village. Generally, 
cadres in townships and villages retain the role they played in the People's 
Communes, managing collectively owned enterprises and distributing resources to 
villagers (Watson, 1992:182 -88). Consequently, it is not surprising to see the local 
party secretary or bureau head as the general manager of township and village 
enterprises (TV Es). Other scholars, notably Blecher and Shue (1996), Qian and 
Stiglitz (1996), Marton (1996) and Brown (1998), also provide evidence of this 
mutual dependence. For instance, the involvement of local government in major 
entrepreneurial decisions and the mobilisation of resources and capital in shaping 
enterprise development in various parts of China. 
Amalgamation of the local government's administrative and economic roles 
has significant consequences for China's regional economic development. Tension 
67 
between resource -exporting provinces and manufacturing provinces has been 
intensified. During the pre -reform period, a spatial division of labour between 
interior and coastal provinces was established (Yang, 1997). These interior 
provinces, which are rich in natural resources, specialised in exporting raw 
materials whereas coastal provinces concentrated on manufacturing. The allocation 
and distribution of raw materials and manufacturing goods between regions were 
strictly manipulated by the state's distribution and material apparatus through 
`planned prices'.2 Generally, the pricing system, however, has under -valued raw 
materials and over- valued manufactured and consumer goods.3 In other words, 
provinces exporting raw materials were underpaid for these resources and 
overcharged for imported manufacturing goods. Under this unequal exchange, huge 
amounts of coal, crude oil and other materials were extracted from Xinjiang, 
Shanxi, Yunnan and other provinces. Conversely, Shanghai - the largest 
manufacturing centre - and other industrial cities benefited from this practice. 
Decentralisation of decision -making power has increased the role of local 
government in local affairs. Given the unequal exchange and financial pressures 
stemming from fiscal reforms, raw material exporting localities have intensified 
their efforts to establish local resource -processing industries. This has given rise to 
the `zichan, ziyong, zixiao (local production, local use and local sale)' in the wool 
producing areas of Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia to stop the 
2 The `planned price' was set by the state under the system of `unified purchase and unified sale', 
which was implemented in 1953. 
3 The pricing system's objective was to increase state accumulation. By reducing the production cost 
of the industrial sector, net profits and revenue to the state were increased. Consequently, interior 
resources were pumped to the coastal area through this system. 
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leakage of assets (Yang, 1997:69). Similar situations have been observed in other 
areas such as Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang and Shandong. These actions have 
affected factories in net importing areas, which are finding it more difficult to 
obtain the required raw materials and markets. As competition has intensified, 
tensions have increased between local governments, some of which have not 
hesitated to protect their interests by renewing administrative protection measures 
prevalent during the pre -reform period, and inherent in the administrative system of 
the reform era. These have included taxes, embargoes, roadblocks and even military 
action. 
The outcome of government intervention is market fragmentation. This 
phenomenon has stemmed from `commodity wars' in different parts of China over 
raw materials such as wool, tea, tobacco leaves, silk and cotton. Although these 
activities lessened during the 1990s, other administrative measures have been used 
to protect markets. A detailed case study of this is given in Chapter 6. The prime 
reason for market fragmentation is the relaxation of central control. As the 
governmental command structure has been decentralised, the administrative and 
entrepreneurial roles of local government have been blended. Local governments 
have not hesitated to use administrative measures to protect their interests when 
these are jeopardised. 
Regional conflicts have not only occurred between material export and 
manufacturing areas, but also between different administrative units. Driven by the 
need to attain high profits and revenues, local governments launch projects which 
promise high returns within their borders. Assembly lines for consumer goods have 
69 
been imported extensively. In the 1980s, duplication was witnessed in tape 
recorder, electric fan, colour television, washing machine and refrigerator 
manufacturing in different cities and counties. This situation continued into the 
1990s with most investment being replicated in automobile assembly lines, 
petrochemical industries, video -CD player manufacturing and `development zones 
(kaifa qu)'. Again and again, administrative boundaries have been used effectively 
to protect the local economy - particularly when there are shortages in the supply of 
raw material and when the central government implements tight measures to slow 
down the over -heated economy and inflation. 
Consequently, China's regional economy has taken on a cellular structure. 
Each `cell' comprises the administrative zone of local governments, such as a 
province, city, county and town. Within each `cell' there is a small empire of 
similar industrial and economic structures. Instead of integration and cooperation, 
these administrative zones make their own independent policy, compete vigorously 
and are hostile to each other. A special `administrative -zone economy' has thus 
been created (Liu and Shu, 1996). By 1998, there were more than 3,000 cities and 
over 2,000 counties in China. This administrative -zone economy implies that 
China's market is divided into thousands of small pieces, despite the state's attempt 
to co- ordinate activities as if `the country is a single chessboard' (quan guo yi pan 
qi). 
The administrative 
-zone economy cannot be seen merely as the spatial 
expression of local corporatism. It is also the product of China's half -baked reforms 
a great leap in economic matters but only a tiny step in political aspects. The great 
70 
leap in economic reform has contributed to remarkable changes in the rural, 
industrial and financial sectors, and the noted formation of local corporatism. The 
tiny step in political reform, however, has retained Mao's administrative hierarchy. 
Consequently, the governing mechanism inherited from the reform era still ensures 
the operation of the administrative -zone economy. 
The administrative hierarchy is probably the most significant measure 
established in Mao's development model, which merged the country's political and 
economic hierarchies. Accordingly, there was only one ranking in China - the 
political- cum -economic hierarchy regarded by Skinner (1964) as an `artificial' 
system. Political and administrative functions were over -emphasised in Mao's 
hierarchy while economic concerns were undermined. Under Mao's system, all 
central places, such as cities and towns, were regarded as administrative bodies 
rather than economic centres. `Cities' and `towns' thus became designated 
administrative organisations and levels of government in the hierarchy. All central 
and local governmental authorities, such as police, procuratorial, legal and judicial 
departments, and People's Congress, were situated there, although there were no 
walls and a moat surrounding cities like those in Imperial China.4 
The above situation also explains why the term `city' has been so confusing 
in China. First, the city is not only a central place in the economy but also a level of 
government. Secondly, there are different levels of city government, such as 
municipality, prefecture -level city and county -level city (Fig. 3.1). As 
4 Please refer to Fei (1953:95 -104) for a comparison between political and economic centres in 
Imperial China. 
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administrative activities are paramount they determine the city's economic 
functions and powers; higher ranks in the hierarchy possess the greatest power. For 
example, the major difference between prefecture -level and county -level cities has 
been that the former enjoy the authority of promulgating decrees but the latter do 
not (Pu and Zhu, 1993). Moreover, prefecture -level cities are entitled to establish 
urban districts (shi qu) within their jurisdiction, but not county -level cities. The 
population within such districts is regarded as an `urban population', which enjoys 
better social welfare and funding from the central government than its rural 
counterpart, despite the malfunctioning of the household registration system during 
the reform period. 
The political- cum -economic system reached its extreme expression when 
the People's Communes were established in rural China. Although most proved to 
be disasters and were finally abolished, the practices of administrative control have 
persisted in urban areas. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were between 170 and 
180 cities in China, demonstrating that the number of urban administrative units 
were maintained at about the same level before economic reform commenced in 
1979. 
Reform has done very little to separate the political- cum -economic 
hierarchy. Among the 31 provinces and autonomous regions in China, only Hohhot 
city - the provincial capital (political centre) of Inner Mongolia - is not the 
province's primacy city in terms of economic indicators. The other 29 provincial 
capital cities still exhibit the strong integration of political and economic functions. 
A significant number of economic central places have been assigned the 
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Fig. 3.1 China's administrative hierarchy since 1982 
administrative status of city or town to accommodate the rapid development of new 
urban areas.5 For example, when the status of `city' is granted to a county, the 
amount of tax revenues retained for local construction is expanded from 5 per cent 
to 7 per cent (Liu, 1991). Also, local government is endowed with greater power in 
allocating local goods and materials, approving land uses and adjusting prices. 
Moreover, investment from the central government is increased and grants and 
loans offered. Thus, economic benefits are closely related to administrative status. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a rapid increase in cities and 
designated towns. In 1978, there were only 193 cities; by 1997, stimulated by the 
reform era's economic liberalisation, the number had soared to 668 (SSB, 1998:3). 
The total of designated towns has also increased from 2,851 in 1979 to 7,511 in 
1985, through 18,400 in 1997 (SSB, 1998:17). Distinctive status, such as special 
economic zones and separately planned cities (jihua danlie chengshi), were also 
used to nominate economic central places which were neither primacy cities in a 
political sense nor provincial capitals. These developments have given special 
status areas economic decision- making powers equivalent to those of provincial- 
level units. Designation as a city or town means an economic central place has been 
`institutionalised' and becomes part of the administration system. The institutional 
process has not only allotted cities and towns political functions but also endowed 
them with a certain level of economic discretion. In the era of economic reform, 
these powers have awarded cities and towns certain privileges, including the ability 
5 Based on this observation, Chung and Tang (1997) have argued that China's urbanisation is a 
totalisation process, in which more and more space is involved into the administrative system and 
subject to state control. 
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to seek foreign investment. These events explain why economic central places have 
to be promoted administratively before they can undertake major reform initiatives. 
Concomitantly, if the economy of a rural county expands sufficiently, the rural 
county is promoted to the rank of `city'. 
The political and economic systems are regarded as a single hierarchy with 
overlapping spheres of interest under the administrative -zone economy. Over time 
the administrative system takes precedence over the economic one. The zone's 
boundaries also encompass its economic hinterland, and within this jurisdiction, 
local government has absolute power. This political- cum -economic structure has 
several implications for China's regional economic development, including: (a) the 
alignment of administrative with economic central places; (b) the dominance of 
local government within the designated administrative zone; (c) the paucity of 
interaction between administrative zones due to competition and protectionism; and 
(d) the plight of residents in border areas due to their peripheral location. 
Thus the administrative -zone economy is a unique product of China's 
gradual reforms, marked by the decentralisation of power and `half -baked reform'. 
Decentralisation has redefined the relationship between the state and local 
government, and a significant number of enterprises are now subordinate to local 
government. Consequently, the local government's financial power is reinforced, 
which, in turn, has increased local government's desire to intervene in the local 
economy. Further the half -baked reforms have meant that high -level government 
intervention has also been retained because the hierarchical administrative system 
has remained unchanged during the reform era. Administrative -zone economy is 
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also regarded as the product of rudimentary market forces. The juxtaposition of 
state power and market forces have enabled local government to use administrative 
measures to interfere in economic activities. Conflicts between state control and 
market forces will not cease until a mature market is developed. However, given 
China's gradual reforms, a relatively stable balance of state and market powers has 
been created. This situation, according to Liu and Shu (1996), has contributed to 
the stability of the administrative -zone economy. 
3.2 Rural market development in the China context 
Commercial activities in China have experienced considerable growth during the 
reform period. During the early 1980s, the number of market places grew because 
restrictions on trading in agricultural products were abolished and non -state 
agencies and individuals were allowed to participate. A remarkable expansion in 
the number of market places occurred between 1984 and 1989 with the abolition of 
unified purchases of agricultural sideline products and recurrent increases in state 
purchase prices (Table 3.1 and 3.2). During this period, market turnover value 
recorded an average annual rise of 26.5 billion yuan (Cao, 1996). Tn prosperous 
coastal areas, the traditional periodic markets have been replaced by daily markets. 
Strong growth in market and commercial activities continued in the 1990s. 
Between 1978 and 1997, the number of market places had expanded threefold to 
87,105, and with turnover value increased 137 times to 1742.5 billion yuan (SSB, 
1999:553). Over 63 per cent of the country's total retail sales of consumer goods 
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Table 3.1 The number of rural markets established since the reform era 
Year Total no. of 
markets 
i0 +© 
Urban 
Oi 
Rural 
CZ 
1979 38,993 2,226 36,767 
1980 40,809 2,919 37,890 
1981 43,013 3,298 39,715 
1982 44,775 3,591 41,184 
1983 48,003 4,488 43,515 
1984 56,500 6,144 50,356 
1985 61,337 8,013 53,324 
1986 67,610 9,701 57,909 
1987 69,683 10,908 58,775 
1988 71,359 12,181 59,178 
1989 72,130 13,111 59,019 
1990 72,579 13,106 59,473 
1991 74,675 13,891 60,784 
1992 79,188 14,510 64,678 
1993 83,001 16,450 66,551 
1994 84,463 17,890 66,569 
1995 82,892 19,892 63,000 
1996 85,391 20,832 64,559 
1997 87,105 22,352 64,753 
Source: SSB (1999:553), SSB -GMSD (1999:233). 
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Table 3.2 Rural market turnover value, 1979 -1997 (in billion yuan) 
Year Total turnover Urban Rural 
value O 
OO+© 
1979 18.3 L2 17.1 
1980 23.5 2.3 21.2 
1981 28.7 3.4 25.3 
1982 32.8 4.1 28.7 
1983 37.9 5.1 32.8 
1984 45.7 7.5 38.2 
1985 63.2 12.0 51.2 
1986 90.7 24.4 66.2 
1987 115.8 34.7 81.1 
1988 162.1 54.5 107.5 
1989 197.4 72.4 125.0 
1990 216,8 83.8 133.0 
1991 262.2 108.0 154.3 
1992 353.0 158.3 194.7 
1993 534.3 256.2 278.1 
1994 898.2 457.0 441.2 
1995 1159.0 617.6 541.4 
1996 1469.5 788.3 681.2 
1997 1742.5 946.9 795.6 
Source: SSB (1999:553), SSB -GMSD (1999:233). 
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were derived from market turnover values. Among the 87,105 market places in 
1997, 51,158 were classified as `comprehensive' providing daily necessities such as 
foodstuffs, clothes and household articles (SSB -GMSD, 1999:238). Specialised 
industrial and agricultural product markets accounted for 3,964 and 7,928 market 
places respectively (SSB -GMSD, 1999:238). Thus the market places have replaced 
state distribution agencies and become major exchange channels. It appears that the 
rural market system has revived. 
Despite the dramatic rise in the number of market places, and value of 
turnover, at the national level, the growth of rural markets is still far below the 
equivalent urban areas. Table 3.1 shows that the average annual increases in the 
number of urban and rural markets were 9 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively, 
over the period 1985 -1997. During the same period, the value of market turnover in 
urban areas increased at an average annual rate of 46 per cent. Conversely, only 26 
per cent of annual growth were recorded in rural areas (Table 3.2). Given the bulk 
of the expansion in both numbers and turnover in the market places was in the 
urban areas, a substantial development gap between the two is indicated. With rural 
areas accounting for about one -third of China' s landscape and over 70 per cent of 
its population, rural markets are indeed underdeveloped, despite the liberalisation 
of circulation of goods, and local incentives. 
A comparison of Skinner's estimate of the number of Chinese rural markets 
with current official figures provides further confirmation of the lack of 
development in these markets. Skinner (1965a:226) used a geometric model to 
show that in 1948 there would be have been 65,000 `standard markets' in China; 
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this figure was then adjusted downward by 10 per cent, to 58,555, after taking the 
modernisation of markets into account. The official figure for 1997 was 64,753; 
thus both the Skinner figures and the official figures are of the same order of 
magnitude. If both figures are relied upon, the rate of growth in the rural markets 
over the five decades (1948 -1997) is less than 3 per cent per decade, or 0.6 per cent 
per annum. The increase in rural population, on the other hand, was 72 per cent 
between 1953 -1997 - from 503 to 866 million -a growth rate of 1.25 per cent per 
annum. Since market growth depends upon population increase, there is clearly a 
great discrepancy between the respective growth figures. 
The underdevelopment of rural markets can be explained by local 
government behaviour under the administrative -zone economy. Due to financial 
pressures induced by the fiscal responsibility system, it has concentrated its efforts 
on the industrial sector and property development because these generate larger 
profits and revenues. Generally, facilities that support agricultural production, such 
as water conservation, have been ignored and local government contributions to the 
agricultural sector slashed. In 1997, local government provided only 7 per cent of 
total expenditure towards agricultural production. This figure is lower than the 
central government's input to the agricultural sector, which was 9 per cent of total 
expenditure in 1997 (SSB, 1998:277 -9). However, the real amount is even smaller 
than these figures because local governments divert some of their grants to other 
purposes. 
As noted, decentralisation has not only given local governments with more 
powers, but also has expanded their territories. While there is less central 
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government involvement during the reform period, rural areas are subject to more 
direct and powerful controls from local governments. Rural resources have been 
extracted through various vertical and horizontal channels established during the 
reform era to generate profits in specific sectors (Chung, 1994). The `white slips 
(bai tiro)' provide the best example. These papers of debt (IOUs) have been given 
to peasants by the local authorities instead of paying them cash for their grain; in 
many cases, peasants eventually receive nothing. Another example is the heavy 
burden of taxation and local levies. Between 1994 and 1997, the `big three' burdens 
- agricultural taxes, assigned quotas and village allotment payments - accounted 
for about 8 per cent of a peasant's cash income. (CASS -RDI and SSB- RSESG, 
1998:15). Yet this is only the national average, in more remote areas or in counties 
renowned for their poor economic performance, the proportion is even higher. 
Other instances have included the requisition of farmland for profit -making 
activities such as property development and the creation of industrial zones. 
The slashing of agricultural inputs and leaking of rural resources have had 
significant impacts on rural market development. Lower agricultural inputs mean 
that there is insufficient capital to establish rural markets which explains why most 
of them are old with primitive and temporary facilities. The decrease in government 
inputs to the agricultural sector has affected not only the establishment of markets, 
but also the production and income of peasants. Since rural markets have a close 
and direct relationship with peasant production, any decline in productivity and 
income will reduce consumption. Eventually, rural commercial activities and 
market development suffer, in turn, affecting the sale of agricultural surpluses by 
peasants. In the 1990s, many agricultural products have experienced large -scale 
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`selling problems' throughout China. Indeed, recent Chinese evaluations of rural 
market development have pinpointed the importance of productivity and income, 
and their impact on the growth of rural markets (Chen, 1997; Gong, 1998; Han, 
1998; Zheng and Zheng, 1998). These studies argue that the low consumption rate 
of peasants is the major reason for the underdevelopment of rural markets in China. 
As their real consumption expenditure increased by only 0.4 per cent in 1997, it is 
very difficult to expect rural markets to flourish in the countryside within a short 
period of time (Han, 1998:6). Increasing the income of peasants is regarded, 
therefore, as the state's top priority to promote a flourishing rural market. 
Under the administrative -zone economy's political- cum -economic structure, 
the establishment of rural markets is determined primarily by administrative 
factors. Rural market places under the present system must have market licences 
issued by the Industry and Commerce Management Bureau (ICMB), a state 
authority that manages all commercial activities, including rural market 
development. The licence system implies that any market places and street peddling 
outside the system are regarded as illegal and suppressed by the Bureau. It also 
highlights that Skinner's (1964) `natural' marketing system, which was formed 
solely by market forces, no longer exists. Under the licence system, there must be a 
bona fide licence holder or owner. According to Shi (1995), there are five types of 
market ownership. They are: (a) state; (b) departmental; (c) enterprise; (d) private; 
and (e) joint (by the department and other parties). The first two are generally 
regarded as state -owned, and include over 90 per cent of rural retail markets and a 
considerable number of wholesale and specialised markets. Enterprise and privately 
owned markets are usually found at the village level, particularly in coastal areas 
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where both rural and township enterprises are flourishing. In the countryside, the 
majority of rural markets are owned by the local ICMB, meaning that not only is 
the Bureau the supervisor of rural markets, but also their owner and operator (Plate 
3.1). Establishment of markets, selection of sites, requisition of land, construction 
of sheds and stalls, leasing of stalls, levying of fees, and management, are all 
manipulated by the Bureau. It is also known to lease the most desirable stalls to 
individuals with whom it has close relationships. 
The intimate connection between the ICMB and rural markets suggests a 
Bureau must set up before market places can be established. As the Bureau is an 
administrative unit found at different levels of government, such as provinces, 
cities, counties and towns, with various size and power, the attached outlets display 
a range of scales and functions. However, rural markets may also be established in 
townships (xíang) which are not recognised as a designated government level 
within the administrative system. In this case, they are subordinated to the ICMB 
located in a designated town. This practice demonstrates that there can be no 
natural growth of market places under China's political- cum -economic system. 
Consequently, the market hierarchy reflects the organisation structure of the 
ICMB and levels of local government. In general, small markets - or standard 
markets in Skinner's (1964) terms - are established in designated towns, although 
this is not always the case. Many standard markets are periodic markets which 
perform only simple exchange and retailing functions for peasants. A town's 
population size is not a major criterion, irrespective of whether it has a population 
of 5,000 or 30,000 it is served by one rural market. The town's administrative 
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territory is also the market's hinterland. Where designated towns are town - 
government seats, there could be two rural markets. Usually, the second one is an 
intermediate large -scale daily market with a greater variety of commodities and 
services, particularly high -order goods. It would also provide basic wholesale 
functions for standard markets. Central markets are established in provincial 
capitals, usually a prefecture -level city. In some cities, wholesale markets are also 
present. Such establishments demonstrate that the rural market hierarchy is still 
closely aligned to the administrative one. 
At the local level, for administrative purposes, rural markets are always 
placed in the town- government seat which houses different government bureau and 
offices. Precisely, market places are always adjacent to the TCMB office, the 
authority which controls their development (Plate 3.2). This position enables 
Bureau officials to patrol rural markets during market days and collect fees from 
peasants. Although the town -government seat has a concentration of non- 
agricultural population, it is not an optimum situation for peasants as often they 
have to travel long distances to visit the market place. This problem is compounded 
in the hilly or mountainous areas where transport facilities are primitive and roads 
poorly maintained. Moreover, the town -government seat is not always situated in 
an ideal spot, some are far away from accessible main roads and others are located 
along defunct waterways or routes that are usually bypassed. 
The relocation of the town -government seat is always accompanied by the 
re- siting of the rural market, although relocation to accommodate market forces is 
rare. In this sense, the demise of a rural market in China is not solely due to 
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Plate 3.1 The main entrance of a rural 
market - -- All government markets 
have this distinctive gateway 
Plate 3.2 A typical rural market - -- ICMB office (the building) is 
attached to the market place (ground floor) 
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transport factors, as argued by Skinner. The location of the town -government seat 
also constrains market expansion because available land there can be very limited 
and is generally occupied by different authorities. This means that market activities 
can only expand through street peddling, which is scattered, and economies of scale 
cannot be obtained. In Guangdong province, a furniture market at Shunde extends 
along a road for over 5 km and while a roadside location is advantageous, it also 
creates traffic problems. 
Market days and market size are not determined by administrative factors. 
Generally, market days follow the traditional pattern authorised by the ICMB. 
However, the lunar calendar has been abandoned despite its widespread use among 
peasants. Like traditional periodic markets, neighbouring outlets have different 
schedules, allowing peasants to visit different rural markets without any time 
conflict. Although size is not determined by administrative factors, it is always 
controlled by local government. As noted, lack of capital input by local government 
has contributed to the underdevelopment of market places. Consequently, many 
venues are small in scale and their facilities old and inadequate (Plate 3.3 and 3.4). 
However, there are local governments which have established extravagant market 
places to demonstrate their economic performance and financial achievements. For 
example, in Guangdong's coastal areas there are huge multi -storied rural markets. 
Whether a market is shabby or extravagant is a good indicator of the mismatch 
between its scale and the size of its economic and population capacity. Sometimes, 
these situations have created a `market without a marketplace (you shi wu chang)' 
and a `marketplace without a market (you chang wo.. shi)' (Cao, 1996). These 
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Plate 3.3 Street markets still exist in some remote areas 
Plate 3.4 A scene at a rural market - -- Many standard markets are old with 
primitive facilities 
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situations have definitely stemmed from the intervention of local government. 
Wholesale markets are another topic that characterises China's market 
development during the reform era. Although Skinner does not address wholesale 
markets in his studies, it is a key feature of the process of market modernisation. In 
1986, there were only 892 agricultural wholesale markets and turnover value was 
2.8 billion yuan (Agricultural Ministry, 1995). By 1997, their number increased to 
4,038, with a turnover value of 233.3 billion yuan (DTM, 1998:VI -12). A 
breakdown of their types and turnover value is shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The 
first wholesale market in China was a vegetable market established during the mid - 
1980s in Shouguang county, Shandong's major production area. By the early 
1990s, various wholesale markets had been set up in different cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Zhengzhou and Tianjin. Table 3.3 lists 
these wholesale markets. Like retail markets, these emerging wholesale markets are 
also controlled by the state through a licensing system. According to Watson 
(1996), wholesale markets have been established in three ways: (a) by the ICMB; 
(b) by the state's commercial agencies and (c) by independent organisations and 
managed by the Bureau. Although no detailed statistics are available, a study 
conducted by the Agricultural Ministry (1995) shows that a significant number of 
wholesale markets were jointly established by local governments and the ICMB. 
According to Xu (1996), local governments have regarded their `assistance' in 
establishing wholesale markets as a matter of public policy. Local governments and 
other local authorities have intervened in the operation of these markets by 
providing both capital and land. 
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Fig. 3.2 Proportion of rural wholesale markets by type, 1997 
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Fig. 3.3 A breakdown of turnover value for rural wholesale markets, 1997 
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Table 3.3 Major wholesale markets for agricultural products in China 
Location Trade items Establishment agency Major 
trading unit 
Set up 
date 
Beijing Grain Grain Bureau of Beijing 
city 
State -owned 
enterprises 
1993 
Shanghai Pork Shanghai city government State -owned 
enterprises 
1993 
Changchun Maize Jilin provincial government State -owned 
enterprises 
1991 
Chengdu Pork Sichuan provincial 
government 
State -owned 
enterprises 
1991 
Zhengzhou Wheat Domestic Trade 
Department and Henan 
provincial government 
State -owned 
enterprises 
1990 
Tianjin Sugar Domestic Trade 
Department and Tianjin 
city government 
State -owned 
enterprises 
1992 
Source: Agricultural Ministry (1995) 
Wholesale markets controlled by government do not give free rein to 
economic forces. Usually, intervention occurs through price controls and subsidies. 
Zhengzhou's state -run wholesale grain market is a good illustration. First, price 
ranges for auction and negotiation - the two price -setting systems used in the 
wholesale markets - were determined by the local government (Xu, 1996). Then 
the local government compensated for any contract prices which differed from 
current spot prices by more than 6 to 10 per cent (Xu, 1996). This arrangement 
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protected mid and long -term contracts, which accounted for one -third of those 
signed every year. Also, to protect local interests, direct administrative measures 
were introduced to control the demand and supply of commodities. This has 
severely interfered with the operation of market mechanisms and market 
integration. For instance, the persistence of departmental and regional trade barriers 
has fragmented sugar trading in northern China, despite a wholesale sugar market 
being established in Tianjin. As a result, a significant amount of the sugar trade 
occurs outside the wholesale market. Government intervention also contributes to 
the irrational geographical distribution of wholesale markets, as instanced by three 
of them being established within 1 km of each other (Xu, 1996). 
As with the retail markets, local governments are not only the owners of 
wholesale markets but also participants. In many instances, private buyers are not 
strong enough to compete with government commercial agencies and corporations 
which have excellent transport and storage facilities and business networks. Under 
these circumstances, it is not surprising that one or two government corporations 
monopolise the markets in some places. In fact, a membership system has been 
adopted at state -mn wholesale markets. Only members, usually state commercial 
corporations, are allowed to trade there. In this sense, it appears that government 
control is more severe in wholesale markets. 
The markets formed under the political- cum -economic system do not 
conform to an economically rational pattern. According to official figures, 
comprehensive retail markets accounted for 88 per cent and wholesale markets 6.2 
per cent of the 64,753 rural markets in 1997 (PRC -MDT, 1998:VI -12). Many retail 
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markets are merely standard markets providing only basic commodities exchange 
and retail functions for peasants and serve only small areas (i.e. a town) (Cao, 
1996). Conversely, there are only a few retail markets with high -order functions. 
Given China's extraordinary scale and rapid economic growth during the reform 
era, the development of wholesale markets is still unsatisfactory (Cao, 1996). Their 
pattern demonstrates the rudimentary and economically irrational nature of China's 
rural market system. 
The political- cum -economic structure has redefined the functions of rural 
markets. They are now regarded as important tools to maintain social and political 
stability in the countryside. As the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) success was 
based on a peasant revolution, the state clearly understands that an unstable rural 
society may have serious social and political consequences. This is particularly the 
case with the growth of surplus labour in rural areas following the implementation 
of the household responsibility system. Furthermore, the peasant's burden has been 
aggravated by various allotment payments and extra tax levies. Agricultural 
production costs are soaring and there are great fluctuations in the incomes of 
peasants. Rural markets are regarded as an effective tool to appease the 
unhappiness of peasants, providing them with working opportunities to increase 
their incomes and living standards. According to Shi's (1995:74) study, the 30 rural 
market places in Baoji county during 1992 provided employment opportunities for 
11,469 households in surrounding areas. Thus market places have not only 
absorbed rural surplus labour but also alleviated serious underemployment in urban 
areas. 
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The fifteenth congress of the Party Central Committee in 1998 has assigned 
another task to rural markets. Despite an 8 per cent growth rate being recorded, the 
regional economic and financial crisis between 1997 and 1998 severely damaged 
the country's exports and economic growth, particularly in rural areas. In order to 
guard against any future economic downturn and maintain long -term stability in the 
rural areas, the state decided to accelerate rural market development so as to 
stimulate domestic demand and hence national economic growth. The Party Central 
Committee decided on four key issues to be targeted in the next decade, they 
include: (a) stimulating the productive incentive of peasants; (b) increasing their 
consumption power; (c) stable market prices; and (d) stimulating rural market 
growth. Diplomatic reasons also exist. Since China is negotiating to join the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), a well -established rural market system will definitely 
increase the country's bargaining power. Whether the above targets merely remain 
on paper is yet to see. Once again, rural markets and their development are regarded 
as tools to reach the state's political targets. 
Rural marketing activities, in a broad sense, are still controlled by the state 
and different local authorities. Major crops, such as grain and cotton, are subject to 
price control, despite the relaxation of price controls for most crops. State 
procurement still exists. Cotton, for instance, is subject to unified purchase and 
monopoly sale by the state. Private trade is absolutely prohibited. Control of grain 
is not as strict as that of cotton. Nevertheless, peasants have to fulfil the state's 
procurement quotas before they can sell their surpluses at the rural markets. Any 
pre -procurement sale is regarded as illegal. Grain is acquired at a price set by the 
state, and although the set price increases, it is always lower than the market price. 
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In 1995, the difference sometimes reached 0.6 -0.8 yuan per jin, the largest variation 
during the 1990s. These price differences encourage peasants to sell their grain in 
niral markets. According to the Nnngmin Ribao (Peasant's Daily) (1998, June 10), 
peasants preferred to sell grain at rural markets not only because the price is higher, 
but also cash is paid immediately, Further, private dealers do not impose extra 
levies and grain deductions on peasants but local government does. This practice 
has jeopardised local government's procurement quotas which are assigned by a 
higher level of government. This is particularly the case when market prices are 
significantly higher than the state's procurement price. To fulfil the procurement 
quota, it is not surprising to see administrative measures, such as market closures, 
roadblocks and forced procurement, being adopted by local governments and state 
commercial units (Han and Yu, 1995, 1996; Zhou, 1994). Moreover, to safeguard 
their own interests, local governments have, on occasions, blocked the outflow of 
grain. Conversely, local governments have also reduced the procurement price 
illegally and used the difference between official and illegal prices to make huge 
profits. Such stories are not new in the rural areas. As reported by Nongmin Ribao 
(Peasant's Daily) (1998, June 26), a local authority in Jiangling district of Jingzhou 
city, Hunan province, used an illegally low price of 0.9 yuan to purchase grain 
privately from local peasants during the acquisition of the summer crop in 1998. 
The grain was then resold to the state grain authority at the official price of 1.22 
yuan. Consequently, each transaction 100,000 jin earned the local authority a profit 
of 32,000 yuan. This is a typical example of local government intervention and 
misappropriation of state assets. It is not an exceptional case. 
The same situation has prevailed in the procurement of special local 
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commodities such as pine resin or silkworm cocoons. To fulfil quotas, 
administrative measures have been used to block the outflow of these commodities 
from production areas. Police forces have been involved, and peasants not only 
have had their products confiscated but also faced heavy penalties. However, unlike 
the `commodity wars' of the 1980s, these blockades usually occur within local 
administrative zones such as counties. Usually, the conflict is between local 
government and the peasants. A detailed story of this activity is given later (see 
Chapter 6). 
In sum, rural markets, both in the narrow and broad sense, are subject to 
intervention by local government and state authorities under the administrative - 
zone economy, despite the diminishing of the state's control through economic 
reform. In the narrow sense, the establishment of market places, their number, 
location, scale and daily operation is controlled by various administrative factors. 
Owing to the political- cum -economic administrative system, the current rural 
market arrangement does not operate as a distinct and independent hierarchy. This 
arrangement has been heavily eroded by the administrative hierarchy and can only 
be seen as its appendage. Consequently, the current rural market hierarchy can only 
be justified in administrative and not in economic terms. This scenario is very 
different from the pre -1949 period. Although administrative and economic spheres 
sometimes overlapped, as described by Skinner, the political and economic 
hierarchies were basically two separate systems. In the broad sense, local 
government intervenes in market activities through price controls and direct 
administrative measures. Accordingly, economic forces have not been developed as 
smoothly as some economists have predicted. Again, these scenarios did not exist 
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in the pre -1949 traditional markets described by Skinner, 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
Traditional rural markets appear to have been revived during the reform era. 
Consequently, one has witnessed: the withdrawal of state control in the distribution 
and trading spheres; the restoration of periodic markets and traditional market days; 
the remarkable increase in the number of market places; a growth in market 
turnover value; and the emergence of wholesale markets. Moreover, daily markets 
have emerged in some prosperous regions, and long -distance marketing also 
occurs. Market places have replaced the state distribution channels and become the 
major place for commodity exchanges. 
This is not the end of the story. Abstract research, which employs 
oversimplified rules to study China's rural market development, has not gone 
beyond the above set of description. Consequently, improbable conclusions have 
been drawn. Thanks to the debate on the contextual approach and the importance of 
space, there is now a basis for concrete research on social and economic processes. 
By re- establishing the interaction between changes in rural markets and China's 
reform process, scholars have discovered that development is falling far behind its 
urban counterparts. A substantial gap between urban and rural areas has appeared 
therefore. Furthermore, the establishment of rural markets, their number, location 
and daily operations are closely controlled by the political- cum -economic 
administrative system and local government behaviour. Under these circumstances, 
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the market hierarchy is also determined by the administrative hierarchy. In 
comparison, Skinner's (1964) praise for `natural' economic centres in the per -1949 
period shows that government interference in market activities was relatively weak 
then. While the current marketing system is closely controlled by government, the 
traditional system has not been revived. 
The reconstruction of the relationships between China's market 
development and its political and economic contexts also demonstrates that the 
current market system has emerged from a unique set of spatial contingent 
conditions and causal effects. These contingent conditions and causal effects have 
been constructed in the reform era, when relationships between the state and local 
governments, and between different levels of local government have been redefined 
and decision making powers decentralised. This situation, again, is very different 
from the pre -1949 period, when: the country was still under the control of the 
Republican government; the national economy suffered from civil war; the state's 
capacity was weak; and the rural economy was primitive and closed. The traditional 
market system, as described by Skinner, was formed within this context. While 
some aspects of the current marketing system are similar to the traditional one, they 
are generated by different factors and operate within a different framework. In this 
sense, the traditional marketing system has not been revived. 
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Chapter 4 
Skinner's market pattern and hierarchy: Case studies of 
Deqing and Dongguan 
Rural market development is both a function of a place's location and its social and 
economic progress. Given the variations in socio- economic development, the rural 
market system differs from place to place. This is particularly the case with China, 
which is characterised by its extraordinary scale and local diversity. Yet Skinner's 
mid -1960s thesis on rural market structure is problematic in this regard. There is no 
doubt that Skinner's two models of market structure have broadened the 
geographical horizons of scholars by extending central place theory beyond the 
homogeneous plain. However, his understanding of spatial variations remains 
centred on topographical differences - a narrow perspective which has weakened 
the explanatory power of his models. Physical landscape and transport are not the 
only elements that create spatial variations. Moreover, in an attempt to establish a 
grand theory that can "apply anywhere in the world ", Skinner (1965a:17) cuts off 
the connections between rural market development and the changing dynamics of 
political and socio- economic contexts over time. Accordingly, his theory fails to 
anticipate new factors, such as foreign investment and rural industrialisation which 
have had significant impact on China's regional development during the era of 
economic reform. This is demonstrated in the following discussions. 
This chapter intends to show how changes in Iocal contexts contribute to 
spatial variations in rural market systems. It focuses upon the impact of socio- 
economic, political and environmental shifts on different rural market systems 
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during the reform period. Equivalent plain and mountainous areas have been 
selected to compare with Skinner's models which are based on the Chengdu plains 
and surrounding mountainous areas. These arc Deqing, situated in the hilly border 
of Guangdong province, and Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta. By addressing the 
changing local contexts - spatial boundary effects - of Deging and Dongguan, this 
chapter argues that spatial differences are caused not only by topography, but also 
by political, social, economic and environmental influences. Initially, variations in 
the factor mixes of Deqing and Dongguan are addressed. Then an analysis of their 
impact on rural market development is conducted. 
4.1 Deqing and Dongguan: A semi -closed economy vs. an open economy 
Skinner's (1965a) two models of market structure and evolution in plains and 
mountainous areas suggest a simple correlation between three factors: topography, 
transport- productivity and market pattern. He argues that unfavourable landscapes, 
such as hilly and mountainous areas, generate poor transport and low agricultural 
productivity and hence create a scattered distribution of rural markets. Conversely, 
in the plains, better transport and higher agricultural yields lead to a much tighter 
market structure. However, the participation of the state, local governments and 
foreign investors in China's economy during the reform period suggests that a more 
complex correlation between these components and market development has been 
formed. In other words, variations in market structure and pattern are created by 
complex relations between these elements rather than by Skinner's simple 
equations. 
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Recent debates on the abolition of special economic zones suggest 
preferential policies are the major factor creating regional disparities during the 
reform era (Hu, 1999). The reform philosophy of let a small number of people get 
rich first (rang bu fen ren xian fu qi lai)' is indicative of the state's strong desire to 
regulate economic development via market forces. However, the central 
government has restricted preferential policies for foreign investment to a small 
range of cities and areas -a strategy which has created a marked gap in the level of 
development between Deqing and Dongguan in particular, and between coastal and 
inland regions in general. Although some neighbouring counties have benefited, 
Deqing itself has been largely excluded from foreign investment because it is 
located outside the open economic zone. Also, it is not a recipient of the special 
strategies planned by the provincial government in 1996 because it is outside 
Guangdong's Eastern and Western Wings' Region.' Conversely, Dongguan city is a 
core member of the Zhujiang Delta Open Economic Zone and can capitalise on the 
range of programmes designed to attract foreign investment. This preferential 
policy instigated by the state is a major reason for the variations in market 
development. 
Skinner has broadened scholarly understanding of external factors - notably 
transport routes and market modernisation. Yet he does not anticipate the 
significant impact of foreign investment on China's market development. Although 
foreign investment is not a key factor in establishing market- places, it affects their 
For a detailed report and documentation on the region, refer to Guangdong Province Planning 
Committee (eds.) (1997), Guangdong Sheng Dongxi Lianye Quyuguaihui Yinjiu (Study on the 
Planning of the Eastern and Western Ring Regions of Guangdong Province). Guangdong: Jingji 
Chubanshe. 
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subsequent evolution by restructuring the industrial and agricultural sectors of 
specific places (Eng, 1997; Lau, 1998). Given the close relationship between 
agricultural production and rural markets, any significant changes in the former 
inevitably affect the latter. Industrialisation also influences market intensification 
by increasing the level of specialisation between industrial and agricultural sectors. 
Moreover, a successful transformation from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy includes an increase in income and density of demand - a change which 
also impinges on market development because individuals are major actors in its 
disposition. 
Unlike Dongguan and other Zhujiang Delta counties, which attract large 
amounts of foreign investment, Deqing has been shunned by foreign investors. In 
1997, the total amount of foreign capital attracted was USD $30.36 million, ranking 
it fifth among Zhaoqing's six county -level units (ZQSB, 1998:312). In 1996, the 
county had 20 registered joint ventures employing 1,743 people which accounted 
for 7.3 per cent of its employment. In 1997, only two new foreign investment 
agreements were signed, fewer than anywhere else in Zhaoqing city. Moreover, a 
net outflow of population was recorded. In both 1996 and 1997, more than 5,000 
people changed their household registrations to other places (DQSB, 1998:2). In 
addition, many people have temporarily left Deqing to become migrant workers in 
the delta area. However, no detailed statistics are available on their precise 
numbers. 
Preferential policies and central location have made Dongguan one of 
China's most attractive cities for foreign investment. In 1997, the total amount of 
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foreign capital invested was USD $1.2 billion (GDSB, 1998:507). This ranked the 
city third out of the province's 21 prefecture -level cities. By December 1997, 
25,054 foreign investment contracts had been signed and 10,179 joint- venture 
enterprises had been established in the city (DGSB, 1998:5,9), including 
multinational companies such as Philips, NEC, Nokia and Nestlé. These firms have 
absorbed local surplus labour and attracted migrant workers from other areas of 
China. In 1997, almost half of Dongguan's 2 9 million population were migrant 
workers (DGSB, 1998:195 -7). 
Foreign investment has greatly bolstered Dongguan's industrial base in both 
urban and rural areas (Plate 4.1). Again, the influence of industrialisation on spatial 
variations in rural market patterns and development is another factor which 
Skinner's models do not anticipate. Between 1978 and 1997, Dongguan's gross 
value of industrial output (GVIO) increased from 0.6 billion to 49.2 billion yuan 
(DGSB, 1998:241). By 1997, industrial output accounted for 53 per cent of the 
city's GDP. Three quarters of Dongguan's 16,857 industrial plants were foreign - 
supported processing enterprises.2 In 1997, 70 per cent of Dongguan's GVIO was 
contributed by these businesses. A significant number of them are township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) which contributed over 82 per cent of Dongguan's total 
GVIO. State -owned enterprises, however, contributed only 1 per cent. Thus, TVEs 
have replaced collective -owned firms and have become Dongguan's major source 
2 Chinese materials refer to these industries as sanzi and sanlai yibu enterprises. Sanzi refers to three 
forms of foreign investment. They are: (a) equity joint venture; (b) contractual joint venture; and (c) 
wholly foreign investment. Sanlai yibu refers to four forms of production. They are: (a) processing 
imported materials; (b) assembling imported parts; (c) manufacturing according to imported designs; 
and (d) compensation trade. Both sanzi and sanlaí yibu are the most common forms of investment in 
Dongguan and in the Zhujiang Delta. 
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of taxes and revenue, leading to significant consequences for the rural areas, 
including the spatial pattern of markets. 
Conversely, the lack of foreign investment input in Deqing has resulted in 
stunted industrial development during the reform era. In 1997, industrial output 
accounted for 38 per cent of the county's GDP. Between 1949 and 1997, the total 
number of factories increased from 49 to 6,003. Of these, 280 were collectively 
owned and 4,629 owned by individuals (DQSB, 1998:68). Inevitably, these figures 
are overestimates because they refer to registrations not actual plants. Indeed, many 
state -owned factories have been downsized or ceased operations. Those still 
functioning include several large, collectively owned installations -a silk reeling 
mill, wineries, pine -resin processing units and cement plants. Deqing's silk reeling 
mill, for instance, was one of the county's biggest enterprises employing over 2,000 
people. Now less than 200 workers remain and its contribution to the county's tax 
revenue has dropped markedly. According to official figures, the number of state - 
owned and collectively owned plants accounted for less than 5 per cent of Deqing's 
total, but their outputs made up almost 58 per cent of the county's GVIO. In 
contrast, although 83 per cent of the factories in the county were at the village level, 
their GVIO was only 23 per cent (DQSB, 1998:68 -9). As post -reform 
industrialisation has generated few advantages for Deqing's rural areas, little 
change is observed in its market structure. 
However, rapid industrialisation has accelerated Dongguan's market 
modernisation by restructuring its agricultural sector, an effect not anticipated by 
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Plate 4.1 A foreign -invested TVE in Wangniudun 
il h¡iijiïiìì;:.ììzìáìì. ììa'i,-; ; 
Plate 4.2 A farm in Dongguan specialising in bananas 
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Skinner's (1965a) models which focused on agricultural production and marketing 
patterns in a pre -modern period. Since local industries have absorbed rural surplus 
labour and radically changed the living standard of peasants, the traditional 
dependence on farmland for one's living has been eroded. Agricultural production 
has switched from self- sufficiency to specialisation on cash cropping. Considerable 
areas of low -yield farmland have been converted to pasture. Also, paddy fields have 
been shifted into crops with high economic returns such as sugar cane, bananas and 
vegetables. Fruit, vegetables, aquatic products and poultry have been the most 
popular products. During the late 1980s, over 2,000 of these new farms were 
developed, some geared to overseas markets such as Japan and Hong Kong. 
Generally, they are large in scale, (i.e. over 1,000 mu), hire many workers, and use 
scientific methods such as new and enhanced species, soil -less cultivation and 
biological pest control. For instance, in Dongguan's Dalingshan town, a 3,000 mu 
orchard was established during the mid -1980s to specialise on fruit such as lychee, 
Tongan, oranges, mandarins and tangerines. Included in the orchard are a nursery, a 
fishpond and a pig farm. By the end of 1997, there were 8,200 of these large -scale 
farms/households in Dongguan city, cultivating a total area of 390,000 mu, about 
58 per cent of the city's arable land (DGSB, 1998:6, 205) (Plate 4.2). 
This high level of agricultural specialisation has led to flourishing 
marketing activities within Dongguan city. Fruit, aquatic products and poultry are 
destined not only for the local market, but are also despatched from there to both 
national and international markets including Hong Kong, Macau and other Asian 
destinations. In Humen town, for instance, a 20,000 mu orchard and a 4,500 mu 
vegetable farm have contributed over USD $2.6 million in foreign exchange 
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earnings to the local government. The town has also derived an annual income of 
USD $50,000 from its 3,000 mu aquatic farm. In 1997, the commercialisation level 
of Dongguan's agricultural products reached 85 per cent (DGSB, 1998:7). Thus, 
wholesale as well as retail markets have been established -a modern market system 
is observed. 
In comparison, Deqing's economy has yet to be restructured. Over 80 per 
cent of its population still depend on farming for their livelihood, the level of 
agricultural specialisation is low, and a small -scale peasant economy persists. 
Major farm crops include wet rice, sweet potato, potato, maize, soybean and 
peanuts that are primarily destined for the local market. Marketing activities are 
stagnant because exports from the county and internal transfers within China are 
rare. Consequently, Deqing's rural market growth has been constrained and its 
market structure has remained primitive with few departures from the traditional 
pattern. 
Soil erosion and flooding are further crucial elements restricting Deqing's 
agricultural production. Given the close relationship between agricultural 
production and market growth, these constraints have also curbed market evolution. 
While Skinner's (1965a:196) thesis does cover these factors, little weight is given 
to them because they are regarded as exceptions: occurring only during periods of 
catastrophe in Chinese history. This generalisation applies to Dongguan but not to 
Deqing which has a long history of soil erosion and flooding. Soil erosion has 
become a serious problem in Deqing following the rapid increase of population, 
and massive deforestation for fuel and farmland. Not only has topsoil been washed 
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away and soil fertility lost, but landslides and gullying have resulted. Farmland has 
been inundated and inland waterways clogged. Indeed, soil erosion has been 
regarded as the `tiger that eats farmland'. According to a 1957 survey, Deqing's 
eroded area covered 378 km2 - about 17 per cent of the county's territory (Deqing 
County Record Editorial Committee. 1996). About one -fifth of the county's hilly 
area suffered from soil erosion. Some 29,293 gullies were recorded within the 
county and 140,000 mu of farmland was endangered. Deforestation continued 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s as more land was opened up for farming and other 
purposes. An extra 36,000 mu of farmland was created but soil erosion worsened. 
Terracing was implemented to stop this but, in 1983, a second survey showed that 
the county still had lost 354.39 km' of land (Deqing County Record Editorial 
Committee, 1996). The removal of topsoil was particularly serious. 
Reafforestation and other measures adopted since the 1980s have not 
completely stemmed erosion. Gullying and landslides have remained serious 
problems (Plate 4.3). These stem from the lifestyle of local peasants. `Living on a 
mountain live off the mountain (qiao shan chi shan)' has been the Deqing peasant's 
philosophy of life for centuries. In an enclosed mountainous area, peasants depend 
on local resources for survival. Initially, jungles were cleared for housing and 
farmland; then trees were felled for fuel and timber sales; recently, hilly slopes have 
been excavated and soil and rocks taken for brick- making and construction. By 
concentrating on short-term benefits, peasants have overlooked the importance of 
the sustainable use of natural resources - this is a main cause of poverty. 
Flooding is another factor constraining Deqing's agricultural production as 
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 Plate 4.3 Gully -like erosion is common in Deqing 
Plate 4.4 Serious flooding in 1998 caused huge damage in Deqing 
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the county is situated on the upper -middle course of the Xijiang River. The 
county's earliest flood was recorded in AD 996, when houses and farmland were 
submerged and peasants forced to leave (Deqing County Record Editorial 
Committee, 1996). Similar situations have been noted in historical records up to the 
present day. During the 1950s, large -scale water conservation projects were 
launched. Despite old dykes being consolidated, widened and heightened, and new 
concrete ones being built to protect the towns and villages along the Xijiang River, 
many of them - particularly those in rural areas - have not been strong enough to 
contain major floods. For example, major flooding occurred in 1994 when five 
towns along the Xijiang River - Yuecheng, Jiushi, Decheng, Huilong and Xinxu - 
were flooded and damage totalled 549 million yuan. In June 1998, another serious 
overflow again submerged the five towns and damaged the main road (Plate 4.4). 
External transport was suspended for eight days. Dykes in Huilong and Jiushi 
towns collapsed and caused severe damage to houses and farmland. Over 300 
million yuan in losses was estimated. A detailed study of the impact of flooding on 
rural marketing is given in Chapter 5. 
Soil erosion and flooding, coupled with declining arable land, have been the 
major environmental reasons for low agricultural productivity. Admittedly, paddy 
yields have never experienced rapid growth in Deqing county (Table 4.1). Between 
1970 and 1997, the county's arable land decreased from 282,700 mu to 209,698 mu 
(DQSB, 1998:25)_ Although paddy yields have increased, they have still been 
marginal. According to the peasants, this is due to the use of chemical fertilisers 
which have had long -term harmful effects on soil fertility. During the reform era, 
most attention has been paid to the industrial sector and construction of 
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infrastructure, with the agricultural sector being neglected. Government investment 
in irrigation and water conservation has been reduced. In addition to the soaring 
production costs, the incentive to grow grain has diminished. Yet the peasants 
cannot abandon cultivation because they have to fulfil the government's 
procurement quotas. Consequently, paddy yields are only sufficient for taxation and 
home- consumption. In 1997, Deqing county's paddy yield was the lowest among 
Zhaoqing city's six county -level units. 
Table 4.1 Arable land and paddy yield in Deqing county 
Year Arable land 
(in thousand mu) 
Paddy yield 
(in thousand ton) 
1970 282.7 99.9 
1975 273.5 115.0 
1980 264.7 132.2 
1985 238.5 112.6 
1990 240.0 141.2 
1995 210.2 127.7 
1997 209.7 151.3 
Source: DQSB (1998, 1996) 
While Dongguan's agricultural development demonstrates high levels of 
specialisation and export orientation, Deqing still remains relatively 
underdeveloped. Given the high level of self -sufficiency, rural markets persist with 
basic functions such as surplus exchange and retailing. No wholesale markets have 
been established as many products are consumed locally. During the 1970s, the 
county encouraged the cultivation of economic crops such as oranges, mandarins 
and tangerines. Since the 1990s, slopes have been opened for the growing of 
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lychees, longan and mangoes. However, these advancements have neither 
successfully promoted cash cropping nor increased the level of specialisation. New 
varieties have not been as productive as those in the delta area because of Deqing's 
adverse climate and soil. This attempt has also failed to augment the income of 
peasants. Like many places in China, peasants are attracted to fruit growing but 
invariably prices drop and their income shrinks. This situation has further restricted 
Deqing's desire to develop an advanced rural market system like Dongguan's. 
Deqing's relatively poor industrial and agricultural advancement has 
constrained the growth of commercial activities, regarded as an important feature of 
market modernisation by Skinner (1965a:212). Apart from that, the level of 
commercialisation is crucial in causing spatial differences in market development 
between places. The higher the level of commercialisation, the more intense are 
interactions between people, locations and different sectors. These interactions 
provide the dynamics for shifting rural markets from the simple function of surplus 
exchange to modern trading. 
Skinner suggests the expansion of commercial activities is one of the crucial 
factors for market modernisation, a perception which receives complete support 
from case studies of Deqing and Dongguan. Deqing's lower level of 
commercialisation means there are limited connections between the county and the 
outside world. Since many peasants depend on farming for their livelihood, they 
have little or no external associations because they do not need to travel to survive. 
Collectively owned plants are probably the only units with external alliances. Large 
collectively owned companies, such as the Forest Chemical Plant, account for over 
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90 per cent of the county's total exports which are controlled by the Native Product 
Import and Export Company, also a state -owned company. Although competition 
emerged when private firms were established during the reform period, they have 
always been too weak to challenge the Import and Export Company which has vast 
experience and better facilities and networks. Accordingly, the Import and Export 
Company has continued to dominate the market and most external connections. 
This explains why Deqing persists with a semi- closed situation and a simple market 
structure. 
In comparison to Deqing, private companies in Dongguan have eroded the 
dominant position of state -owned enterprises in commercial activities. Before the 
economic reform, exports of agricultural side -line products, such as eggs, 
vegetables and poultry, were monopolised by the Dongguan Food Import and 
Export Company, the city's only state -owned food export enterprise. Like Deqing's 
Import and Export Company, this enterprise dominated Dongguan's external 
connections. Subsequently, the company's monopoly position has been challenged 
by the rise of private food trading firms during the reform era. Due to poor 
management and low efficiency, its market share has been greatly reduced like that 
of many state -owned enterprises. Now, the Dongguan Import and Export Company 
can only maintain its former market share in vegetable exports; movement of eggs, 
poultry and some vegetables has been taken over by private food -export 
corporations. The company's decline in production is not rare, many state -owned 
enterprises in Dongguan have had similar experiences. Thus external connections 
are no longer the privilege of one or two big state -owned enterprises, as is still the 
case in Deqing county. With commercial activities booming in Dongguan, there has 
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been an evolution of rural markets from a simple to a modern system. 
Undoubtedly, transport has been one of the crucial factors in generating 
variations in market structure and modernisation. However, in China, it is the rapid 
post -reform development of commercial, industrial and marketing activities that is 
pushing transport advancement (World Bank, 1985, 1990, 1992). This causal 
relationship is different from Skinner's (1965a) thesis which suggests transport 
improvements inevitably result in market modernisation. The reason for this 
difference is China's lack of capital which has made transport a `bottleneck' in 
local economic growth - a problem that was not resolved until foreign capital 
became available. 
Dongguan's case is a good illustration. Since the mid 1980s, the 
government, in co- operation with Ilong Kong developers, has built local highways 
to improve the transport system. However, the most notable event was the opening 
of the Guangzhou -Shenzhen -Zhuhai super -highway in 1993 which facilitated both 
the Zhujiang Delta and Dongguan's development (Plate 4.5). As Dongguan is 
situated between the special economic zone of Shenzhen and the provincial capital 
of Guangzhou, it has benefited from all new highways and railways built by 
provincial government to connect these two places. In addition to the 4 major and 
13 supportive roadways built in Dongguan during the past two decades, a relatively 
well- established road network has been put in place. In rural areas, many local 
roads have been paved. In 1997, the Humen river bridge was completed to link 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai - two special economic zones in Guangdong. Also, Humen 
port was upgraded and opened to foreign vessels. Improvements in the transport 
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Plate 4.5 The Guangzhou -Shenzhen -Zhuhai super highway 
passing through Wangniudun 
' GS 
Plate 4.6 The New Road 321 in Deqing - -- This road project has been 
the county's largest one since reform 
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network have made long- distance trading possible as well as contributing to 
Dongguan's flourishing market activities and rapid modernisation during the 
reform era. This progress generally supports Skinner's argument connecting 
transport improvement with market modernisation. 
In comparison, although Deqing had been linked to Zhaoqing and 
Guangzhou, the connections have been simple, unpaved roads. This poor transport 
system explains why a semi- closed economy with a simple market structure 
persisted in Deqing during the pre -reform period. Conscious of the Delta area's 
successful experience, Deqing county government has paid particular attention to 
roadway construction since the 1990s to boost economic activities. During the early 
1990s, the Deqing government initially co- operated with a Hong Kong developer to 
improve the territory's roadway system, resulting in the Roadway Bureau becoming 
the county's most prestigious unit - particularly as its funds were bolstered by an 
injection of foreign investment. Indicative of this wealth is that the Bureau owns 
four, brand new, imported Japanese jeeps and one sedan. Conversely, the nearby 
Industry and Commerce Management Bureau (ICMB) has only a collection of 
locally assembled motorbikes and old bicycles. 
In September 1995, Deqing's first road improvement project was 
completed. The 79 km Deqing section of the 278 km National Roadway No.321, 
which linked Guangzhou with Wuzhou -a major border city of Guangxi province 
- was straightened and widened from 6 m to 16 m with 4 lanes, plus a 1 m footpath 
on both sides (Plate 4.6). This new road has shortened travelling time between 
Deqing and Zhaoqing city from 4 hours to 1.5 hours, and between Deqing and 
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Guangzhou city from 8 hours to 3.5 hours. However, despite the completion of this 
project, almost three -quarters of Deqing's roadways were still unpaved in 1996 
(ZQSB, 1997 :115). 
The Roadway 321 improvement has been the largest recent project in 
Deqing. Local government hoped it would improve the county's market conditions 
and stimulate economic development by attracting foreign investment. Although 
these benefits have still to be realised, road tolls have contributed significantly to 
the county's tax base. Since 1998, toll payments in China have been legalised 
through the Roadway Law which allowed toll stations to be established with local 
and foreign capital. Two toll stations have been created on Roadway 321 in Deqing 
at Yuecheng and Decheng towns.3 In 1997, the local government's tax revenue 
from toll payments was 35 million yuan. Whether the boost in revenue will increase 
government's input into market development is unknown, therefore the impact of 
transport improvement on market modernisation has yet to be seen. 
The lack of foreign investment, unsatisfactory development of industrial, 
agricultural and commercial activities, and relatively poor transport facilities 
account for the semi- closed condition of Deqing's economy, a condition which has 
both economic and political implications. Economically, Deqing's growth is slower 
than that of Dongguan; politically, government control persists in many aspects of 
its economic life because market liberalisation is less strong. Although the greater 
liberalisation of Dongguan's economy does not imply government regulation has 
3 Six toll stations exist on the 134 km roadway from Zhaoqing city to Wuzhou city, two of which are 
located in Deqing county. 
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been completely wiped out by market forces, it provides strong pressure to check 
and balance government intervention. 
Deqing and Dongguan illustrate that Skinner's mountainous and plains 
models cannot fully explain the underlying causes which have contributed to a 
particular place's rural market pattern and evolution during the reform era. 
Topography and transport are not the only reasons for differences. During China's 
reform era, the prime causes distinguishing Deqing from Dongguan have been 
government policy, foreign investment input, level of industrialisation, and soil 
erosion and flooding. While Dongguan has been advantaged by foreign investment, 
Deqing, which does not enjoy any preferential policies, has been neglected. Foreign 
investment has helped restructure Dongguan's economy but not Deqing's 
industrial, agricultural and commercial base. While an open, export orientated and 
prosperous economy has developed in Dongguan, Deqing's economy has remained 
primitive, stagnant and in a semi- closed condition. The varying economic contexts 
of Deqing and Dongguan have thus created markedly different market structures 
and degrees of market intensification. 
4.2 Rural market hierarchy and development in Deqing and Dongguan 
The contrasting levels of socio- economic, political and environmental development 
in Deqing and Dongguan are reflected in the relative growth rates of rural markets. 
In Deqing, improvement has been slow because of government regulation, its high 
level of self- sufficiency, semi- closed economy and relatively remote location. High 
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levels of self- sufficiency imply low levels of specialisation and exchange of 
commodities. Although peasants do have surpluses to sell, these are small and 
irregular, and as they rely on their own farmland for survival there is little need for 
interaction with the outside world. In such circumstances, commercial activities and 
rural market development are stagnant, not to mention the additional burden of 
government regulation. 
Deqing's stunted rural market development is reflected in the slow increase 
in the number of venues. The number of markets was small - only 3 - with the first 
record of rural markets being made in the sixteenth century. During the Republican 
period (1911- 1949), this figure increased to 15 (Table 4.2). All of these had three 
market -days every ten days, for example, HuiIong town on every third, sixth and 
ninth day of the Chinese lunar month (i.e. market days occurred on the 3rd 6`h 9`h 
13th, 16th, 19th, 23rd, 26th and 29" ). Special schedules were set for the trading of 
specific commodities, for instance, pig markets occurred on every first, fourth and 
seventh day of the month, grain and coal markets on the second, fifth and eighth 
day and silkworm cocoon markets on the third, sixth and ninth day. This situation is 
different from Taiwan - the only Chinese community in which Skinner's marketing 
framework had been applied - where periodic markets never existed (Crissman, 
1976a, 1976b). 
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the old 
market system and schedules were retained. However, as in most areas of China, 
rural markets in Deqing county experienced a major recession during the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Between 1954 and 1964, 5 markets 
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Table 4.2 Number of markets created during different time periods in Deqing 
Time period No. of 
markets 
Name of markets 
Republican period 
(1911 -1949) 
People's Republic 
of China 
1960 
16 Decheng, Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Mocun, Bozhi, 
Fengcun, Yongfeng, Yuecheng, Jiushi, Liucun, 
Huilong, Xiaoshui, Zacun, Shuixin and Shitou 
13 Decheng, Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Yongfeng, 
Mocun, Bozhi, Yuecheng, Fengcun, Jiushi, Liucun, 
Xiaoshui and Zacun 
1975 11 Decheng, Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Yongfeng, 
Mocun, Bozhi, Yuecheng, Fengcun, Jiushi and 
Liucun 
1985 14 Decheng Central, Decheng West, Decheng East, 
Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Mocun, Bozhi, 
Yuecheng, Yongfeng, Fengcun, Jiushi, Liucun and 
Shapang 
1990 16 Decheng Central, Decheng West, Decheng East, 
Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Mocun, Bozhi, 
Yuecheng, Yongfeng, Fengcun, Jiushi, Liucun, 
Shapang, Datang and Wulong 
1997 17 Decheng Central, Decheng West, Decheng East, 
Guanxu, Maxu, Gaoliang, Mocun, Bozhi, 
Yuecheng, Yongfeng, Fengcun, Jiushi, Liucun, 
Shapang, Datang, Wulong and Xinxu 
Source: Fieldwork and Deqing County Record Editorial Committee (1996). 
closed and those which survived were strictly controlled by the state. During the 
1980s, there was a gradual recovery and 3 new markets were established. 
According to the 1CMB, Deqing's rural markets initially involved street peddling. 
Peddlers and customers were crowded into narrow streets or temporary sheds for 
buying and selling, market places were dirty, stalls disorganised, and there were no 
rules and regulations to control and protect participants. 
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During the 1990s, 2 new markets were established and several old ones 
improved. Enhancements have included the construction of permanent concrete 
sheds and market complexes, and the implementation of regulations governing 
operations. Street peddling is only permitted in designated areas established by the 
ICMB. Within the market place, a zoning system was introduced. Until the end of 
1997, there were 17 rural markets in the county (Fig. 4.1). Also, 2 farm cattle 
markets were established in Maxu and Yongfeng. In Huilong's town government 
seat a new market was due to open at the end of 1998 but this has stíIl not 
happened. All rural markets have retained their periodic schedule except for 
Decheng Central Market which operates on a daily basis. 
In contrast to Deqing, Dongguan's rural markets have been boosted by the 
growth of the city's rural economy and high levels of agricultural specialisation and 
commercialisation. Rapid development of secondary and tertiary industries has not 
only restructured the latter's rural economy but also reduced the self- sufficiency of 
peasants. Agricultural specialisation has increased the exchange of products and the 
level of commercialisation which, in turn, have boosted the number of rural 
markets. 
Dongguan also has a long history of market development. According to 
historical records, 95 rural markets existed there during the eighteenth century. In 
1949, immediately after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over China, 
there were 58 rural outlets. Rural markets in Dongguan also experienced a marked 
decline in number during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, by 
1963, there were only 22. Unlike Deqing, however, Dongguan's rural markets have 
121 
,j HUNAN 5 
{ FUJIAN 
GUANGOONG r 
Guangzhou 
Hong Kong 
Shapáng 
( Gaoliang 
A ;' Maxu 
Datang 
A `. 
Fengcun 
Jiushi A 
Jiang; 
Legend 
Q County seat 
O Town government seat 
A Rural market 
A. 
Liucun 
© Toll station 
-- National level roadway 
Main county level roadway 
Fig. 4.1 Rural markets and settings in Deqing, 1997 
undergone remarkable growth during the reform era. Between 1985 and 1997, their 
number increased from 48 to 189, and by 1997, there were 241. Some designated 
towns, such as Wangniudun, Changan, Houjie and Xiegang, have more than 3 rural 
markets. Moreover, there were more than 5 market places in the seat of city 
government. 
The relationship between population increase and market intensification is 
an important issue that arises in Skinner's (1965a) model of market evolution. He 
argues that markets intensify simultaneously with population increase. This 
intensification process is characterised by three contingent steps: (a) an expansion 
in market size, (b) an increase in market days and, (c) a growth in market numbers 
(Skinner, 1965a:209). An increment in market size is seen as the "most sensitive 
and virtually automatic" response towards population growth (Skinner, 1965a:209). 
This simple population -market equation has been verified in Latin America's and 
Africa's market development process (Bromley, 1978; Wood, 1978). 
Disparity in population growth between Deqing and Dongguan and its 
impact on rural market numbers seem to support Skinner's argument. Between 
1980 and 1997, Deqing and Dongguan's populations increased 22.5 per cent and 
152 per cent respectively (Fig. 4.2a) (DGSB, 1995, 1998; DQSB, 1998).4 The 
substantial variation in the population growth of the two places is associated with 
markedly different growth rates in the number of markets. Between 1980 and 1997, 
4 Owing to the deficiencies of early 1980s data, Dongguan's 152 per cent increase in population is 
based on the assumption that non -native population (wai lai ren kou) accounts for an insignificant 
proportion in the city's total population in 1985. Concomitantly, the same assumption is applied on 
Deqing because the same figure is not available. 
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Fig. 4.2 Population, number of markets and turnover value in Deqing 
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the number of venues in Deqing increased from 13 to 19, while in Dongguan the 
expansion was from 35 to 241 (Fig. 4.2b). The growth rate for Deqing and 
Dongguan was 46.2 per cent and 580 per cent respectively. 
When the population -market relationship within Deqing itself is examined, 
however, population growth appears to have little effect on the expansion of rural 
markets. In 1978, the population of Decheng town was 19,024, and two new 
markets - Decheng East and West - were established. Until 1997, the town's 
number of outlets did not change, despite its population reaching 50,000. In 
contrast, Huilong town had a population of 17,000 in the late 1970s but did not 
have its own rural market until 1987. In 1997, the local government decided to 
build a second rural market, despite the town's population being slightly over 
20,000 and sparsely distributed in the hilly areas. 
Similarly, population growth in Deqing has not led to an increment in 
market days, despite its population doubling between 1949 and 1997. While 
Decheng's Central Market has changed to a daily one, the others still remain 
periodic, and a traditional schedule has been retained. Neighbouring markets have 
retained different timetables so that peasants can visit other venues without any 
scheduling conflict. For instance, Decheng, Guanxu and Maxu are three 
neighbouring market places within 13 km of each other. Market days in Decheng 
are on every second, fifth and eighth days of a ten -day cycle, Guanxu on every 
third, sixth and ninth and Maxu on every first, fourth and seventh day. 
Obviously, market days are busier than ordinary days (Plate 4.7). During 
market days in Decheng, the pier outside the Central Market is full of `market 
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vessels' - local boats taking people to market (Plate 4.8). There is neither a 
permanent dock nor other boarding facilities at the pier. Passengers carrying pigs 
and other commodities on shoulder poles get on and off the vessel adroitly over a 
narrow gangplank, skilful drivers even take their motorbikes on it. Inside the town, 
the main road is crowded with people, bicycles and tricycles. Most visitors are sun- 
tanned peasants, wearing straw hats, vests and slippers, and carrying small baskets. 
Some stroll along the street, while others are rushing to the market with piglets, 
vegetables and fruit on a shoulder pole or bicycle. Children are dressed in tidy 
clothes and follow their parents happily. Areas nearby are full of street peddlers 
selling plastic containers, towels, mosquito nets and posters of Hong Kong movie 
stars and singers. The interior of the market is congested, besides vegetables, there 
are pigs, puppies, chickens, ducks, vegetables, herbs, sugar cane and bananas for 
sale. On non -market days all is quiet, there are no market vessels and few peddlers. 
Many shops are closed except for vegetable and meat sellers. The market place is 
empty. 
Deging's low level of agricultural specialisation and commercialisation has 
not only limited its market days but also trading hours. For example, the busiest 
period at Guanxu rural market in normal seasons is between 9 am and 10 am. At 
sowing and harvesting time, the peak hour is delayed by two or three hours because 
peasants have to finish farm work before they can visit the rural markets. During 
the farming season, rural markets are less busy. This pattern demonstrates the close 
relationship between the livelihood of Degìng peasants and rural markets. Tt also 
highlights that external influences are minimal in the county. 
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Plate 4.7 Decheng central market during 
a market day (left) and a non -market day 
(below) 
Plate 4.8 Market- vessels outside Decheng central market 
Conversely, economic prosperity has eliminated periodic markets in 
Dongguan. However, market schedule still persists on a three market -day per ten - 
day one (Table 4.3). Since the 1990s, all of Dongguan's market places have 
changed to daily operation. New generations have no idea about market days and 
their past significance in daily life. `Chenxu (going to market during market days)' 
is no longer practised and has become a part of history. In Wangnìudun town, for 
instance, every first, fourth and seventh days are still regarded as market days but 
all now trade on a daily basis. All shops, and meat and vegetable stalls are open 
every day to provide fresh foodstuffs to local residents. Only peasants are conscious 
of market days for special agricultural products such as seeds, piglets, fry, and 
vegetable seeds. The change from periodic to daily markets is an initial result of the 
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intensification process which also shows that Dongguan is one stage ahead of those 
in Deqing in this respect. 
Table 4.3 Market days at different places in Dongguan city 
Name of market Market days 
Wangniudun, Changan, Liubu, Tangxia, 
Changping, Shipai, Xiegang 
Dalang, Fenggang, Qishi, Houjie, 
Zhangmutou 
Dalingshan, Huangjiang, Qiaotou, Qingqi, 
Hengli 
Every 1s`, 4d' and 7dr 
Every 2nd, 5th, 8th, and 10ffi 
Every 3rd, 6th and 9th 
Source: Fieldwork, and GDPN and GDICMB (1992). 
The rapid expansion in market size also demonstrates that Deqing's market 
intensification does not completely follow its population growth. Between 1987 
and 1997, Deqing's population grew from 310,847 to 340,301 (Deqing County 
Record Editorial Committee, 1996:699; DQSB, 1998:1). Simultaneously, the total 
area of market places increased from 38,976 m2 to 75,700 m2 between 1987 and 
1997 (Deqing County Record Editorial Committee, 1996:458; DQSB, 1999:6). The 
growth rate was 9.5 per cent and 94.2 per cent respectively. 
The great increase in market areas was due mainly to the ICMB's 
intervention rather than the natural result of population growth. During the early 
1990s, many venues were redeveloped by the ICMB, and oversized market places, 
which did not reflect a town's population size and economic capacity, were built. 
For example, Maxu and Yongfeng are two towns with similar features (i.e. same 
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population size and a road links them to other towns). However, since Yongfeng's 
redevelopment in 1992 and Maxu's in 1995, they have been served by 3483 m2 and 
1129 m2 market places respectively. Observation during fieldwork suggests that 
many stalls in these venues are unoccupied. Moreover, the above figure, which is 
the only one the government provides, shows the total available market area rather 
than the real occupied space. This results in an overestimation of Deqing's market 
size and consequently a misleading assessment of the county's market 
development. 
A similar situation is found in Dongguan. Between 1985 and 1997, the 
population expanded from 1,208,515 to 1,471,200 and total market area from 
81,522 m2 to 1,614,100 m2 (DGSB, 1998:181, 319). Growth rates were 22 per cent 
and 19 times, respectively. Again, much of the increment was engendered by the 
ICMB's improvement projects. Since oversized markets have been built to show 
off local economic achievements, vacancies are always observed. However, there is 
`real' expansion in Dongguan. The emergence of village -level markets, which have 
been established outside the government system and managed by peasants, also 
have played an important role in shaping market intensification_ Although these 
village -level outlets are generally small, some of them are over 1,000 m2 with over 
200 fixed stalls. Examples of these large village -level markets are those situated in 
Wusha and Shatou villages of Dongguan. 
The variations in population -market growth between Deqing and Dongguan 
suggest market intensification is not merely a function of economic factors such as 
population growth and transport. In fact, government intervention plays an 
130 
important role in restricting market intensification in Deqing. As noted, this is 
contributed to by the underdevelopment of economic forces under Deqing's semi - 
closed economy. Strong government intervention constrains rural market 
development because it results in adherence to the administrative principle of `one 
designated town, one market' (see Chapter 3). The consequence of this precept is a 
slow increase in market numbers, despite population growth being observed. This 
explains why many towns in Deqing have only one rural market. 
The paradox of rapid growth in market turnover and marginal increases in 
numbers in Deqing is another consequence of government intervention. Between 
1978 and 1987, gross market turnover in Deqing and Dongguan increased 42 and 
40 times respectively (Fig. 4.2c). Given these rates, market growth in Deqing 
should be faster than in Dongguan as Skinner assumes an expansion in trading 
volume is a prerequisite for market evolution. However, as noted, only 6 new 
markets were established in Deqing between 1980 and 1997, in contrast to 193 
increase in Dongguan during the same time period. 
Relative levels of government regulation and socio- economic development 
between Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate that different market patterns have 
occurred in the two places. Rural market density and village -to- market ratios 
provide a guide to this development. These ratios were compiled using 1997 data 
(Table 4.4). There is no point in comparing these measures with Skinner's figures 
because China under communist rule has created a new social, political and 
economic context, which is very different from his study period. Also, it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to estimate the optimal village -to- market ratio. However, it is 
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Table 4.4 Market density and village -to- market ratios 
for Deqing and Dongguan 
Deqing county Dongguan city 
Market density 1:133 1:10 
Village -to- market ratio 4 10:1 2:1 
Village -to- market ratio 4) 94:1 n.a. 
Notes: ratio © is estimated by administrative village and ratio © by natural village. 
Table 4.5 Village -to- market ratios of different towns in Deqing county 
Designated town Village -to- market ratio* 
Decheng 12:1 
Xinxu 118:1 
Huilong 106:1 
Guanxu 146:1 
Shapang 75:1 
Maxu 121:1 
Gaoliang 232:1 
Mocun 76:1 
Guyon n.a. 
Yongfeng 93:1 
Wulong 44:1 
Bozhi 89:1 
Fengcun 138:1 
Yuecheng 162:1 
Jiushi 61:1 
Note: * is estimated by natural village 
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possible to use other means to demonstrate the substantial differences in market 
patterns between Deqing and Dongguan. Dongguan's prosperous economy and 
high population density have contributed to a high market density and a low 
village -to- market ratio. Conversely, Deqing's semi- closed economy has produced 
the reverse. There is 1 rural market for every 10.23 km in Dongguan and 1 for every 
132.75 km in Deqing. Market density in Dongguan is thirteen times greater than in 
Deqing. A circle with a 10 km radius from the city -government seat of Dongguan 
encloses 12 rural markets. A similar exercise for the county -government seat of 
Deqing records only 3 markets. Deqing's closest market places of Guanxu and 
Maxu markets are 7 km apart. 
Substantial variations in village -to- market ratios between Deqing and 
Dongguan also illustrate differences in market patterns between the two places. The 
ratios use the number of administrative villages because information on 
Dongguan's natural villages is inadequate.5 The village -to- market ratios of Deqing 
and Dongguan are 10:1 and 2:1 respectively. This suggests that 1 market place 
serves 10 administrative villages in Deqing and 2 villages in Dongguan. If Deqing's 
1,594 natural villages are taken into account, 1 market place serves an average of 
94 villages in Deqing. Ratios range from a low of 1 market per 12 villages in 
Decheng town to 1 market per 232 villages in Gaoliang town (Table 4.5). The only 
5 Administrative villages are natural villages with administrative functions. They are unique in 
China. Local people used to call them "administrative zones (xingzhen qu) ". An administrative 
village organises a certain number of natural villages, its size differs between places. In general, an 
administrative village has a population of about 2,000. For instance, Zhìan is one of the 18 
administrative villages that are subordinated to Guanxu town in Deqing county. It organised 138 
natural villages and had a population of around 1,700. 
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comparable figure for natural villages in Dongguan is Wangniudun town, which 
has 1 market for every 5 villages.6 This is significantly lower than those in Deqing. 
Variations in market size, days, numbers, density and village -to- market 
ratios underline the fundamental differences in patterns in Deqing and Dongguan. 
These differences can be highlighted by describing the four stages of rural market 
development in China identified by Wang (1994): 
Traditional rural markets: Peasants have a high level of self -sufficiency. 
Rural markets are basically places for surplus exchange. Market 
hinterlands are small and external interactions are rare. 
Commercialisation of rural markets: The level of specialisation is 
increased by an improvement in production. Rural markets become 
more commercialised and their hinterland expands. Professional traders 
emerge and rural markets are no longer the place for surplus exchange. 
Moreover, wholesale and futures markets are formed. 
Modern daily markets and supermarkets: Commercial and agricultural 
activities are merged with urban and rural markets. Rural markets are 
eventually replaced by modern daily markets and supermarkets. 
Agricultural products are highly commercialised and specialised. 
Agricultural production is driven by market forces and led by 
commercial activities. 
Modern marketing system: Urban -rural disparities disappear and rural 
markets are replaced by modern marketing systems, i.e. supermarkets 
and hypermarkets. 
6 There are 8 rural markets and 42 natural villages in Wangniudun town. Many of the natural 
villages are large with populations of 2,000. 
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Clearly, Deqing is at the initial stage of Wang's scheme. In addition to the 
periodic nature of rural markets, evidence of Deqing's primitive system is further 
derived from its rudimentary hierarchy. As noted, rural markets in Deqing county 
were initially established under the administrative principle of `one designated 
town, one market place'. Apart from the county seat which has 3 rural markets, 
there are 14 designated towns in the county and, accordingly, there are 16 rural 
markets, including 2 farm cattle outlets, located at the town level. These rural 
markets are all located in town -government seats. They are equivalent to the 
standard markets regarded by Skinner (1964) and form the lowest level of the 
market hierarchy (Fig. 4.3). Decheng Central Market, situated in the county seat 
and the only daily venue in Deqing, forms the other level - intermediate - of the 
hierarchy (Plate 4.9). Therefore a relatively flat market hierarchy of two -levels has 
been created. This structure demonstrates Deqing itself is an intermediate market 
system - with 16 standard markets dependent on it. Moreover, since the system has 
been established under administrative principles, its economic hinterland is bound 
by Deqing's administrative boundary, i.e. 2,257 km. Decheng town, the county 
seat, serves as both economic and administrative centre of this local system. 
All markets in Deqing's hierarchy are at the town -level, though some are 
large and others small (Plate 4.10). Among the former, Gaoliang town has 550,000 
visitors per year and a turnover value of 132.7 million yuan. Ranged after Gaoliang 
in 1997 were Bozhì with a turnover of 131 million yuan and Maxu with 127.5 
million yuan. Conversely, Shapang, like Datang and Liucun, is a small market with 
40 stalls, 180,000 visitors per year and a turnover of 2.4 million yuan. 
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Plate 4.9 Decheng central market - -- 
an intermediate market in Deqing 
Plate 4.10 A town -level market (standard market) in Deqing 
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Despite local distinctions, there are no differences in functions between 
large and small markets. All are engaged in exchanging surpluses and retailing 
basic necessities such as vegetables, pork, household utensils and clothes. As 
commercial activities are not as widespread as in the Delta, no wholesale markets 
have been established. Although 40 stalls are assigned for clothes in Guanxu, less 
than one quarter are leased. Many are selling foodstuffs, such as vegetables, pork 
and poultry, and agricultural related products, normally on short-term contracts of 
one to three months. Such a leasing situation reflects the spasmodic nature of 
agricultural surpluses. 
The only village -level outlet in Deqing is located in Liucun of Jiushi town - 
a traditional site since Imperial times. It was designated as a rural market by ICMB 
in 1974. This small market has only 48 temporary stalls and 21,900 visitors per 
year, facilities are primitive and old, and is the sole rural market in Deqing still 
practising street peddling. Elsewhere in Deqing small shops, which sell groceries, 
salt, cigarettes, candies, wine and other daily necessities, are scattered in the 
county's 1,584 natural villages. In some remote areas, there are mobile traders on 
motorcycles selling pork. These rural shops and mobile traders, however, are not 
regarded as formal agents in the county's retail system because they are operated by 
peasants on a part-time basis outside farming schedules. There are no official 
figures of their numbers, particularly as some of them are unlicensed. 
Three markets in Decheng town - the county seat - form the top level of 
Deqing's market hierarchy. They are all located along the town's main road, 
Zhaoyang road. Improved in 1992, the two- storeyed Decheng Central Market is the 
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largest in the county. It is classified as `comprehensive' with a total area of 7,266 
m2. The ground floor is designated for processed and fresh foodstuffs and the 
second floor is for `dry commodities' such as clothes, shoes and other household 
articles. Inside there are 506 fixed stalls which attract 2 million customers each 
year. A rural market is located behind the complex and is about 50 m from the 
town's pier, where all `market vessels' stop during trading days. There are both 
fixed and temporary stalls in the rural market. Three hundred metres to the east of 
the Central Market is Decheng Eastern Market, a comprehensive one with 108 
stalls. The Western Market is situated 500 m to the west of the Central Market, and 
specialises in seeds, but foodstuffs are also available. The scale of these two 
markets is smaller than that of the central one. Local people used to call them the 
'Decheng markets'. 
There are substantial differences between the functions of Decheng and 
other town -level markets. Although exchanging surpluses and retailing are still 
major activities, clothing and daily necessities sold in the Central Market are high - 
order goods. Small electrical appliance shops are also found. While stalls selling 
foodstuffs account for about one third of the market, more than half of the stalls are 
selling clothes, shoes and other accessories. More variety is available therefore. 
However, despite these features, the function of absorbing surplus rural labour is 
not as obvious as in the Delta area because many peasants still have self -sufficient 
lifestyles. Moreover, market development remains embryonic because some stalls 
and shops are owned by peasants who still depend on farmland to survive and 
regard trading as a part-time activity. All of these characteristics demonstrate that 
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Fig. 4.4 Rural market system in Wangniudun town, Dongguan, 1997 
the rural market system in Deqing has yet to be modernised. 
Market structures and hierarchies within Dongguan are relatively complex. 
Although Dongguan's rural markets were initially established according to the 
administrative principle of one designated town, one market place', the rapid 
development of TVEs and the village -level economy have stimulated their growth 
in villages. Besides the 33 rural markets in designated towns, many more have been 
established in Dongguan's 551 administrative villages. In addition to the retail and 
wholesale outlets in the urban district of Dongguan city, a three -level market 
hierarchy has been created. 
Unlike Deqing, rural markets at the village level form the lowest level - 
standard market - of Dongguan's hierarchy (Fig. 4.3). Village markets have been 
established by administrative villages but not by the local governments or ICMB; 
they are usually small in scale and open daily. For example, Duwu administrative 
village within Wangníudun town has one of the 5 village -level markets there (Fig. 
4.4). It has only 20 stalls but opens every day and all facilities are in permanent 
concrete structures (Plate 4.11). Due to the village's significant agricultural 
specialisation, the market is not designed to sell surpluses but to supply daily 
foodstuffs such as fish, pork, vegetables and other non -staple foods. According to 
local cadres, the prime reason for establishing a village market is to provide 
convenience for local residents. Most customers, therefore, are residents of the 
administrative village. As the peddlers are former peasants, the rural market has 
absorbed surplus labour. 
Rural outlets at the town -level form the intermediate level of Dongguan's 
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market hierarchy. Unlike village markets, they are formally established and 
operated by the TCMB. Situated at traditional sites, they changed to daily operations 
during the 1990s. Although market days have been retained, they are no longer 
relevant. Wangniudun town has 3 town -level market places and all of them are 
situated in the town -government seat (Fig. 4.4). The foodstuff outlet was 
established in 1985 and has 158 fixed stalls selling pork, fish, vegetables and other 
non -staple foods to town residents (Plate 4.12). In 1989, a modem three- storey 
trading complex was built, with an area of 7,500 m2. The first floor is given over to 
foodstuffs and has 94 stalls, The second and third floors are used for clothing, 
footwear, household appliances and other necessities. Restaurants and cafés are 
also found on the third floor. in 1993, a bigger complex - known as Hexi market - 
was established in the town -government seat; this has not only provided more 
shops and stalls, but also a western style supermarket which has attracted many 
visitors (Plate 4.13). As in Wangniudun, the market place has been transformed 
into a modern shopping centre. 
Wangniudun's case demonstrates that an intermediate market system has 
formed at Dongguan's town level, while a similar structure is found in Deqing's 
county level. Since this system was initially established by administrative 
principles, as noted, its economic hinterland is basically bound by Wangniudun's 
administrative boundary, i.e. 30 km2. By comparison with Deqing's 2,257 km2, 
Wangniudun's market hinterland is 75 times smaller than the same intermediate 
market system in a hilly area. Given all the socio- economic and administrative 
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Plate 4.11 A village -level market (standard market) in Wangniudun 
Plate 4.12 Wangniudun market situated in the town -government seat 
143 
Plate 4.13 A modern western -style supermarket in Wangniudun 
changes since Imperial China, these figures cannot be compared with Skinner's 
(1965a) estimation (see Chapter 2). However, the substantial difference between 
Wangniudun and Deqing generally supports Skinner's (1965a) argument that the 
marketing area of an intermediate system is small in plains but large in 
hilly /mountainous areas. 
The large -scale markets in Guancheng, the city government seat, are at the 
highest level of Dongguan's hierarchy. They are equivalent to the central markets 
noted by Skinner (1964). Of the 7 situated in the city district, the three -storey Kehu 
market is in the city centre with a total area of 6,000 m2. A non -staple food 
wholesale market has also been established on the ground floor of the complex. 
Kehu market is one of the busiest and each day has visitors between 6,000 and 
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8,000. Not far away from Kehu is Qincaitang market, established in 1979, and the 
largest in the city government seat. It has a total area of 11,300 m2 and over 270 
permanent stalls /shops. The market provides products ranging from foodstuffs to 
household articles, cultural and educational items, clothes and footwear, and 
electrical appliances. A fast food eatery, restaurant and small department store are 
also present. Over 10,000 people visit the complex each day. 
There are also wholesale markets at Dongguan's highest market hierarchy. 
However, Skinner (1964) does not address these in his thesis because they were 
rarely found in the countryside during Imperial China. During the mid- 1980s, 
wholesale markets for fruit and aquatic products were also established in the city 
government seat. Locally grown fruit, such as bananas, sugar cane and lychees, 
have been exported from here, and fruit from northern China has been imported. 
The aquatic products market attracts specialised peasants in designated towns to 
exchange products. Over 1,000 jin are traded daily. The presence of wholesale 
markets demonstrates that the process of market modernisation has taken place in 
Dongguan. 
Thus, Deqing's rural market development is still at an initial stage. 
However, the emergence of daily markets in the county seat and an increase in 
specialisation levels indicate progress in moving from a traditional to a modern 
stage. Yet this is constrained by Deqing's low level of economic development 
which is inferior to that of Dongguan. In contrast, a more complex and advanced 
market system has been formed in Dongguan. Moreover, when old standard 
markets - town -level ones - become intermediate, new standard markets - village- 
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level ones - emerge. The modernisation process as suggested by Skinner (1965a) is 
observed. Despite these features, the system in Dongguan has not reached the most 
sophisticated stage outlined by Wang (1994) because of persistent disparities 
between urban and rural areas, and within rural areas. Small peasants still exist, 
although agricultural activities are highly commercialised. 
The relatively advanced rural market system in Dongguan implies that the 
city has gone through a modernisation process during the reform era. However, its 
market intensification is a top -down affair rather than a bottom up one as described 
by Skinner (1965a)7. Dongguan's top -down movement has involved the use of 
administrative parameters such as the licence system, administrative control over 
the establishment of markets, and local government intervention. Although the 
emergence of village markets in Dongguan demonstrates that marketing activities 
are driven more by economic forces than administrative parameters, the persistence 
of government intervention has not given free rein to market forces. Accordingly, 
Dongguan's village -level markets can only be seen as hybrid structures derived 
from the interplay of economic forces and administrative parameters. This hybrid 
system is the unique product of the transformation of China's economy. A market 
system created by economic forces has yet to appear. 
in short, the developmental gap between market systems in Deqing and 
Dongguan is substantial. Rural market development is not only slow in Deqing, but 
market density is low and this contributes to the county's very high village -to- 
7 The top -down process of market development is not unique to China. It has also been found in 
Puno of Peru and Changhua plain of Taiwan (Appleby, 1976; Crissman, 1976a). 
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market ratio. Moreover, the two -level hierarchy shows that the system in Deqing is 
primitive and rudimentary. In contrast, rural markets in Dongguan have flourished 
during the reform era. Market density is high and each market services a relatively 
small area compared to its counterpart in Deqing. Rural markets have also been 
extended to the village -level and form the base level of the city's market hierarchy. 
In addition to the establishment of wholesale markets, a more advanced system has 
been created. Although development is well ahead of its Deqing counterpart, the 
system in Dongguan is still far removed from a completed rural market system 
comprising retail, wholesale and futures markets (Wang, 1994). However, given the 
high concentration of industrial development in Dongguan, it is doubtful whether 
any agricultural futures markets will develop. For the same reason, a complete rural 
market system might only be found in China's inland areas but not in the country's 
coastal areas. 
Despite the disparities in rural market development, Deqing and 
Dongguan's cases demonstrate that their economic and administrative hierarchies 
overlap. All rural markets are situated in either town -government or county seats, 
those at village -level in Wangniudun - established by economic forces - are no 
exception to this rule. They are located in village committees, administrative 
central places at village levels. Deqing and Dongguan's cases are not exceptions. 
They reflect the relationship between economic and administrative hierarchies 
during the reform era. Although the political- cum -economic structure has persisted, 
one should not automatically assume that the degree of control, or government 
regulation, is equally high in both Deqing and Dongguan. This is demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters. 
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4.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter re- establishes the connections between rural market development and 
the changing local context which are not embodied in Skinner's simplified models. 
This is done by examining the socio- economic, political and environmental 
differences between Deqing and Dongguan and their impact on rural market 
development. It is demonstrated that both places have varied in regard to foreign 
investment input, industrial and agricultural development, commercial growth, 
accessibility, and level of liberalisation under different reform policies. These 
variations have created very different market systems in Deqing and Dongguan - 
the former is still primitive and rudimentary whereas the latter is advanced and 
complex - despite both being highly integrated with their respective administrative 
hierarchies. 
By comparing Deqing and Dongguan, this chapter also elaborates on 
Skinner's plains and hilly /mountainous models in term of spatial variations. Apart 
from the physical landscape, there are many economic and social elements that 
generate spatial differences. New aspects, which Skinner did not anticipated, are 
exposed. The emergence of these components, such as rural industrialisation and 
foreign investment, demonstrate that the dynamics of economic and social 
conditions vary over time - an observation weakening the contemporary 
explanatory power of Skinner's models. If Skinner's models are to maintain their 
universal appeal, a wider range of features will have to be incorporated to explain 
the more complex situations that have arisen during the reform period. As these 
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factors are now multiple, subtle and various, this may not be a feasible proposition. 
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Chapter 5 
Beyond Skinner's preoccupation with transport: 
Economic factors and their impact on China's rural market development 
This chapter examines locality effects and their impact upon the marketing patterns 
of Deqing and Dongguan. Locality effects include the level of self- sufficiency and 
incomes of peasants, the degree of commercialisation, road routes, and 
administrative principles. These factors and how they shaped rural market 
intensification and modernisation were addressed in Skinner's (1964, 1965a) 
sophisticated framework. While they remain critical, their significance has shifted 
in response to changes in China's economic, social and political conditions since 
the Imperial period. This chapter aims to re- examine and elaborate Skinner's 
framework. Unlike Skinner, who argues that the transport system, including roads, 
is the prime factor orchestrating rural market intensification and modernisation, this 
chapter demonstrates that other locality effects are equally important. While 
admitting the significance of transport factors in market development, the chapter 
also confirms that the impact of a road system is more complex than Skinner's 
(1965a) original thesis allows. This will be demonstrated in the following 
discussions. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the interactions between peasants and 
rural markets in Deqing and Dongguan. It establishes the significance of peasants 
in shaping rural market development in their roles as both consumers and 
producers, and how they provide the dynamics for growth. The focus is on 
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economic factors, while non -economic ones - the establishment of markets and 
government regulations - are discussed in the next chapter. 
5.1 Self -production or market purchase: The level of self-sufficiency and its 
impact on rural market development 
The level of self -sufficiency crucially affects China's rural market development. Tt 
is a critical indicator of the interrelationship between the production patterns of a 
specific place and its economic activities. Skinner does not overlook this but he 
puts most of his emphasis on transport. According to Skinner (1965a:208 -9; 212- 
3), a decrease in household self- sufficiency increases food demands and thus 
stimulates market intensification and modernisation. He does not disclose the 
underlying causes of the decline in self -sufficiency, but assumes it is a `natural' 
process driven by increases in agricultural productivity. Generally, his argument 
reflects the correlation between agricultural production and rural market 
development in Imperial China which was characterised by a closed economic 
system with minimum regulations. Although fieldwork in Degìng and Dongguan 
supported the thrust of Skinner's observations, the level of self- sufficiency is not 
necessarily a `natural' process and many `artificial' factors are noted. 
One of the `artificial' factors which affected the level of household self - 
sufficiency during the reform era is the heavy tax and improper levies (luan 
shoufei) impost - a result of institutional corruption (Wedeman, 1997). These 
levies have led to the persistence of a `high self- sufficiency and low market 
interactions'. This situation is illustrated by reference to Mr Lu. 
Mr Lu lives in Shengtian village of Huilong town and cultivates 4 mu of 
paddy field which, in 1997, yielded 4,000 jin. Despite the relatively 
152 
high yield, Mr Lu had never thought of selling his grain on the rural 
market because he had to reserve it for taxes -ín -kind. Tax items include 
an agricultural tax, administration fees for the town government, 
collective allotted payment, water conservation tax and others. The 
amount of tax is set in accordance with the number of people in his 
household and the area of the paddy field owned by Mr Lu. The amount 
is estimated in monetary terms and then converted to grain. Taxes can 
be paid in either cash or grain, or both. Many peasants pay their taxes in 
grain because they rarely have a cash income. 
In 1997, Mr Lu paid a total of 2,498 jin of grain for tax (Table 5.1). 
Given that Mr Lu's yield was 4,000 jin in 1997, taxes accounted for 
more than half of the paddy yield. The remainder was retained by Mr 
Lu as his family's food grain for the year, with little surplus remaining 
for sale. Mr Lu said tax and all minor levies were the major reason for 
this situation. Moreover, as Mr Lu's paddy is situated in the hilly area 
of Deqing, there is little he could do to increase the harvest. 
Occasionally, bad weather and natural disasters have reduced yields. 
Despite these occurrences, tax items and payments have increased 
annually. During poor years, tax payments were in arrears. Conversely, 
in normal years, the amount of grain after tax was just enough to feed 
his five family members. 
According to Mr Lu, peasants only sell their grain when they need money for 
emergency uses such as paying children's tuition fees and other local levies. By 
retaining the grain for tax and self- consumption, peasants minimised the need to 
sell it in rural markets. Thus rural market activities remain stagnant, as the major 
function of surplus exchange is undermined. 
Mr Ou's case is worse than that of Mr Lu: 
Living in Shangpao village of Huilong town, Mr Ou had 3 mu paddy 
field to support his family. Since Mr Ou's field comprised several small 
ones scattered over different areas, the yield was low. In 1997, his total 
harvest was 2,400 jin. Tax payments had accounted for over half of the 
total yield. Mr Ou also said the tax burden had increased year by year 
(Table 5.2). In 1995, when Mr Ou had 5 mu paddy field, the tax 
payment was 1,534 jin. In 1997, after he lost 2 mu field, the tax was 
1,481 jin. As a large proportion of the yield was given to the 
government for tax, the remainder was not enough to support his four 
family members. This situation put Mr Ou in debt. Consequently, Mr 
Ou's daughter had left home and worked as a migrant worker to support 
the family. Mr Ou's son, who had just graduated from junior high 
school, was also planning to look for a job in the Delta area. 
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Table 5.1 Mr Lu's tax assignment (in grain) of 1997 
Items Grain to submitted (in jin) 
1 Agricultural tax (in grain) 212 
2 Agricultural tax balance due -- 
3 Grain procurement 654 
4 Grain procurement balance due 577 
5 Administrative fee for town government 627 
6 Collective allotted payment 60 
7 Water conservation grain 120 
8 Civilise district construction grain 20 
9 Land rent 56 
10 Last year's balance due 172 
Total: 2,498 
Table 5.2 Mr Ou's tax assignment (in grain) in 1995 and 1997 
Tax items 1995* 1997 ** 
1 Agricultural tax in grain 277 277 
2 Agricultural tax balance due 294 -- 
3 Purchase grain 730 680 
4 Administrative fee for town 
government balance due 
-- 85 
5 Education payment (in grain) 50 110 
6 Water conservation payment 69 138 
(in grain) 
7 Land rent 37 110 
8 Collective allotted payment 37 
9 Civilise district construction -- 20 
10 Others 40 61 
Total 1,534 1,481 
* based on 5 mu paddy field; ** based on 3 mu paddy field 
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With taxes absorbing the surplus grain of peasants, they only had sideline 
products to sell in markets. Recall Mr Lu's case: 
In 1997, the two pigs Mr Lu owned were the only products he sold at 
the market (Fig. 5.1a). As a producer, this was the only interaction Mr 
Lu had with rural markets. Beside that, he rarely visited markets despite 
the closest venue - Datang market - being situated only 3 -km from his 
village (Fig. 5.1a). 
In Mr Ou's case: 
He did not keep pigs but was involved in pine resin production during 
the slack season. Pine resin was sold at a fixed price to authorised 
agents at designated purchase points and cash was paid. Although the 
procurement of pine resin was monopolised by the local government, 
selling pine resin was the only `commercial' interaction Mr Ou had 
negotiated with the market (Fig. 5.1a). 
The above discussion demonstrates that the county's embryonic market 
development has, in turn, enforced high levels of self- sufficiency. Stagnant trading 
activities result in difficulties in selling surpluses.1 Moreover, low surpluses affect 
the consumption levels of peasants because sale of excess grain is the only major 
source of income in a semi- closed economy like Deqing. 
Conversely, in Dongguan, taxes and levies do not have the same negative 
effects. Take Mr Dui's case as an illustration: 
Although Mr Dui, like his Deqing counterpart, has to pay an 
agricultural tax and a number of levies to the government, these are 
supported by the collective unit - the administrative village - as a 
collective economy flourishes in Dongguan. Unlike Deqing, such a tax 
is paid in cash rather than in grain. As Mr Dui did not personally take 
care of taxes, he did not know how much he paid each year. His largest 
expenditures were in production costs such as the field- subcontracting 
fee, purchasing farm chemicals, maintaining the irrigation system and 
other farming facilities. Despite these, Mr Dui earned a stable income 
from specialised farming. Although he did not disclose his total income, 
I See Mei (1998) for an analysis of this situation. 
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he said it was adequate to support his five family members, and also 
enabled him to buy everything he needed in the rural markets. 
Dongguan's highly specialised agricultural production and low tax burden 
has intensified the interactions between peasants and rural markets. For example, in 
Wangniudun town, over 50 per cent of the peasants are specialist farmers - 
implying a high level of commercialisation in agricultural products as all are sold 
in rural markets. This is typified by Mr Dui: 
Mr Dui is a typical specialised farmer in Duwuxin village. While 
subcontracting a 4 mu field and a 12 mu fish pond from the collective 
unit, Mr Dui produced 800 jin of fish, 13,000 jin of sugar cane and 
15,000 jin of bananas last year. All of these products were sold in rural 
markets. According to Mr Dui, about 40 per cent of the fish yield was 
sold to wholesalers from other places, the remainder being sold to local 
retailers in Wangniudun rural markets. As Mr Dui farmed several 
species of fish, maturing at different times of the year, he had fish for 
sale almost every two months. Bananas and sugar cane were also sold 
once or twice annually to both wholesalers and local retailers. 
Frequent peasant- market interactions have stimulated market activities and thus 
generated a rapid expansion of the rural market system. 
Government land requisition has effectively weakened rather than 
reinforced the self- sufficiency of peasants in Deqing. However, this does not imply 
that the requisition of land has fundamentally altered production patterns of 
peasants or accelerated the county's extent of specialisation and commercialisation. 
Nor has it increased the number of non- agricultural positions for peasants. In fact, 
farmlands have been taken over for road construction so peasants can no longer 
depend on their land to survive. As they have lost their means of production (i.e. 
land), they have turned to rural markets for food. Such changes have intensified 
interactions between peasants and markets and provided a major force for further 
rural market development. 
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Fig. 5.1 Peasant -market interactions under the impact of high self -sufficiency and low incomes in Deqing, 1997 
Much land requisition has occurred in villages located along the new 
National Roadway No.321 in Jiushi town (hereafter abbreviated as the `New Road 
321'). Take Mr Chen of Dúwu village as a case in point:2 
Land requisition resulted in Mr Chen losing his private plots and 2 mu 
of paddy field, leaving him with less than 1 mu of paddy field to 
cultivate. Consequently, Mr Chen's annual yield was insufficient to 
support him and his four family members. According to Mr Chen, he 
rarely visited rural markets before the land requisition occurred, 
although Jiushi market is located only 2 km from Dúwu village (Fig. 
5.1b). Loss of farmland, however, had pushed Mr Chen to visit rural 
markets every two days for grain and other foodstuffs (Fig. 5.1b). Thus, 
his connections with rural markets had become more frequent. Cash 
compensation from the requisition of his land allowed Mr Chen to 
effect a smooth transition from high self- sufficiency to buying from the 
market. This change has eroded Deqing's vicious circle of `high self - 
sufficiency stagnant market development' by pushing peasants to the 
market for the food they need. 
As peasant -market interactions have intensified, the rural markets' function of 
commodity exchange has been reinforced. 
However, in Deqing the benefits of requisitioning land have been wiped nut 
on occasions due to the embezzlement of compensation by the local authority. This 
situation provides a counter argument to Skinner's suggestion that a decrease in 
self -sufficiency inevitably increases demand and market growth. For example, 
Yalìzui is a medium -sized village of 600 people, or 110 households, located along 
the New Road 321. Construction of the national roadway took over 60 mu of paddy 
land and dry farmland from the village. Compensation for the requisitioned paddy 
fields was 3,000 yuan per mu, and for dry farmland 1,500 yuan per mu, paid 
collectively to the administrative village (xíngzheng cun) for disbursement to 
2 Dúwu (with accent) is in Deqing; Duwu (without accent) is in Wangniudun, Dongguan. 
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natural villages (ziran cun).3 After deducting administrative fees and many other 
levies, less than half of the proceeds reached the dispossessed. When peasants do 
not have money to spend, rural market development is affected as the dynamic for 
growth is depressed. 
Mr Zhu's family is one of the households in Yalizui village to suffer 
from inadequate compensation from land requisition (Fig. 5.1b). Mr 
Zhu had 5 mu of paddy field before land requisition. The usual annual 
paddy yield not only provided sufficient grain to support his family, but 
also surplus for occasional sales. Road construction took away more 
than 4 mu of farmland from Mr Zhu. Now cultivating less than 1 mu 
farmland, Mr Zhu was worried about his future because he would not be 
able to produce enough grain to support his six family members (Plate 
5.1). Nor did the government's minimal compensation enable him to 
make the transition from self- sufficiency to a dependence on markets. 
He stressed that the meagre compensation was not enough to make up 
for the paddy field he lost and the stable life he once had. Mr Zhu's 
dilemma was that while he could not maintain self- sufficiency, he did 
not have money to purchase rice and other foodstuffs in the market. 
Accordingly, Mr Zhu's son has to work outside the village to 
supplement the family income. Mr Zhu remembered clearly that 1998 
had been the third year he had bought rice in the local rural market. 
While land requisition had intensified Mr Zhu's connections with rural 
markets, insufficient compensation choked off these tentative linkages. 
Consequently, Mr Zhu struggled to survive because purchasing 
commodities in markets requires money. 
In this case, increased peasant visits did not greatly affect the `high self -sufficiency 
low market interactions' correlation. 
The embezzlement of compensation creates obstructions to rural market 
development. It prevents interactions between peasants and rural markets. 
Although land requisition provides peasants with a golden opportunity to abandon 
a self- sufficient livelihood, many think that local government and developers have 
3 In China, villages can be classified into administrative and natural villages. The formers are 
village -level administrative units which local people used to call them `administrative zones' and 
`production brigades' during the post and pre- reform periods respectively. Natural villages were 
known as `production teams' before 1979. Instead of village, many peasants still use this term to 
refer to their village, and other neighbouring villages. 
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taken away their farmland and destroyed their self- sufficient livelihood. Mr Lin is 
one of the peasants who shares this view. 
After losing 4 mu of paddy field, Mr Lin had only 2 mu of farmland left 
to support the family. Unlike Yalizni village, compensation has not 
been paid to Niutontang village peasants. This has not only aggravated 
Mr Lin's strong resentment towards local government, but also left him 
in immediate financial difficulties. Although Mr Lin's paddy land had a 
high yield of 500 jin per mu, this was not enough to support his seven - 
member family. Consequently, like many peasants located along the 
New Road 321, Mr Lin has had to purchase grain from the local market 
with his tiny income from pine resin production (Fig. 5.1b). Still, he did 
not have a stable income. According to Mr Lin, his living standard had 
deteriorated with the increase in market interactions rather than 
improved because he had to spend money in markets. 
Unlike Deqing, land requisition in Wangniudun town of Dongguan has 
stimulated market growth, as those dispossessed have transferred to non- 
agricultural activities. Interactions with markets have thus intensified because 
peasants are now dependent on them rather than farmland for grain and foodstuffs. 
For example, rapid economic growth has converted Hedong village's 300 mu 
farmland into an urban landscape since the early 1990s. With compensation - 
including cash and grain - being paid to all those dispossessed, many peasants used 
the money to develop small businesses. 
Mr He started a passenger delivery business and became completely 
divorced from the agricultural sector. This change has resulted in Mr 
He visiting rural outlets for grain, non -staple foods, clothes, footwear 
and all daily necessities. According to him, he visited rural markets 
almost every day and sometimes different venues for different 
products. Mr He is not an exception, as all the villagers in Hedong are 
reliant on markets for goods. 
Transferring peasants from agricultural to non -agricultural activities has 
consolidated Dongguan's `low self- sufficiency and high market interactions' 
correlation which, in turn, has stimulated rural market development as more people 
are dependent on them for survival. 
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Plate Si Farmlands in Deqing - -- Many families depend on them to survive 
Plate 5.2 Flooding is a major problem affecting agricultural production in Deqing 
l61 
Natural disasters have also weakened the `high self- sufficiency and low 
market interaction' of peasants in Deqing. This factor is considered as artificial, or 
semi -artificial, because it is contributed to by Deqing people's philosophy of: 
`living on a mountain, live off the mountain'. When natural disasters occur, 
peasants are pushed to the market for foodstuffs. Again, in many cases, this has 
occurred in villages found along the New Road 321 in Jiushi town. The new 
roadway, which runs along the side of the Xijiang River, is much higher than the 
water level. According to the Roadway Bureau, the roadway was designed to avoid 
it becoming impassable during flooding, it also acted as a dyke to protect the 
villages and farmlands. However, the roadway's poor drainage design has 
prevented inland waterways from flowing out to the Xijiang River, and flooding 
has occurred inside the dyke during the rainy reason. Consequently, many paddy 
fields were submerged, causing serious loss (Plate 5.2). Tangweng, a medium size 
village with a population of 500, has suffered from inland flooding. Since the 
opening of the New Road 321, floodwater has submerged the fields for several 
months each year. As a result, there is only one crop in Tangweng village. 
Despite Mr Li having 1.6 mu field to support his family of two adults 
and two children, he only produced enough grains for 10 months, so he 
resorted to purchasing rice from rural markets. Although Tangweng 
village is situated 3 km to the south of Liucun market and 5 km to the 
north of Jiushi market, Mr Li rarely visited these venues before the 
onset of regular flooding (Fig. 5.1b). The need to purchase 
supplementary grain has resulted in him visiting rural markets more 
frequently than before. 
Stich a change is significant for rural market development because peasants 
increasingly have to depend on markets for foodstuffs. 
Inland flooding in Jiushi also benefits market development by changing the 
level of self- sufficiency of peasants. For example: 
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Mr Wang, who lives in Liutang village and cultivates 4 mu paddy field, 
had seen his annual yields significantly decreased by inland flooding. 
After deductions for tax, the annual yield of 300 jin per mu became 
insufficient to support Mr Wang and his four family members. In recent 
years, he has not only visited markets more frequently, but has extended 
sideline production to increase his income because market trading 
requires higher capital resources. Like many Deqing peasants, Mr Wang 
rarely visited markets when he was self -sufficient, although Liutang 
village is located only 2.5 km from both Jiushi and Liucun rural markets 
(Fig. 5.Ib). While buying supplementary grain from rural markets, Mr 
Wang kept 5 pigs and hoped to sell them at a higher price to increase 
family income. He also worked part time during slack seasons. Thus 
flooding has altered Mr Wang's high level of self- sufficiency by 
changing his production pattern and intensifying his interactions with 
markets. 
Such changes are undoubtedly important factors pushing market development in 
Deqing. 
The two problems of land requisition and flooding in Jiushi town have 
clearly helped to produce a closer relationship between peasants and rural markets. 
Where these have not occurred, paddy yields are generally adequate for tax and 
self- consumption. In these places, peasants have a very high level of self - 
sufficiency and never buy grain from markets, although occasionally they do 
purchase non -staple foods and clothes. Discussions with Deqing peasants suggest 
that self- sufficiency is their preferred lifestyle, many think that having to pay for 
grain is a sign of poverty. This perception has limited Deqing's rural market 
growth, despite interactions between peasants and rural markets being intensified. 
The variations in peasant -market correlation between Deqing and 
Dongguan can also be viewed from the perspective of peasants as consumers. As 
peasants generally consume their own grain and vegetables in Deqing, they rarely 
purchase these staple foods in rural markets. 
Mr He, who lives in Licun village and cultivates 2 mu farmland, 
illustrates this well. As with many Deqing peasants, all grain and 
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vegetables were supplied by his own farm. Consequently, there was 
little need for him to buy things in rural markets, apart from occasional 
visits to Jiushi rural market for salt, soy sauce, sugar and clothes, 
although Liucun rural market is located only 2 km from his village (Fig. 
5.1b). Mr He did not remember exactly how many times he had visited 
rural markets in the last year but he thought it was less than ten, 
His interaction with rural markets is constrained therefore by his self- sufficiency, 
Given the semi- closed economy of Deqing county, there are very few 
internal economic forces to counter the high level of self- sufficiency. Accordingly, 
weak interactions between peasants and rural markets have persisted. Moreover, 
high level of self- sufficiency also constrains the cash income of peasants. In Mr 
He's case, however, he had a small supplementary income from non -agricultural 
activities - the collection of pine resin. Nevertheless, like many peasants in Deqing, 
he was still dependent on land for survival and work on the farm was his family's 
primary activity. Limited cash income also constrained consumption by peasants in 
markets. This also explains why rural market development in Deqing has been slow 
and the market system remains rudimentary. 
Conversely, the high level of specialisation (i.e. low sufficiency level) has 
consolidated Dongguan's low self- sufficiency and high market interaction' 
pattern. Not only do peasants sell their farm products in markets, but they also buy 
almost everything they need there. In fact, self -sufficiency has been consigned to 
history in Dongguan, with villagers, as consumers, depending on rural markets for 
everything they need. Accordingly, frequent connections between peasants and 
rural markets are observed. For example: 
Mr Du is a specialised farmer who lives in Duwu village of 
Wangniudun town. Over 80 per cent of his farmland was used for 
growing bananas, one of the most popular cash crops in Dongguan. 
Unlike his Deqing counterparts, Mr Du did not grow either paddy or 
vegetables for his own consumption. All foodstuffs, including staple 
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and non -staple foods, were purchased from the rural market. Mr Du did 
not mention how much grain his family used each year or the cost. 
However, he reported the grain price had been very stable in recent 
years and his income allowed him to buy grain in markets. The opening 
of a village -level market in Duwu was very convenient for him. He 
visited it almost daily for pork and vegetables. Besides foodstuffs, Mr 
Du also bought clothes, footwear, children's apparel, farming tools, 
farm chemicals and other household articles in the Hexi market, the 
town -level market located in the town -government seat (Fig. 5.2). 
According to him, he visited the rural market three to four times per 
week, although he did not necessarily buy goods every time. 
Mr Du's case is no exception. Ninety per cent of Duwu village's farmland 
is taken up by the growing of economic crops such as bananas, sugar cane and 
vegetables. As many peasants are specialised farmers, they make money from their 
cash crops and buy grain and non -staple foods in rural markets. So commodity 
exchange has become an important channel to obtain the goods they need, and their 
interaction with rural markets is extensive; a fact which also explains why a 
village -level market was established in Duwu village but not in Deqing. 
This section has shown that the level of self- sufficiency is an important 
factor influencing rural market development in Deqing and Dongguan. As 
producers, the tax burden of peasants, land requisition, and flooding are three 
components affecting the levels of self- sufficiency of peasants and their degree of 
interactions with rural markets. These factors are considered as `artificial' because 
they are caused by local government policy and the life style of Deqing people. 
While the tax burden of peasants has reinforced Deqing's `high self- sufficiency 
low market interaction' by causing zero surplus for sale in markets, land 
requisition, and flooding have weakened this pattern by forcing peasants to 
markets. However, local government's embezzlement of compensation had also 
prevented peasants in Deqing transferring from a high level of self -sufficiency to 
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high interactions with markets. Such situations did not occur in Dongguan. The 
situation is relatively simple when peasants behave as consumers and Skinner's 
observations are generally still applicable. The connection between self- sufficiency 
and market interaction has produced variable effects on rural market advancement 
in Deqing and Dongguan. Market development has been slow and, as the peasant - 
markets connection is weak, market hierarchy is rudimentary in Deqing. In 
contrast, frequent interactions between Dongguan peasants and markets have 
contributed to the city's rapid market growth and advanced the hierarchy. 
5.2 `No money, no shopping': Level of income and the marketing pattern of 
peasants 
The level of income of peasants is another major element affecting rural market 
development (Han, 1998; Zhou, 1998; Zheng, 1997). Skinner does not address this 
directly because it was not a key factor in a primitive small peasant economy 
during Imperial China. Instead, he discusses the increase of agricultural 
commercialisation as a result of a decrease in household self- sufficiency (Skinner, 
1965a:214). However, greater commercialisation does not necessarily improve the 
income of peasants. Concomitantly, a rise in income is not naturally contributed to 
by agricultural commercialisation. This is particularly the case in the reform period, 
when much of the growth in family income stems from rural industrialisation and 
remittances from migrant workers. 
The income levels of peasants are closely related to their level of 
consumption. This is regarded as a key factor in the flourishing of rural markets by 
Chinese scholars (Gong, 1998; Xiao, 1998). The higher a peasant's income, the 
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Fig. 5.2 Peasant -market interactions under the impact of economic factors in Wangniudun, 1997 
higher is the rate of consumption. A high level of consumption suggests relatively 
frequent interactions between peasants and markets which is the dynamic for rural 
market development. Unlike the level of self -sufficiency, this `high income and 
high interaction' correlation is applicable to both Deqing and Dongguan. The more 
stable and higher the income of peasants, the higher the shopping frequency and the 
greater the choice of markets. Although the income of peasants in Deqing is 
generally low, there are remarkable differences between those who have stable 
incomes and those who do not. Similar situations have also been found in 
Dongguan, despite peasants being generally wealthier there. 
The correlation between the income level of peasants and the degree of 
market interaction is derived from the marketing pattern of consumer goods in 
Deqing and Dongguan. Dongguan's relatively higher income results in its peasants 
spending more in rural markets. In 1997 the income per capita of peasants in 
Deqing and Dongguan was 3,318 and 7,811 yuan respectively (DQSB, 1998:59 -61; 
DGSB, 1998: 383 -4). The consumption expenditure of peasants in the two places 
accounted for 58 per cent and 75 per cent of their income respectively. In 1997, 
over 55 per cent of such expenditure was on food while only 6 per cent went on 
consumer goods such as clothing (CASS -RDI and SSB- RSESG, 1998:147). 
Despite the differences in spending on food and clothes, the lower incomes of 
peasants in Deqing have contributed to lower rates of consumption, implying lower 
peasant- market interaction. In Dongguan, the situation is reversed. Higher levels of 
consumption by Dongguan peasants have led to the growth in market activities. As 
noted in Chapter 4, this factor has resulted in marked distinctions in rural market 
development between Deqing and Dongguan. 
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The production patterns of peasants are the prime factors affecting their 
income and thus their shopping trends. In Deqing, the cash income of peasants 
remains low as they cultivate paddy fields on a self -sufficiency basis. For example: 
Mr Tan is a typical small peasant living in Xiangshan village of Deqing 
(Fig. 5.1a). While family income was mainly based on sideline 
production, such as selling cassia bark and keeping pigs, his income 
was small and fluctuating. Since agricultural production costs and living 
expenses for his nine family members absorbed a considerable amount 
of Mr Tan's income, he did not have any extra money to spend at the 
market. 
Thus, the low income of peasants has constrained rural market development 
because they do not have money to spend. Market activities and turnover are thus 
stagnant. Conversely, specialised farming and non -agricultural activities have 
engendered a relatively high cash income for Dongguan peasants. This is illustrated 
by Mr He's case: 
Mr He ceased farming in 1993. As an entrepreneur (ge ti hu) with a 
delivery business, his income was stable and he was relatively wealthier 
than ordinary peasants. Living in Hedong village of Wangniudun town, 
Mr He's monthly income could be over 1,000 yuan. 
A high income gives peasants more spending power in markets and thus 
contributes to Dongguan's flourishing rural markets. 
Just as production patterns affect the income of peasants, cash income, in 
turn, affects rural market development. Recalling Mr Tan's example: 
Mr Tan did not visit rural markets regularly because he had no money 
to spend, particularly for buying consumer goods like clothes and 
footwear. According to Mr Tan, he bought new clothes and footwear 
only when the old ones were unfit or worn out. Last year, Mr Tan 
purchased only one new piece of clothing in the rural market during the 
Chinese New Year. Family income also determined Mr Tan's choice of 
markets. As Mr Tan earned only a pittance, he always visited Guanxu 
market (i.e. the local venue) for everything he needed (Fig. 5.1a). Mr 
Tan never travelled there by bus, although Xiangshan village and the 
market are linked by a rural road and a private bus service is available. 
Cycling 9 km to Guanxu market took Mr Tan about 40 minutes but this 
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practice enabled him to save the 4 yuan bus fare for other purposes. 
Low peasant -market interactions suggest a low consumption level in rural markets. 
This is the major factor for Deqing's stagnant market activities and development. 
Deqing's `low income and low market interaction' correlation and its 
impact on rural market development is further illustrated by Mr Liang' s case. 
While Mr Liang's family income was based mainly on pine resin 
production - a popular sideline in Deqing - it was tiny and irregular 
(Plate 5.3). The reduction in the purchasing price for resin had further 
decreased his income from this source to only 170 yuan in 1997. 
Although his two sons were working as migrant workers, no regular 
remittance was received. His unstable family income constrained Mr 
Liang's choice of markets and number of shopping visits. Despite 
Guanxu market being located 5 km to the east of Baxiandong village, it 
is the nearest for Mr Liang and he used it for everything he needed (Fig. 
5.1 a). Although Mr Liang knew there was a greater variety of clothes 
and footwear in Decheng, he rarely went there because it is situated 18 
km from his home. Also, Mr Liang never travelled to the market by bus 
because he did not want to spend extra money on transport. He 
preferred to retain it to other items, as his cash was limited Family 
income also constrained Mr Liang's shopping frequency. He usually 
visited markets every ten days. Ile did not remember how many times 
he purchased consumer goods in the market but said it would not be 
more than three times each year. 
This situation has contributed to the persistence of markets in Deqing as places for 
simple surplus exchange. 
The low income and low market interaction' relation is also applicable to 
low- income peasants in Dongguan, despite them being wealthier than their Deqing 
counterparts. 
Mr Jiang of Hexi village is regarded as a low- income peasant in 
Wangniudun town. He is a paddy farmer. With less than one mu of 
paddy field, Mr Jiang's annual yields were not very high. As Hexi 
village - the collective unit - paid peasants' taxes and local levies, Mr 
Jiang kept all the rice he produced for his own use and for sale. During 
slack seasons, Mr Jiang also took part-time jobs to earn extra income. 
Mr Jiang said that the choice of market and shopping frequency 
depended on his income. Using a bicycle as the major means of 
transport, Mr Jiang usually purchased foodstuffs, clothes and other daily 
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Plate 5.3 Pine resin (left) and silkworm 
cocoon (below) - -- the reduction in 
purchase price makes them no longer 
profitable for peasants in Deqing 
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necessities in Hexi market, which is located about 2 km from his village 
(Fig. 5.2). He seldom visited other venues because he did not want to 
pay the bus fare. The daily market in Dongguan enabled Mr Jiang to 
purchase meats and vegetables everyday. However, owing to his low 
income, he seldom bought consumer goods such as clothes, footwear 
and household products. Last year, he purchased only a new jacket and 
a new pair of shoes on the eve of the Chinese New Year. 
Mr Jiang is representative of a small number of low- income peasants in 
Dongguan. However, when compared to his Deqing counterparts, Mr Jiang still 
had frequent interactions with rural markets despite his relatively low income. Such 
high interactions between peasants and rural markets are a precondition for market 
growth. Indeed, Dongguan's `high income and high market interaction' among its 
peasants has boosted market activities. For example: 
Unlike peasants in Deqing, Mr He of Hedong village in Wangniudun 
travelled to different markets for different goods (Fig. 5.2). Mr He had 
rebuilt his home as a concrete structure of three storeys a few years ago. 
Some of his electrical appliances, such as colour television, were 
bought from Panyu city, a prefecture -level city located at least 200 km 
on the west of Hedong village. According to him, there was a large 
electrical appliances market in Panyu and prices were cheaper than 
locally. Although transport costs and toll payments were involved, he 
did not mind travelling a long distance and spent 10,000 yuan for his 
favoured big screen Japanese television. Sometimes he travelled 10 km 
to Guancheng, the city -government seat of Dongguan, for other 
electrical appliances. Mr He said his case was not exceptional because 
many villagers in Hedong village did the same. 
Such a shopping pattern has undoubtedly contributed to Dongguan's prosperous 
market activities. 
The small number of peasants who can enjoy a relatively high or stable 
income exacerbates the slowness of rural market development in Deqing. Unlike 
Dongguan, there is no `big farmer' in Deqing. Families who have members 
working as migrant workers are generally better off. Mr Qi's case is a good 
illustration. 
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Being a migrant worker for several years, Mr Qi had saved enough 
money to buy a used motorcycle and start up a passenger delivery 
business. The income from this is relatively stable so he could afford to 
visit different markets. Mr Qi usually purchased non -staple foods in 
Guanxu market and consumer goods in Decheng central market. His 
shopping frequency was markedly different from other peasants as he 
also owned a motorcycle. Not only did he visit Guanxu market almost 
everyday, he also went to Decheng markets four to five times per week, 
despite it being located 9 km from Tongyougeng village (Fig. 5.1a). 
Transport was not Mr Qi's major concern, he chose Decheng Central 
Market for consumer goods because there was greater variety and prices 
were generally cheaper than in the local market. Still, Mr Qi's average 
expenditure of 10 yuan was too small to push market growth. 
As with Mr Qi, remittances from Mr Li's son, who was working in 
Guangzhou as a truck driver, had provided a fairly stable income for Mr Li's 
family. 
This income enabled Mr Li to travel to different markets by bus. 
Although the distance between Shangxie village and Decheng market is 
16 km and the return bus fare was 6 yuan, Mr Li did not hesitate to visit 
the market and purchase clothes for his grandson. According to him, 
product quality was better in Decheng markets and he did not mind 
paying a little more. Foodstuffs were purchased in Guanxu market 
which is located 3 km on the west of Shangxie village (Fig. 5.1a). Mr Li 
generally visited rural markets during market days. The different 
timetables in Guanxu and Decheng enabled him to visit both venues 
without any time conflict. 
Their relatively stable incomes have enabled both Mr Qi and Mr Li to have 
frequent interactions with rural markets and thus spend more money there. Such 
connections are essential in triggering market growth in a semi- closed economy 
like Deqing. 
Mr Jiang of Zhujiang village also visited different rural markets for the 
goods he needed. 
He too enjoyed a relatively stable family income as his son was 
working in Decheng town. This enabled him to travel to other rural 
markets frequently. He usually shopped in Guanxu rural market but 
sometimes he visited Decheng markets, which are located 5 km and 18 
km from Zhujiang village respectively (Fig. 5.1a). Although Mr Jiang 
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cycled to Guanxu, he did not hesitate to take buses when travelling to 
Decheng. Mr Jiang said that he enjoyed shopping there because the 
market is bigger than in Guanxu and there is more choice. He visited 
the outlet at least once per month. Conversely, he visited the local 
market not more than three times per week, purchasing non -staple 
foods, such as pork, for family consumption. 
The frequent interactions of peasants with markets suggest they spend more money 
there. These interactions stimulate the growth of rural markets because commodity 
exchange is encouraged. 
The above discussions demonstrate the significance of the level of income 
in Deqing and Dongguan when examining the shopping frequency of peasants and 
their choice of markets. This is particularly the case when they are acting as 
consumers. People with a stable income visit markets more frequently; those who 
earn a pittance do not have a regular shopping schedule. Also, the wealthy visit 
different markets for specific items while those with low- incomes are confined to 
local markets for their everyday needs. Such shopping patterns have different 
impacts on rural market development in both Deqing and Dongguan. The relatively 
low and unstable income of peasants in Deqing is the major reason for the county's 
stagnant market activities. Conversely, higher income and frequent interactions 
between peasants in Dongguan boosts rural market activities. All of these case 
studies demonstrate that the level of income has become a more significant factor 
in China's rural economy since economic reform. 
5.3 Transport : A real or imaginary factor 
Earlier criticism of Skinner's overemphasis on transport factors in rural market 
intensification and modernisation does not mean that they are insignificant. In fact, 
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the significance of transport improvement on shaping economic activities has long 
been recognised by scholars (Owen, 1968; Fulton, 1969; Bromley, 1971). Skinner 
also suggests that there is a positive correlation between roads and rural market 
advancement. In general, he argues that new transport connections stimulate rural 
market growth, such as market periodicity, intensification and modernisation 
(Skinner, 1964:11; 1965a:213, 216, 219). In particular, standard markets wither 
away when new transport connections to higher level 
(Skinner, 1965a:220). Such arguments form the core 
processes of market evolution and modernisation. 
markets are established 
of his analys s on the 
Skinner's transport- market equation is inadequate because fundamental 
changes have occurred in basic conditions since he established his position. 
Transport factors include road, accessibility, bus service and transport modes. 
Skinner concentrated on road and accessibility but did not anticipate public 
transport. During the reform era, transport improvement and its economic impact 
on the Pearl River Delta were identified by Loo (1999) and Lin (1997c) 
respectively. However, the case of Deqing shows that the positive relationship 
between transport development and economic growth, as suggested by Lin (1997c), 
does not necessarily exist in rural market development. In fact, the opening of the 
New Road 321 appears to have had little effect on local market evolution, though it 
provides connections to higher lever markets. In some remote villages, however, 
Skinner and Lin's simple equations are still applicable to interpreting the marketing 
pattern of peasants. 
The former situation is illustrated by the case of Jiushi town. While the 
Huilong section of the New Road 321 stemmed from the upgrading of an existing 
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one, the Jiushi section was new. Before the opening of the new road, Jiushi town 
was regarded as being in the county's `corner' -a situation similar to the traditional 
period described by Skinner. There was only one rural road and external transport 
was dependent on waterways before the new one was constructed. Dùwu, 
Lunchong, Yalizui, Niutoutang and Xiyan villages are located along this new 
roadway, yet despite their perfect location, peasants in these places thought the new 
roadway had had little or no effect on their marketing patterns. 
According to Mr Zhu of Yalizui village, the opening of the new road 
has neither increased his choice of market nor shopping frequency, 
despite significant improvement being made in the local transport 
system. Before the opening of the new road, water transport dominated 
and `market vessels' between Jiushi town and Decheng town were 
available. The journey took about 3 hours and there was only one trip 
during market days. Road transport has dominated since the opening of 
the new road. A bus service has been introduced and provided a fast 
way to visit Decheng town - the county seat that is located 20 km from 
Jiushi town. Despite buses stopping in front of Mr Zhu's home, he 
rarely travelled by bus because he could not afford bus fare. 
Accordingly, all the changes appear to have had little effect on Mr Zhu. 
He continues to visit Jiushi market twice weekly by bicycle (Fig. 5.1b). 
This demonstrates rural markets do not necessarily receive a development boost as 
transport improvement has not increased peasants' interactions with other markets, 
particularly those at higher levels. 
Mr Lin of Niutoutang village offered a similar observation. He said 
passing vehicles had increased substantially after the opening of the 
New Road 321. Also, the number of people who stopped off in Jiushi 
town had increased. Despite these changes, the new roadway had had 
little effect on rural market development because passing people are not 
the major participants in the market. The opening of the new roadway 
had not altered Mr Lin's shopping pattern. He still kept on using his old 
bicycle and went to the Jiushi market for everything he needed (Fig. 
5.1b). Like Mr Zhu, Mr Li rarely travelled to other markets because he 
could not afford the fare (for instance, a return bus fare to Decheng 
town was 10 yuan). 
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The consistent use of primitive transport means - bicycles - and low 
incomes are the major reasons why road improvements have had little effect on 
rural market development. Although an impressive roadway has been built and bus 
services have been introduced, very few peasants have benefited from these 
changes. Every day when classes in Jiushi's junior high school were over at four 
o'clock, the New Road 321 was full of bicycles. To many Deqing peasants, there is 
no difference between cycling on unpaved rural roads and concrete highways. In 
Dongguan though, where people have relatively higher incomes and their own 
motorcycles, the impact of modern roads and bus services on rural market 
development is substantial. This is because the new roads have increased peasants' 
choice and degree of interaction with markets. For example, bus services in 
Wangniudun town have not only linked the town- government seat with villages 
under its administration, but also connected the town with Guancheng, the city - 
government seat. The distance between Wangniudun and Guancheng is 13 km and 
the return bus fare 5 yuan. Buses left Wangniudun every two hours and were 
welcomed by peasants. 
According to Mr Du of Duwu village, he seldom visited Guancheng 
before the introduction of bus services. As these now provide a 
convenient and fast way to travel to Guancheng, he visited the city at 
least once a month (Fig. 5.2). He said market places in Guancheng had 
a greater and different variety of commodities. 
Skinner's transport- market equation receives complete support in this case. 
Variations in Jiushi and Wangniudun towns demonstrate that modern roads 
and bus services have impacted differently on the choice of markets by peasants, 
and on their shopping patterns. In Jiushi, the insignificance of transport factors is 
indeed the result of a mismatch between transport and economic development. 
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While Deqing's peasants still received pittances from sideline production, bus fares 
are beyond their budget. As well, a modern highway means little to many peasants 
because bicycles are their major transport mode. This situation shows what Owen 
(1959) regarded as an ineffective transport system.' Accordingly, no significant 
changes are observed in the county's rural market development. 
Apart from new roads, there are other transport improvements, such as the 
introduction of bus services, which have had little impact on Deqing's rural market 
development. As noted, the continued use of bicycles by peasants and their low 
incomes are responsible for this phenomenon. This is particularly the case in the 
hilly areas of Deqing_ For example, private bus services have been introduced from 
the hill town of Huilong but not many peasants use these. in fact, they still visit 
small rural grocery shops which sell daily necessities such as stationery, shoes, 
metal fittings, light- bulbs, candles, cigarettes, fireworks, wines, candy, beer, sugar, 
salt, cooking oil and soy sauce. According to Huilong iC,MB officials, there are 
about 100 small rural shops scattered throughout the town. All of them are run by 
peasants on a part-time basis. 
Mr Tan was living in Chencun village. The distance between his home 
and the nearest rural market is over 15 km (Fig. 5.3). Like many 
peasants in the area, Mr Tan purchased non-staple foods and other 
household articles in the rural shops in in administrative village, 
which is situated 2 km from Chencun village. The recent introduction of 
`small wheels' - a private bus service - had almost no impact on Mr 
Tan's shopping patterns. Nor did he travel by bus to visit different rural 
markets. According to Mr Tan, the 10 yuan return bus fare was a huge 
amount of money to him as he earned a pittance from his sideline 
production. Mr Tan's case is typical since many Huilong peasants are 
small farmers whose income is meagre. Thus, the bus services are of 
little use because they cannot afford the fare. 
Owen (1959:186) argued that "the provision of good transportation is not capable by itself of 
promoting economic growth ". "How effectively the transport system functions" is a critical factor. 
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Fig. 5.3 Peasant -market interactions under Deqing's simple transport network, 1997 
Expectations of accelerating rural market development have not eventuated. 
Mr T. owned a small rural shop of 5 m2 at the roadside of Shengtian, 
his home village (Fig. 5.3). Everyday at noon, when classes in 
Shengping's only primary school were over, his shop was crowded with 
children, buying candles and snacks. His grocery was not only the place 
for selling simple daily necessities, but also the sole place for social 
gatherings. According to Mr Lu, although all commodities in his shop 
were purchased in Decheng markets in the county seat, he did not visit 
them regularly. This was because turnover was low in the rural area. 
Although `small wheels' to Decheng markets were available, Mr Lu 
seldom took the bus because, like many others in the area, he did not 
want to spend the 10 yuan bus fare. Cycling to the market took over an 
hour but Mr Lu did not think it was a problem as all commodities he 
sold were small items. 
Skinner's transport- market equation does not mention the decline of roads 
and its impact on market evolution. Based on his positive correlation between road 
routes and market evolution, it is anticipated that road deterioration constrains the 
process of market intensification. However, the decline of roads has not necessarily 
impacted negatively on rural market intensification in Deqing. When New Road 
321 was opened in 1995, the old National Roadway No.321 (hereafter Old Road 
321) was no longer the sole roadway linking Deqing and the other counties (Plate 
5.4). All vehicles are now directed to New Road 321 which runs along side the 
Xijiang River. Old Road 321, which runs over hills inland, has been downgraded to 
a county -level roadway and traffic has decreased significantly. Surprisingly, the 
diversion of traffic has had little impact on the shopping patterns of peasants. Thus, 
Skinner's argument that rural markets fail to be upgraded when they are bypassed 
by modern roads, has yet to be verified in Deqing. 
The reason for this situation is that Guanxu market was established by 
administrative principles rather than economic forces. Peasants seldom bypass it 
because it is the only one in the town, the nearest alternative - Maxu rural market - 
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Plate 5.4 A section of the abandoned 
Old Road 321 - -- the decline of the 
road's importance appears to have 
little impact on Deqing's rural 
marketing 
Plate 5.5 A better road network makes long- distance marketing possible in Dongguan 
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is located some 8 km to the east. Discussions with peasants in Guanxu suggest that 
the immediate effect of the opening of New Road 321 was a reduction of passing 
vehicles and people. Consequently, a number of restaurants and grocery shops in 
the town -government seat were closed. Despite the opening of New Road 321, 
Guanxu rural market is still one of the busiest in Deqing regardless of the changes 
in the road system. In 1997, its turnover value was over 127 million yuan, ranking 
it fourth among the county's 17 markets. 
Mrs Li and Mr Li's cases are good examples: 
They live in Langtou and Shangxie villages respectively, which are 
located 4 km and 3 km to the east of Guanxu market respectively. The 
reduction of traffic on Old Road 321 had no effect on Mrs Li's choice 
of market and shopping frequency. She still shopped at Guanxu market 
for sugar, salt and pork, and sometimes clothes, because it was the 
nearest (Fig. 5.2). Also Mrs Li did not alter her shopping frequency 
because family income was the determining factor. Accordingly, Mrs Li 
continued to visit markets irregularly. 
Like Mrs. Li, Mr Li of Langtou village did not change his marketing 
pattern after New Road 321 was opened. 
As Mr Li's house is situated less than 100 m from Old Road 321, he 
was clearly aware of the reduction in traffic. According to him, the 
decrease in passing vehicles and people only affected some shops in the 
town but not his shopping pattern. As a result, Mr Li kept on visiting 
the same rural market once or twice a week on his old bicycle (Fig. 5.3). 
These illustrations suggest there has been little diversion of traffic following the 
opening of New Road 321. 
Unlike Deqing, however, transport improvements have had a positive 
impact on rural market development in Dongguan. This situation supports 
Skinner's hypothesis. Wangniudun town is an apt illustration of its explanatory 
power. 
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Mr Du is a specialist banana grower. He cultivated 1 mu of farmland 
and grew more than 200 banana trees. Living in Duwu village, Mr Du 
was well connected to both local and external markets by paved rural 
roads which were improved during the mid 1980s. These improvements 
had enabled Mr Du to use big trucks and to engage in long -distance 
trading (Plate 5.5). Wholesalers within and outside Dongguan were 
attracted to the village and purchased products from peasants like Mr 
Du directly. A purchase point was established in the village and Mr Du 
used this to trade with them (Plate 5.6). The purchase price was 
negotiated between the peasants and the traders. In 1998, Mr Du sold 
over half of his 6,000 jin yield to the wholesalers. As a specialised 
farmer, Mr Du did not know the final destination of his bananas. He 
knew only that some were despatched to the eastern and northern parts 
of Guangdong province. As wholesalers came with big trucks during 
the banana harvest, peasants like Mr Du did not necessarily concern 
themselves with information on delivery and transport costs. 
According to Wangniudun ICMB, almost all villages in the town were accessible 
by paved roads and trucks. This has allowed peasants to market their products more 
widely. 
Apart from selling bananas to wholesalers, Mr Du also sold a considerable 
amount in Wangniudun rural markets (Fig. 5.2). 
According to Mr Du, although sales were not as large as in local rural 
markets, the price was higher than that offered by wholesalers. Unlike 
his Deqing counterparts, Mr Du said transport no longer constrained the 
marketing of his products because over 70 per cent of the peasants in 
Duwu village owned motorcycles. The 3 km distance between Duwu 
village and the town -government seat of Wangniudun took Mr Du only 
seven minutes. The convenience of such transport had encouraged him 
to sell some of his bananas in the local rural market for higher profits. 
Thus, the better road system and modern transport have enabled Mr Du to sell his 
products at different markets - some involve long -distance travel and other short- 
distance. These factors have stimulated the rapid growth of rural markets in 
Dongguan during the reform era. 
The positive relationship between transport and rural market development 
suggested by Skinner is also valid when peasants are acting as producers. In 
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Deqing, many producers have recognised the significance of roads in market 
development because poor road systems and lower accessibility have limited their 
choice of markets (Plate 5.7). Such a limitation has contributed to low interactions 
between peasants and rural markets and subsequently impeded the latter's 
development. For example: 
Mr Mo and Mr Li are small peasants living in Xiaoluo and Shanding 
villages (Fig. 5.3). The distances between these villages and Decheng 
markets are 23 km and 22 km respectively. Long- distance travel and 
poor road conditions have discouraged Mr Mo and Mr Li from selling 
their pigs - their only sideline product - in rural markets. Although 
`small wheels' to Decheng market were available, Mr Mo never 
considered this option because the return bus fare was 6 yuan. As a 
producer, Mr Mo said he had to minimise costs. Neither did he cycle to 
the Decheng markets because it took almost two hours. Mr Li of 
Shanding village also said the rough and narrow road surface had 
created great difficulties for him in delivering pigs by bicycle. 
Consequently, Mr Mo and Mr Li sold their animals to mobile traders, 
despite the price being slightly lower than at the market. 
According to Huilong ICMB, there were about 10 registered mobile pig traders in 
the town. They travelled around the hilly villages by motorcycle, buying pigs and 
selling pork to peasants. Since interactions between producers and markets have 
been limited, market activities have stagnated, Consequently, market growth has 
been very slow. 
Conversely, where peasant -market interactions are relatively intense in 
villages with higher accessibility and served by better rural roads, market activities 
have flourished because pigs are sold locally. These interactions provided the 
dynamics for rural market growth. Despite mentioning the importance of transport 
factors in their decision making process, peasants often have other concerns. This is 
illustrated in Mr Liang's case: 
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Plate 5.6 A banana purchase point in Duwu village, Wangniudun 
Plate 5.7 Rural roads in Deqing - -- To many peasants, they are the only 
contacts with the outside world 
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Mr Liang lives in Dutou vidage 
between Dutou village id D. 
village is linked to thr t' 
wheels' are availat,... 
oilong town. Despite the distance 
market being about 17 km, the 
by a better rural road, and `small 
;nnections had attracted Mr Liang 
to sell his two pigs r> > t last year (Fig. 5.3). Although he 
said transport factors were undo ' dly important, as a producer he had 
other concern. Also, he chose D .,, ;cng market because it is the county's 
largest rural market - the trading scale is bigger than in other town -level 
markets and the selling price is much higher. 
Mr Cheng of Shanggeng village also had a similar point of view. 
Living 13 km to the west of Decheng market, Mr Cheng sold four pigs 
in the market last year (Fig. 5.3), which were delivered to the market by 
bicycle. Since Mr Cheng's home is situated along New Road 321, he 
said it was easier to cycle on the concrete road surface, though it took 
him 30 minutes to reach Decheng market. Mr Cheng also thought 
transport was not the sole reason for his choice. The other factor was 
the concentration of non -agricultural population in Decheng town, the 
county seat. As Decheng town is a big outlet for agricultural products, 
the turnover rate is higher than in other markets. I.ast year, Mr Cheng 
made about 200 yuan profit from selling his four pigs. 
The frequent interactions of producers with Decheng markets have contributed to 
its reputation as the busiest in Deqing; it is also the largest among the 17 outlets in 
the county. 
The effect of variations in transport routes on rural market development is 
further illustrated by the case of a specialised farmer. 
Mr Li, who lived in Daqiao village, was one of the very few specialised 
farmers in Deqing county. The village is located on the county seat's 
eastern border and links Decheng markets by New Road 321 and other 
paved rural roads. Also, public and private bus services are available. 
The concentration of non -agricultural population in Decheng town had 
given rise to a greater demand for vegetables and this prompted Mr Li 
to shift from mono -cultivation of paddy to specialised farming several 
years ago. Moreover, the extension of the Decheng joint -dyke to Daqiao 
village has resolved the flooding problems that the village had suffered 
for decades. A lot of households in Daqiao village have changed 
therefore to specialised farming as both transport and production 
conditions have improved. Mr Li had subcontracted 1 mu field for 
vegetable growing. According to Mr Li, he grew different vegetables in 
different seasons. This practice enabled him to have a variety available 
in markets throughout the year. All produce was sold in Decheng 
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central market (Fig. 5.3). In 1997, Mr Li sold over 6,000 jin of 
vegetables and some of his neighbour even sold over 10,000 jin in 
markets. 
Mr Li was delighted to see the transport improvements in recent 
years and thought such changes had enabled the efficient delivery of his 
vegetables to the market. As he rented a fixed stall in Decheng central 
market, he and his family members had to deliver perishable vegetables 
early every morning. Mr Li insisted on delivering these by bicycle, 
although bus services were available in Daqiao village. Sometimes his 
brother helped to shoulder -pole the vegetables to the market. As the 
distance between Daqiao village and Decheng central market is only 2.5 
km, cycling and walking took 15 and 30 minutes respectively. Given 
the semi -closed conditions of Deqing county, better rural roads and 
transport connections have become the major factors in Mr Li's 
decision to sell his products in Decheng market. 
Market development is certainly boosted when specialised farmers are connected to 
the rural market by a better road system and transport services. 
Mr Liu's case is another example: 
Mr Liu was one of the very few specialised farmers in Huilong town. 
Unlike his Dongguan counterpart, Mr Liu still grew grains and 
vegetables for his own consumption. In 1995, Mr Liu borrowed 90,000 
yuan from the local credit union and subcontracted 70 mu of farmland 
for fruit growing. About 50 mu of sloping land was devoted to lychees 
and 20 mu of flat land to vegetables and a variety of fruits such as pear 
and pomelo. He also used a small proportion of the loan to pave the 
small road in front of his house and enhanced his irrigation system. Mr 
Liu and the families of his two brothers, who live in the same village, 
formed a working team of 15 to look after the huge farm. He hoped that 
the 70 mu farmland would earn him a fortune within 20 years. 
Living in Mumian, Mr Liu said the village was in a perfect location. 
Huilong's old town -government seat was situated about 500 m on the east of the 
village. As the old town -government seat was situated along the Xijiang River, 
both road and water transport were available, Before the removal of the old town - 
government seat, there was a concentration of government offices and small shops. 
As noted, geographical proximity to the town -government seat provided markets 
for Mr Liu's products. Although the market was not as big as that in Decheng, it 
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also attracted peasants from nearby villages. Shops and meat and vegetable booths 
were also available. However, in 1995, the town -government seat was moved to a 
new site located along the New Road 321 and 3.5 km from the original. In a small 
town like Huilong, the relocation of the town seat ruined all the economic activities 
at the old spot, peasants no longer went there and all shops were closed. At the new 
site, another market has not yet been formed, though all government institutions 
have been established. Only two small groceries and one small restaurant exist 
there and these are not usually patronised by people. Interviews with peasants 
suggested that they had switched to either Datang or Decheng markets situated 6 
and 12 km respectively from the new government seat. Such changes provide a 
good illustration of the impact of government intervention on rural market 
development, suggesting that market demise results from government intervention 
rather than from the transport improvements highlighted by Skinner. 
Poor roads and transport facilities in Huilong town had created extra 
difficulties for Mr Liu in delivering his products to rural markets. This situation 
had constrained market development because interactions between peasants and 
rural markets were limited. Despite Mumian village being located along the Xijiang 
River and accessible by both road and water routes, neither of them were well 
developed. Vessels to Decheng markets were only available on market days. 
Although the delivery of goods by water was cheaper than by road, the vessels 
were small in size and slow. For example, both water and road distances between 
Mumian village and Decheng town are about 10 km. Road transport took only 25 
minutes but water transport took almost an hour. Last year, Mr Liu delivered some 
vegetables and pears to Decheng central market by water (Fig. 5.3). According to 
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him, the Ionger travelling time by the water route made him miss the peak business 
hour in the market. Since Mr Liu's products are perishable and Decheng is a large 
competitive market, his late arrival meant a loss of business and profits. 
Road transport is also poorly developed in Mumian village. The opening of 
New Road 321 (Huilong section) has not increased the accessibility of Huilong 
town and Mumian village. 
As the village is located 3 km away from the roadway, Mr Liu had to 
use the rural road before reaching New Road 321. According to Mr 
Liu, he sold 3,000 jin of jujube to Wuzhou city last year - this was 
delivered by truck. However, the vehicle was too big to reach Mumian 
village because the rural road link to New Road 321 is narrow and 
rough. Mr Liu had to use bicycles and tractors to take his products to 
the rural road before they could be transferred to a truck and delivered 
to their destination. This practice cost Mr Liu more than 700 yuan. 
The situation is the same for other products delivered to Decheng 
market by road. According to Mr Liu, this dilemma will persist until 
there is a significant improvement in Huilong's road system and in 
Mumian village's accessibility. 
While transport problems create obstructions for specialised farmers 
delivering their products, the growth of both specialised farming and rural markets 
were constrained. Rural markets cannot expand when the levels of specialisation 
and commercialisation are so feebly developed. A similar conclusion was drawn in 
Lado's (1988) study of rural market development in southern Sudan of Africa. 
On top of the zero impact of transport improvement on Deqing's rural 
market development, it is worth mentioning that remoteness and poor transport 
facilities have led to agricultural specialisation in the hilly areas. However, the 
level of specialisation has not been as good as in the Delta. Indeed, the service area 
is concentrated on only a small number of off -road villages. Specialisation is 
limited to pork and mobile traders travel around different villages in the hilly areas 
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by motorbike, buying pigs and selling pork to peasants. A small table is installed 
on the back seat of the bike and baskets are added to both sides. According to 
officials at Huilong industrial and commercial office, no statistics are available on 
these mobile traders because they do not need a special trading licence. Some of 
them, however, are illegal because they have not registered with the appropriate 
authorities. Remote villages within Huilong and Guanxu towns are all served by 
mobile pork traders who are welcomed by the peasants. The emergence of mobile 
trader in areas of poor accessibility was not anticipated in Skinner's original 
framework. Neither was it observed in the rural marketing network of other 
developing countries such as Nigeria (Porter, 1995). Whether this primitive 
specialisation will eventually progress to a formal marketing activity is hard to 
predict. However, remoteness and poor transport facilities in Huilong contribute to 
the current poor market development in these hilly areas. 
In short, the impact of transport factors on rural market development is 
examined by studying the choice of markets by peasants. The significance of 
transport factors varies between the study areas. In Deqing, modern roads and 
transport modes have had little effect on boosting market activities because 
interactions between peasants and rural markets have not intensified through these 
changes. Yet, the same factors play a more important role in Dongguan because the 
level of development and incomes of peasants are different from those in Deqing. 
The impact of transport factors also varies according to whether peasants are acting 
as producers or consumers. In both Deqing and Dongguan, peasants regard 
transport issues as important when they attempt to sell their products in rural 
markets; this is true also of specialised farmers. In contrast, transport factors play a 
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less crucial role when peasants are acting as consumers. Whether this variation is a 
result of what Lin (1997c:162) called the "lag relationship" between transport 
improvement and economic growth in Guangdong has yet to be proven. Obviously, 
the significance of transport varies according to different conditions and to the 
behaviour of the peasants. Given these variations, Skinner's thesis needs careful 
qualification if it is to reflect accurately the role of transport factors in rural market 
development. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the impact of different elements on China's rural 
market development by focusing on interactions between peasants and markets. 
Three economic factors were addressed: the level of self- sufficiency, the level of 
income and the transport. The cases of Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate that all 
components play key roles in shaping rural market development. This result 
suggests that the position of transport factors, as Leinbach and Chia (1989:2) and 
Bryan et al. (1997) argue, is "necessary but not sufficient ". 
The significance of each factor is determined by the local contexts of 
Deqing and Dongguan. A high level of self- sufficiency constrains Deqing's market 
development as interactions between peasants and markets are limited by 
production patterns. This situation is reversed in Dongguan, where agricultural 
production is highly specialised. Moreover, the Ievel of income of peasants plays 
an equally important role in affecting their choice of markets and shopping 
frequency in both Deqing and Dongguan. This income differential creates distinct 
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levels of market development in the two places. Finally, the impact of transport 
routes, modern road systems and bus services on rural market development was 
addressed. Their significance varies in Deqing and Dongguan. Generally, such 
factors have had a more significant impact on rural market development in 
Dongguan than in Deqing. 
The changes in China's social -economic and political conditions during the 
reform era have weakened the explanatory power of Skinner's theory. This is 
because the significance of many seminal factors has changed. Moreover, 
variations between Deqing and Dongguan, and between producers and consumers, 
demonstrate the complexity of the real world and affirm the oversimplification of 
Skinner's thesis of rural market development. China's rural market development is 
not as simple as Skinner's original thesis suggests. 
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Chapter 6 
Skinner's under -estimation of non -economic factors: 
Administrative parameters and rural market development 
This Chapter extends previous discussions by focusing on non -economic elements 
- administrative parameters and their impact on rural market development (see 
Chapter 5). Skinner's perception of administrative factors and their impact on rural 
markets are based on a cyclical theory of policy change. He argues administrative 
intervention played a crucial role in rural market development during Mao's period 
which witnessed the domination of an anti -market ideology and the implementation 
of radical policies such as collectivisation (Skinner, 1985b). However, their 
significance has been wiped out by the elimination of the above policies and the 
release of controls on agricultural production and trade during the reform era which 
was regarded as a liberal phase with "a steady and methodical deradicalisation" 
(Skinner, 1985b:405). 
Despite Skinner's meticulous insights, the persistence of government 
regulation during the reform period (see Chapter 3) does not lend support to his 
policy cycle theory. In fact, his hypothesis has oversimplified China's political 
economy by assuming various reform measures have automatically dismantled 
government control. Although policy changes were considered, the structural 
forces of the state have been overlooked. These omissions account for Skinner' s 
underestimation of administrative components and their role in rural market 
development during the reform era. 
This chapter demonstrates that administrative aspects - despite being 
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weakened during the reform era - are still crucial in understanding China's socio- 
economic development. It also exposed the limitations of Skinner's overemphasis 
on transport factors. The impact of administrative parameters on rural market 
development is examined through a study of interactions between peasants and 
rural markets in Deqing and Dongguan. Particular attention is paid to the choice of 
markets by peasants. Initially, the role of administrative principles on market 
establishment and development is discussed; this is followed by an analysis of local 
government regulations. All case studies are drawn from fieldwork undertaken in 
Deqing and Dongguan. 
6.1 No choice for peasants in a single market structure: The role of 
administrative principles in rural market establishment and development 
The creation of market places using administrative principles is an important factor 
that dictates China's rural development. Since Mao's era, the administrative 
hierarchy has overridden the economic one in China. Such pre- eminence has 
persisted since the reforms of 1978, resulting in China's rural market system being 
an appendage of the administrative system. As rural markets are established by 
regulation under the administrative -zone economy, government rules have replaced 
economic forces as the dynamo driving market development. These principles have 
not only determined the number of rural markets in specific towns, but also their 
location. Unlike markets formed by the `invisible hand', those set up by 
government do not naturally decline if they are not patronised by peasants, neither 
are they relocated or modified to attract patronage. Under this regime of `one 
designated town, one rural market', there is usually little choice but to visit the sole 
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market place in the town, even when it is badly situated. These principles apply to 
all town -level markets throughout China and have had a significant impact on the 
country's rural market development. 
Under the single market structure, people's choice between alternative 
locations is limited and the number of interactions restricted. This is the main 
reason for slow rural market development, particularly in Deqing county. Deqing's 
semi- closed conditions have meant that the county's rural market system is very 
basic and reliant on the government system. As many towns in Deqing have only 
one established rural market, peasants have little choice where to buy and seII -a 
situation further aggravated by their low incomes and reliance on the bicycle for 
transport. 
Peasants using government markets in Deqing have many complaints. 
Although, as producers, they have little surplus for sale, they would prefer a wider 
range of alternatives, particularly the opportunity to use larger markets which offer 
high prices. The single market structure, however, requires producers to sell at a 
market in a specific town. There is only limited competition because the 
commodities being sold are identical, and generally, quality is not high. The 
massive influx of similar products during particular seasons also reduces the selling 
price and limits sales. For example: 
Mr Mai, living in Liucunge village of Guanxu town, sold his surplus 
lychees and mandarins in the local market last year (Fig. 6.1a). This was 
Mr Mai's only choice because the nearest other markets - Maxu and 
Decheng - are situated 10 km and 15 km from his home respectively. 
However, he was one of dozens of peasants selling lychees and 
mandarins. The similarity of commodities in the market had slashed Mr 
Mai's income because the selling price of lychees had decreased from 1 
yuan per jin to 0.5 yuan per jin. Mr Li was even less fortunate. 
AIthough he was desperate to sell his ginger for extra income, he failed 
despite offering it for sale at a very low price. He had to return home 
195 
without selling anything. 
This situation has discouraged peasants from selling their surpluses in rural 
markets, not to mention the marketing difficulties faced by big farmers and 
specialised producers. Mr Jiang's case is a good example: 
Despite a bumper harvest for lychees in 1997 with an unusually high 
surplus, Mr Jiang sold less than half of his surplus produce in Guanxu 
rural market (Fig. 6.1a). Mr Jiang lives in Zhujiang village situated 3 
km west of the Guanxu market. According to him, neither distance nor 
transport determined where he could sell, he had to use Guanxu market 
as it is the sole market in town. As noted by Mr Jiang, since he was 
neither a `big farmer' nor a specialised farmer with many products to 
sell, he did not want to increase his costs by travelling to other markets 
by bus, although buses to other town markets are available in the 
village. Nor did he cycle to the Decheng markets because it is situated 
15 km south of Zhujiang village. Such settings and a lack of local 
choice have discouraged Mr Jiang from selling his surplus in the 
market. 
Discussions with Deqing peasants suggest that many of them share his opinion. 
They thought that the lack of alternative outlets contributed to all of their 
difficulties associated with selling surplus produce. If producers are not selling 
their surplus, market development is stunted. Trading - the prior condition of 
market evolution as regarded by Skinner (1965a) -- remains stagnant and 
improvement in agricultural production is undermined. This explains why market 
activities in Deqing have not matched those in Dongguan. 
Further, markets offering similar local products deter consumers from 
visiting. For example: 
Mr Li, living in Pingshanlang village of Guanxu since the 1940s, was 
no longer interested in visiting the town's sole market. As a consumer, 
he was disappointed with the familiar range of products. According to 
him, there was no specialisation as peasants from the same town were 
selling virtually identical products. For consumer goods, such as 
clothes, the situation was the same. Consequently, Mr Li only visited 
the local market irregularly to buy non -staple foods, despite earning a 
relatively stable income from pine resin production (Fig. 6.1a). 
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Fig. 6.1 Peasant -market interactions in Deqing, 1997 
The mismatch between market location and population distribution also 
discouraged peasant -market interactions under Deqing's single market structure. 
As rural markets are always established in the town -government seats, their 
location offers less than ideal access for the peasant population (Plate 6.1). This 
situation is little different from the 1950s when market activities were centralised 
under the People's Commune. Clearly, the use of administrative measures to 
control market activities has persisted. Peasant -market interactions are constrained 
therefore because peasants have to travel long distances to visit the sole market in 
town. This handicap is particularly pronounced for those living on a town's border. 
Thus, the optimum market -to- village ratio devised by Skinner (1964) loses its 
explanatory value for patterns in the reform period. 
Take Mr Zheng's case as an illustration: 
Mr Zheng of Gutang village lives 8 km to the west of Guanxu market 
and he purchased non -staple foods and other daily necessities there 
because there was no real alternative (Fig. 6.1a). He did not consider 
other markets because they are located in other towns. Using a bicycle 
as his major transport mode, it took Mr Zheng over 30 minutes to visit 
the local market. Other town markets are obviously beyond his reach. 
Mr Zheng's case is a typical example demonstrating the drawbacks of 
determining market locations by fiat. Peasants in Xiangshan and 
Maoerping, which are located 7 km and 9 km from Guanxu market 
respectively, also face a similar situation. 
This practice has discouraged peasants from visiting Guanxu market - the only 
market in the town. 
Deqing's single market structure has created a dilemma in the county's 
rural market development. On the one hand, peasant -market interaction is 
discouraged by low -level competition due to a mismatch between market location 
and population distribution. On the other hand, administrative principles also 
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constrain marketing activities in non -designated market sites. Dissatisfaction with 
the single market structure has triggered the selling of agricultural products at spots 
outside the official venues. This practice could have a positive effect on Deqing's 
rural market development as the choice of sites for peddling is economically rather 
than administratively determined. However, selling at these sites is prohibited by 
law, a restriction which has jeopardised market activities in non -designated 
locations because any attempt to establish a `natural' market system - built on 
Skinner's economic forces - is precluded. As noted in Chapter 4, this is a prime 
reason why Deqing consistently has a low market density and high market -to- 
village ratios. 
The imposition of market fees is another reason for people peddling at spots 
other than rural markets. According to Deqing ICMB, in rural markets peasants are 
subject to market fees, formal payments levied by the Bureau (Plate 6.2). However, 
many regard the charges as an administrative measure to control market activities; 
they do not understand why levies are imposed on non -professional traders like 
them. Interviews with ICMB officials suggest that tolls are an important measure 
for implementing modern market management. As tidy and well -established places 
are provided, payments are imposed on those who peddle there so that the ICMB 
has the necessary resources to maintain them. 
Market fees include an administrative charge and rent. Generally, they are 
combined into one single payment imposed on peddlers in rural markets. This is 
I 
I 
supposed to he levied on 1 to 1.5 per cent of a peddler's daily turnover value. But 
ICMB officials usually levy a 5 to 10 yuan impost on peasants instead of checking 
their actual turnover value. The 5 to 10 yuan market fee represent a huge amount to 
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many who trade in Deqing because they rarely sell more than 100 yuan per day. 
Consequently, it is not unusual to hear complaints about the combined fee. Some 
peasants sell their surplus illegally at spots outside market places to avoid this 
charge. 
This is the case with Mr Qian: 
Living in Nanchong village, he is dissatisfied with the single market 
structure as the nearest rural market is situated 9 km from his village. 
Instead, Mr Qian has chosen to sell his surplus lychees at the side of the 
new 321 roadway, the major roadway in Deqing county. Mr Qian did 
not have a particular selling spot, he usually sat at the roadside and 
waited for passing vehicles to stop (Fig. 6.1a). This practice is irregular 
and sometimes accidents have occurred. Despite this, Mr Qian sold 
about 100 jin of lychee in this way last year. 
Mr Qian's practice is unexceptional. It is common to see peasants seIIing 
various kinds of agricultural products on the roadside. This was particularly the 
case in the summer of 1998, when there were plenty of surplus lychees for sale. As 
noted, street peddling is strictly prohibited. Officials are inspecting the county 
everyday to eliminate this illegal practice. If peasants are caught by the ICMB, not 
only are their produce is confiscated, but also a heavy penalty is imposed. Like 
many peasants who peddle on the streets, Mr Qian had had his goods confiscated 
several times last year. He thought local officials overreacted and this had caused a 
tense relationship between the two. As a result of the crackdown, commodity 
exchange is highly concentrated at certain venues only, with almost no market 
activities outside designated market locations in Deqing. 
Unlike Deqing, Dongguan's prosperous economy and well- established 
market system have wiped out the restrictions inherent in the administratively 
established market system. The emergence of village -level markets reflects the 
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development of a `natural' system based on economic rationale in Dongguan. This 
situation has intensified peasant interactions with markets because they have a 
greater range of choice. Producers, particularly specialised farmers, have a wider 
range of markets to patronise. As noted in Mr Dui and Mr Du's cases (Chapter 5), 
peasants sell their products to markets both inside and outside Dongguan. Given 
the high level of agricultural specialisation and commercialisation of agricultural 
activities in Dongguan, it is not surprising that some peasants did not know the 
final destination of their products. 
Moreover, in Dongguan, the emergence of village -level markets also 
provided a greater choice of market places for small peasants to sell their surplus, 
although their numbers are few in the city. For instance: 
Mrs Li was selling lychees at Humen long -distance coach station last 
year. Living in Liangwu village of Humen town, Mrs Li said 
administratively established town -level markets were not the only place 
to sell her products. The opening of village -level markets provided her 
with other choices. Sometimes she opted to sell lychees at the roadside 
market outside coach stations, despite competition being fierce and, 
reportedly only marginal profits being made. 
This case demonstrates that market activities are flourishing both inside and outside 
designated locations in Dongguan. The intensification of market activities, as 
acknowledged in Skinner's (1965a) theory of market growth, is the prime reason 
triggering market evolution. 
The impact of Deqing's single market structure on constraining market 
growth is also illustrated by the government's monopoly of rice selling. While 
assuming government regulations were dismantled by various reform measures, 
this factor was not discussed in Skinner's mid-I 9ROs articles. Unlike the marketing 
of foodstuffs and clothes, rice selling is still controlled by state regulation. Rice is 
202 
only available in designated supply and marketing co- operatives (gong -xiao she) 
located in town -level markets - the `official' markets set up by the government. In 
Deqing, a small number of peasants have to purchase their grain from rural markets 
because their own production is insufficient. A lot of these purchases are due to 
land requisition (see Chapter 5). While rice sales are confined to designated outlets, 
interactions between peasants and rural markets are restricted to specific places. 
Such controls have not only `throttled' the private sale of rice, but have also 
`strangled' market activities led by economic forces. For example: 
Mr Chen lives in Dúwu village of Jiushi town, situated 3 km to the east 
of Jiushi rural market. Despite buying rice in Jiushi market, location and 
distance were not the prime factors determining Mr Zhu's choice of 
market. Nor had price or product quality governed his decision. 
According to Mr Chen, he chose Jiushi rural market because it was the 
only place in town where rice was available (Fig. 6.1b). If he bypassed 
the local market, he had to travel over 20 km to the nearest market at 
Yuecheng. Using a bicycle as his major transport mode, Mr Chen 
visited the market once a month. He did not consider other venues 
because they are too far to reach on a bicycle. 
As peasant purchasing activity is concentrated on the sole market in town, other 
alternative sites are not used. This explains why the density of markets remains low 
in Deqing, and its market system primitive. 
Conversely, administrative regulations do not have a significant impact on 
market development in Dongguan. This is because preferential policies and foreign 
investment have reinforced the role of the `invisible hand' in Dongguan's 
economic development. Although official rice -selling outlets are established in 
town -level markets, they are not the only places to buy rice. The emergence of 
village -level markets has provided peasants with more choice than in Deqing, there 
are always people selling surplus rice there. This suggests that market activities 
have developed outside the designated market places. For example: 
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Mr Du, living 3 km away from Wangniudun rural market, had two 
choices of market because rice was also available in Duwu village's 
rural market. According to Mr Du, he often purchased rice in the 
village, despite better quality rice being available in the designated town 
market. The opening of village -level markets in Wangniudun has 
provided extra convenience to local peasants because they do not need 
to travel long distances to buy rice. The emergence of village -level 
outlets also suggests market activities have developed outside 
designated locations. 
The interactions of peasants with these village outlets have encouraged a division 
of labour and market integration - events which also explain why rural markets in 
Dongguan are more advanced than in Deqing. 
Apart from rice, Dongguan's well -established market system not only 
provides more choices for agricultural producers to sell their commodities, but also 
offers consumers a greater range of products to buy. For instance: 
Mr Du of Wangniudun town in Dongguan visited his village -level 
market for non -staple foods and vegetables. For high -order goods, such 
as clothing and footwear, Mr Du chose Wangniudun's town -level 
markets, which are located 3 km from his home (Fig. 6.2). Unlike Mr 
Du, Mr Chen of Daguo village within Deqing purchased all necessary 
foodstuffs, clothes and other household items in Guanxu market, despite 
Daguo village being situated 7 km to the west of Guanxu (Fig. 6.1a). 
Although Daguo village is connected to the market place by a rural 
road, Mr Chen said this was not his major reason for visiting Guanxu 
market, he chose it because it is the only place where such products 
were available. 
These examples demonstrate how market settings in Deqing and Dongguan affect 
the choice of outlet for buying ordinary products. 
The use of administrative principles to establish rural markets also 
discourages market integration and specialisation by eliminating the possibility of 
peasants choosing alternative outlets in other towns. Again, Skinner neglects such 
causal relations in his thesis. In Deqing, very few people can afford to travel to 
markets in different towns, most are small peasants who depend on the local 
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Fig. 6.2 Peasant- market interactions under the impact of administrative factors in Wangniudun, 1997 
market for everything they need. Although interactions between peasants and rural 
markets are observed, these are established without choices being available and 
they do not benefit market growth. Accordingly, differentiation between markets is 
low and specialisation and integration limited. 
Jiushi is the only town in Deqing with two rural markets - Jiushi and 
Liucun. Despite this feature, the peasants do not have any additional choices 
because both were established by government fiat. Although they were situated 5 
km apart, their appearance was identical. For example, farm chemicals were 
available in both venues and the brands and prices were virtually the same because 
they were provided by government established retail outlets. This suggests a low 
level of differentiation between Jiushi and Liucun rural markets, not to mention 
similarities with those located in other towns. 
Mr Li had lived in Tangweng village of Jiushi town since the 
establishment of the PRC (Fig. 6.1b). Although the village is located 3 
km from Liucun and 5 km from Jiushi rural markets, Mr Li did not 
think he had a greater choice. He said the commodities in both markets 
were identical and the level of specialisation low. Mr Li purchased farm 
chemicals, such as fertiliser and pig feed, from Liucun market, despite it 
being regarded as a small market. He did not disclose how much 
fertiliser he consumes each year, but said it was not much because he 
had only a 1.6 mu low yield paddy field. According to him, the price, 
quality and brands of fertiliser were all the same in both Liucun and 
Jiushi rural markets because they were supplied by the same 
governmental retail agency_ Mr Li was the only interviewee who still 
used a shoulder pole to carry fertiliser. This primitive method of 
delivery meant that Mr Li took over one hour to travel the 3 km 
distance between home and the market. The small differentiation 
between markets in Jiushi also explains why Mr Li purchased fertiliser 
from the nearest rural market. 
Conversely, in a more commercial area of Dongguan, a higher level of 
differentiation and specialisation was observed between markets. The 
implementation of a responsibility system in farm chemicals has resulted in 
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different levels of service, despite the same government farm- chemical supply and 
retail co- operative being found in all town -level markets. For example, delivery 
services are provided in Wangniudun town. 
Mr Jiang lives 1 km from Wangniudun's Hexi rural market. He 
purchases fertiliser there like many peasants in Hexi village (Fig. 6.2). 
Like his Deqing counterparts, neither distance nor price determined Mr 
Jiang's choice of market because fertiliser is only available there. 
Cultivating less than 2 mu of paddy field, Mr Jiang did not use much 
fertiliser and he purchased it only once a year. Despite having 
purchased fertiliser in the market, he did not consider transport and 
delivery issues because a door -to -door delivery service was provided. 
According to Mr Jiang, the price of fertiliser was higher as transport 
costs were included. However, he welcomed the service because he 
could avoid the problems of arranging transport. Such a service not only 
provided a boon to peasants, but also supplied the dynamics for market 
growth. 
The differences between Dongguan and Deqing demonstrate that rigid 
administrative control does constrain market development. 
A similar service has recently emerged in remote areas in Deqing. For 
example, Dabao village is situated at the hilly border of Huilong town and the 
nearest rural market is located 8 km from the village (Fig. 6.la). 
Remoteness and poor rural roads had created great difficulties for 
peasants, such as Mr Meng, in delivering bulky products such as 
fertiliser. As a result, many peasants bought fertiliser from mobile 
traders who usually visited the village at the beginning of the cultivation 
season with a full tractor load. Retail prices were slightly higher than 
those in rural markets and supply co- operatives because transport costs 
were included. Cultivating less than 1 mu of field, Mr Meng did not 
really care about the price difference because he used less than 700 jin 
farm chemicals each year. Since transport is a great inconvenience, Mr 
Meng said he had no other choice, whatever the price. Mr Lu of 
Shengtian village also purchased farm fertiliser from mobile traders. 
Like Mr Meng, he chose mobile traders because roads were poor and transport 
difficult. 
Since Mr Lu had more than 4 mu of paddy field, he used in excess of 
1,000 jin of chemical fertiliser each year. Although Mr Lu said that 
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1,000 jin was not a huge amount, poor rural roads and transport 
facilities meant great difficulties in delivering the chemicals. Mr Lu 
suggested fertiliser sold by mobile dealers was 5 to 6 yuan per bag 
higher than that in the rural market. Since delivery problems were 
avoided, many peasants in Shengtian and other villages still purchased 
fertiliser from mobile traders. 
Whether such a development will eventually alter Deqing's market development is 
yet to be seen. Given the semi -closed nature of Deqing's economy and the low 
consumption level of peasants, many adjustments still have to be made to ensure 
market growth. 
The above discussion demonstrates the impact of administrative principles 
on rural market development in Deqing and Dongguan. As administrative 
principles determine the number of rural markets and their locations, these factors 
also decide where peasants go to buy and sell products. Although government 
regulations established stereotypical markets at the town -level and provided the 
same basic infrastructure in different places, the study of peasants in Deqing and 
Dongguan showed that their impact varied from place to place. The highly 
commercial environment of Dongguan has overcome many of the drawbacks and 
restrictions associated with market regulation. Conversely, in Deqing, where rural 
markets are still dominated by administrative principles, peasants, both as 
producers and consumers, find their choice of markets highly constrained. 
6.2 Invisible wall versus invisible hand: Government regulations and rural 
market development 
Direct government regulation is another important factor affecting China's rural 
market development. Skinner (1985a, b) overlooked this factor in the reform period 
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by assuming that the abolition of the People's Commune and the relaxation of 
government control restored economic forces. In fact, economic reform since 1979 
has not altered the control mechanism created by the implementation of a planned 
economy. While combining institutional and entrepreneurial roles under the 
administrative -zone economy, local governments continue to intervene in 
economic activities. Such intervention has had a significant consequence on rural 
market development. This is particularly the case in Deqing, where economic 
activities are mainly concentrated in the official rural markets. 
Two forms of government regulation are observed in Deqing and 
Dongguan: trade barriers and toll stations. These have had a varying impact on 
rural market development in the different local contexts. In the next section, an 
examination is made into the government's use of trade barriers to prohibit 
commodity flows. This is followed by a study of the impact of toll stations on rural 
market development. 
6.21 Commodity war repeated: Trade barriers and rural market development 
Direct government intervention has had a major impact on market development in 
Deqing but not in Dongguan. In Deqing, this difference stems from the local 
government's attempt to block private trade in Iocal specialities. Since the 1980s, 
the Deqing government has encouraged cultivation of pine resin, cassia bark and 
silkworm cocoons in an attempt to establish Deqing county as an export base for 
these products in Guangdong province. Unlike other sideline commodities, these 
three are categorised as special local products (tu to chan). The circulation and 
marketing of them are very different from other sideline goods such as pigs and 
vegetables. Special purchase stations have been established in every town to 
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procure them from peasants. Private trading in these products is not prohibited by 
law. However, trading of these items in rural markets is very rare because local 
government strictly controls their flow. Moreover, it is equally difficult for external 
traders to purchase them directly from peasants. 
Revenue raising is the major reason for direct government intervention in 
these local special commodities. During the 1990s, economic reform pushed local 
governments to implement a responsibility system for the acquisition of pine resin, 
cassia bark and silkworm cocoons. These changes were aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the old procurement system controlled by the central government 
through a scheme of sharing profits with subcontractors. However, local 
governments have not given a free rein in the trading of these items because they 
provide a major source of income for both local governments and peasants. 
Consequently, the procurement of a particular special local product is handled by 
one nominated subcontractor in each town. Interviews with peasants and 
government officials suggest that the sole subcontractor has a very close 
relationship with the local government, for example, in Decheng town, the 
subcontractor is a company established by the local government. This is a typical 
practice which demonstrates the intention of local authorities to retain the 
monopolistic trading of the pre -reform period. Moreover, despite the 
implementation of a responsibility scheme, like the old procurement system, a 
town's procurement quota is assigned by the county government and is 
incorporated in the subcontractor's contract. Given the close relationship between 
the local government and the subcontractor, the two usually co- operate with each 
other to guarantee the assigned target is met. This safeguards both the 
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subcontractor's profit and the local government's tax revenue. 
Another major reason for government intervention is the variation in 
purchase price of special local products. Although this is set by the county 
government for pine resin, cassia bark and silkworm cocoons, flexibility is 
allowed.1 This flexibility allows each town's subcontractor to adjust the 
procurement price to increase profits and incentives. Accordingly, a price 
differential exists between towns. In 1988, for instance, the purchase price of pine 
resin was 90 yuan per 100 jin in Jiushi town, while that in Decheng town was 100 
yuan. When compared with Deqing's neighbouring counties, the price differential 
was even greater. In 1998, the purchase price of resin in Yunan county and Gaoyao 
county was 200 yuan and 140 yuan per 100 jin respectively. Private traders even 
offered a higher purchase price of 250 yuan per 100 jin. The same price differential 
was observed in cassia bark. In 1998, the purchase price of cassia bark in Jiushi 
town was 330 yuan per 100 jin, while those in Decheng town and Nanjiangkou 
town were 365 yuan and 400 yuan respectively. 
Obviously, peasants are attracted to selling their products in places where 
higher purchase prices are offered. However, this jeopardises a town's procurement 
assignments and profits. Consequently, administrative measures have been taken to 
stop the outflow of these products and so protect local government's interests, 
including roadblocks, heavy penalties and threats. This is a unique feature of 
China's reform era not mentioned in Skinner's (1985a, b) contention that economic 
' Take pine resin for example. In 1995, its purchase price was 180 to 190 yuan per 100 jin. In 1996 
and 1997, it was slashed to 140 and 90 yuan per 100 jin respectively. Purchase price of cassia bark 
also dropped from 600 yuan per 100 jin in 1994 to 330 yuan in 1998. 
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reform has restored the prior position of market forces in rural market development 
which prevailed during the pre -communist period. 
Administrative regulations have had a marked impact on trading and 
commodities flows and, therefore, on rural market growth. Discussions with 
peasants suggested that the most rigid situation was in Jiushi town. Peasants in 
Xiyan, Niutoutang and Yalizui villages disclosed that both the local government 
and subcontractor had blocked private exports of pine resin, cassia bark and 
silkworm cocoons. Roadblocks were set up on the town's only roadway to 
Decheng town and peasants' bicycles and tractors were checked. If peasants were 
caught, their commodities were confiscated, heavy fines were imposed, and their 
vehicles detained. In a small -scale peasant economy like Deqing, there was very 
little the peasants could do to prevent this intervention. Some had attempted to 
avoid the blockade by using the footpaths in the hilly areas. For example, 
Last year, Mr Li, who lives in Shanding village of Huilong town, 
`smuggled' his pine resin to Decheng town, where the purchase price 
was higher than at the local purchase station (Fig. 6.3a). Mr Li and his 
brothers left home at midnight to avoid roadblocks and checking 
stations. They travelled over 10 km on narrow rural roads and footpaths 
inside the hilly area to Decheng town and finally sold their pine resin at 
150 yuan per 100 lin. 
This example is very unusual because not many people were willing to take such 
high risks, instead, they have continued to complain and to resent the blockade. 
They have no other choice but to sell their products to the relevant local purchase 
station at a lower price, as a result some peasants have stopped producing these 
specialised products as a silent protest against the local government. This has 
further jeopardised rural market development. 
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Plate 6.3 : local pine resin purchase station in Deqing 
Most peasants, who rely on the pittance from pine resin, cassia bark and 
silkworm cocoon production, have been affected by restrictions on trading. This 
situation is best illustrated using a series of case studies. For example: 
Mr Lu lives in. Shengtian village, a medium -size village with a 
population of 200. As he had six members in his family, the collective 
unit - Shengtian village - had allocated about 300 pine trees to him. All 
of his pine trees are mature enough to produce resin. According to Mr 
Lu, the collecting season of pine resin is between April and September 
of the lunar calendar. During this period, peasants can collect three or 
four times before they deliver their resin for sale. In 1997, Mr Lu's pine 
trees produced 7,000 jin pine resin, all of which was sold to the 
government at the local purchase station located only 200 m from 
Shengtian village (Fig 6.3a). Although the purchase price in Decheng 
town was 30 yuan per 100 jin higher than at the local purchase station, 
Mr Lu did not sell his resin in Decheng because the outflow of pine 
resin was blocked by local government. This blockage always caused 
tensions between peasants and the authorities and fighting usually 
erupted. However, peasants were worse -off in virtually all cases. 
The restriction of sales explains why rural market activities are stunted. 
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Peasants in Shatian village, which is located 2 km north of Shengtian, faced 
the same situation. Pine resin production is also a major sideline here, although 
because the village did not collectively own many pine trees only a small number 
of trees had been allocated to villagers. Take Mr Cui's case for illustration: 
Apart from a small number of pine trees allocated by the collective unit, 
Mr Cui further subcontracted a considerable number of pine trees from 
his neighbour at one yuan per tree and have 200 trees in production. 
Being the only labourer to look after the trees, in 1997 Mr Cui produced 
only 400 jin pine resin and earned a profit of 4,000 yuan. According to 
him, he could have made an even higher profit if he had been able to 
sell the resin in Decheng town. But again, such a movement was 
blocked, so he was forced to sell the resin at the local purchase station 
at Shengtian village (Plate 6.3). Like many peasants in Deqing, the 
bicycle was Mr Cui's major means of transport, though sometimes he 
still used the shoulder pole to deliver resins to the purchase station (Fig. 
6.3a). As a producer, Mr Cui did not consider renting tractors to deliver 
the products because he had to minimise his costs. 
The impact of direct government intervention on Deqing's rural market 
development is further illustrated by the marketing of cassia bark. The production 
of cassia bark is similar to that of pine resin. Cassia bark and leaves are collected 
from cassia trees and provide the raw material for Chinese cinnamon, a popular 
spice in China. Many peasants have planted cassia trees in Deqing but the major 
bark production area is in Jiushi town. Unlike pine trees, almost all cassia trees are 
planted by peasants in their private plots. Although these trees take ten years to 
mature, bark and leaves are collected at the age of six and a higher yield is 
expected by the age of eight. For instance: 
Mr Zheng of Xiyan village had cultivated 5,000 cassia trees with an 
annual average yield of 300 to 400 jin barks (Fig. 6.3b). Although 
Xiyan village is situated 5 km from the Jiushi cassia bark purchase 
station, Mr Zheng sold his cassia bark there because it was the only 
place to sell bark in the town (Fig. 6.3b). Like many peasants, Mr 
Zheng delivered his cassia bark to the purchase station by bicycle which 
was the cheapest mode of transport in Deqing. It took him 30 minutes. 
Another Mr Li of Xiyan village also sold his products in Jiushi purchase 
station, although he produced only 100 jin cassia bark last year. 
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As in pine resin, peasants in Xiyan village knew that purchase prices 
differed between towns. Discussions with peasants suggested that the purchase 
price in Nanjiangkou, a neighbouring town located on the opposite side of Xijiang 
River, was 400 yuan per 100 jin, while that in Jiushi was 330 yuan per 100 jin. As 
local authorities had set up blocks on the quay, it was impossible to move cassia 
bark to other places. Moreover, peasants were also threatened not to sell their 
products to mobile traders. Consequently, despite the low price, both Mr Li and Mr 
Zheng thought the local purchase station was the only place to sell their cassia 
bark. In this situation, neither distance nor transport factors but rather government 
intervention determined the choice of markets. This intervention prevents 
interactions between peasants and rural markets in other towns. Consequently, rural 
market growth is restricted as its hinterland is constrained by artificially imposed 
barriers. 
Apart from pine resin and cassia bark, local governments have also 
interfered with the marketing of silkworm cocoons. Unlike pine resin and cassia 
bark, not many Deqing peasants still keep silkworm cocoons because mulberry 
trees, on whose leaves silkworms' feed, grow only in flatland areas. In Deqing 
county, the major silkworm cocoon production area was restricted to Jiushi town. 
In 1997, there was 1,540 mu of mulberry trees in the town, accounting for over 19 
per cent of the county's total. In 1997, the town's silkworm cocoon production was 
83 tonnes, ranking Jiushi second among the 14 towns in the county (DQSR, 
1998:45). 
Dúwu village of Jiushi town was a place in which all households were once 
involved in raising silkworms. This changed when a considerable area of farmland 
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and private plots belonging to peasants were requisitioned for roadway 
construction. Mr Chen was one of the very few who insisted on keeping silkworms. 
Land requisition had less of an impact on his household because he still owned a 2 
mu plot for growing mulberry trees, apart from these, extra space was also needed 
for a special room for keeping silkworms. However, unlike pine and cassia trees, 
which took a long time to mature and produce resins and bark, the silkworm 
cocoon's growing period was only 25 to 27 days. The short growing period 
allowed Mr Chen to harvest seven yields of silkworm cocoons each year. April to 
October is the main growing season, the other months are too cold. Silkworms 
were raised in round bamboo trays one metre in diameter, layers of trays were put 
in special rooms where sunlight was screened and light bulbs installed to keep them 
warm at night. 
Silkworm larvae were available at the silkworm purchase station which was 
located in the town - government seat of Jiushi. Mr Chen usually bought 1 to 1.5 
Jiang larvae for each yield.2 According to Mr Chen, silkworm raising was a labour - 
intensive job because they had to be fed four times a day, i.e. morning, afternoon, 
evening and midnight, and mulberry leaves were collected before each meal to 
ensure their freshness. Moreover, silkworm excrement needed to be removed 
frequently and lime powder was required for fumigation. After 15 days when 
silkworms had grown to a considerable size, they were transferred to straw cocoon 
nets to spin cocoons, these were mature and ready for sale in another 10 to 12 days. 
z Ten hang is equal to 1 jin, which is about 0.5 kg. They are all unit of weights that peasant use. 
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Usually, one Liang of silkworm larvae yielded 50 to 60 jin of cocoon. 
The purchase price of cocoons was still controlled by Deqing's county 
government, despite the deregulation of other items during the reform era. In 
Deqing, the purchase price had decreased since the 1990s, making silkworm raising 
no longer a high income sideline. 
According to Mr Chen, several years ago, the purchase price of 
silkworm cocoon was 8 yuan per jin. By June 1998, it had dropped to 5 
yuan per jin, and in July 1998 had further decreased to 4 yuan. 
Consequently, Mr Chen's income had been slashed from 500 yuan per 
yield to 240 yuan per yield, yet production costs had increased. As 
stressed by Mr Chen, marginal profits were expected only when the 
purchase price was around 6 to 7 yuan per jin. Increases in production 
costs and a decline in purchase prices had wiped out the marginal profit 
of peasants along with the incentive to keep silkworms. Already, many 
in Dúwu village had given up silkworm cocoon production; although 
Mr Chen had persisted, he kept far fewer. He left the job of tending 
them to his father while he worked as a construction worker in town. 
Like pine resin and cassia bark, silkworm cocoons are sold at the designated 
purchase station. 
Although Dúwu village was located 1 km from the Jiushi cocoon 
purchase station, distance was not the major factor that determined Mr 
Chen's choice of market. He was obliged to sell his cocoons at the local 
purchase station because there was no other choice in town (Fig. 6.3b). 
However, the purchase price was higher in Liudou, a neighbouring 
town situated on the other side of Xijiang River. Yet he had never 
thought or selling his cocoons there because local authorities had set up 
blockades. Also rogues were employed by the subcontractor to threaten 
peasants not to export their products. If peasants were captured at the 
roadblocks, all cocoons would be confiscated and a fine imposed. For 
the same reason, it was rare to have mobile traders from other places 
purchasing cocoons in local villages. 
Thus, the flow of cocoons had been strictly controlled by the local government. 
Trade barriers were not imposed on other sideline products but it was clear 
that administrative intervention was a major obstacle preventing the opening -up of 
Deqing's economy. This invisible wall - government intervention - also 
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undermined the benefits brought about by transport improvements in recent years. 
Unlike Deqing, however, direct government intervention in production and 
marketing of agricultural products was weak in Dongguan. It appeared that 
Dongguan's open economy and strong industrial development had wiped out local 
government interest in controlling agricultural production and commodity flows, 
however, the extent of local government control in Dongguan was beyond the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless, situations similar to those in Deqing were not 
found in Dongguan. 
Apart from artificial trading blockades, direct administrative intervention 
was also observed in the production of speciality items, resulting in their decline. 
The collection of pine resin is a good illustration, because it was big business in 
Deqing, not only did local governments attempt to monopolise procurement, but 
administrative villages - village -level administrative units - also interfered in pine 
resin production. The most common strategy was to retain all the collectively 
owned pine trees and not allocate them to peasants, so while many peasants 
produced pine resin, they did not own any trees. 
The case of Daguo village within Guanxu town is a good example. Peasants 
there had to rent pine trees from the collective unit because they were owned by the 
natural village. Mr Chen was one of the peasants living in this small village. 
According to him, rents varied between different villages. In Daguo, 
rent accounted for about 25 per cent of the income of peasants from 
pine resin. While Mr Chen earned 2,000 yuan from pine resin in 1997, 
500 yuan was paid to the collective unit for rent. Moreover, a licensing 
system was about to be implemented, under which those involved in 
pine resin production will have to register with the related authority. Mr 
Chen was very disappointed with this system because more levies were 
likely to be imposed on peasants. He thought it was another way for 
local governments to milk profits from pine resin production. 
219 
Consequently, the earnings of peasants from pine resin are expected to diminish. 
6.22 Another form of roadblock: Toll stations and rural market development 
Toll stations represented another form of direct government intervention which 
affected market development during the reform period. Unlike intervention in the 
trading of local special products, local governments did not intend to use toll 
stations to prevent the movement of people. However, these stations have, 
unexpectedly, restricted the choice of markets through blocking the free journeying 
of people between towns. As interactions between peasants and rural markets were 
restricted, market development was influenced adversely. Toll stations were 
established by the local government and managed by the Roadway Bureau. If 
transport factors are seen as the `invisible hand', toll stations are the `invisible 
walls' that constrain the flow of people, vehicles and even commodities (Plate 6.4). 
The toll station has become a common form of control in Deqing and Dongguan - 
in Deqing county there were four in 1997 and although it was difficult to determine 
their precise numbers in Dongguan, two stations were located in Wangniudun 
town. 
Toll stations were a direct result of dual administrative and entrepreneurial 
roles performed by local government -a development not anticipated in Skinner's 
thesis, As the Deqing government took out loans for road construction, the toll 
payment represented the only as well as the fastest way of repaying debt. This has 
been prevalent during the reform period which has reinforced the economic 
decision- making of local governments. The Roadway Law imposed in 1998 has 
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Plate 6.4 Changgang toll station - -- An invisible wall at the border 
Plate 6.5 A toll payment receipt issued by Deqing Roadway Bureau 
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legalised this practice.3 Toll stations have been allowed on county -level roadways 
jointly developed by local and foreign capital and have become a prime source of 
local government income which explains why so many have been established 
(Plate 6.5). Some illegal ones have also been created. As toll stations were 
generally set up at town or village borders, the movement of people between towns 
was reduced. 
Thus, the positive relations between improved transport routes and market 
development highlighted by Skinner have not occurred in Deqing. Moreover, the 
negative impact of toll stations was reinforced by the county's single market 
structure and its simple road system. Since almost all towns in the county had only 
one rural market, if peasants bypassed it they had to cross the town border to visit 
markets elsewhere. By erecting toll stations the flow of people and commodities 
was easily inhibited because all paved roads in Deqing were part of the county's 
main transport artery. In contrast, although there were more toll stations in 
Dongguan, their impact on market development was less because of the existence 
of both village -level and town -level markets which gave peasants more choices 
within their hometowns. Moreover, while toll stations were established in 
Dongguan, toll payments were not a major concern because peasants were 
wealthier there than in Deqing. Table 6.1 shows the toll rate of Wang -Hong 
roadway toll station in Wangniudun. 
3 The Roadway Law was passed in People's Congress in July, 1997 and took effect on the I ` 
January of 1998. The taw authorises local government to establish toll stations and collect tolls 
within their administrative jurisdictions. Generally, toll stations are allowed every 40 km and 20 km 
in plains and hilly areas respectively. 
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In Deqing, the impact of toll stations on rural market development is aptly 
exemplified by the decline of Datang market in Huilong town. This was the sole 
market in Huilong situated 2 km from the county border -a traditional site which 
had attracted peasants from surrounding towns and counties. Prior to the opening of 
the toll station in the 1990s, the market drew peasants from Changgang towns in 
Fengkai county. Since its establishment at the border, an `invisible wall' has been 
created and interactions between Datang market and places outside Deqing have 
been completely cut off. Tolls required for various types of motor vehicle are 
shown in Table 6.2. This `invisible wall' has had a devastating effect on activities 
at Datang market which was formerly a thriving economic centre. As interactions 
between peasants and markets were restricted, market activities in Datang have 
declined. 
As examples, Shegui and Jiangbianwei were two villages located in 
Changgang town that were linked to Datang and Changgang rural markets by a 
roadway. The establishment of a toll station at the border has discouraged peasants 
in these two villages from visiting Datang market. For instance: 
Mr Yang's family was one of 23 households living in Jiangbianwei 
village. Although the village was located 2.5 km to the west of Datang 
market, Mr Yang always visited Changgang rural market situated 7 km 
to the west of the village (Fig. 6.4). He did not visit Datang market 
simply because of the toll station. Discussions with peasants in 
Changgang suggested that although local bicycles were exempt from 
paying tolls in principle, policies were inconsistent and peasants were 
sometimes caught by the authority and penalties imposed. To avoid 
possible trouble, Mr Yang chose to visit the local market rather than 
cross the border. Using a bicycle as his major transport mode, Mr Yang 
bought non -staple foods, clothes and other daily necessities in 
Changgang rural market. 
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Table 6.1 Toll rate in Wangniudun, Dongguan, 1997 
Type of vehicle Toll rate (in yuan) 
Motor -cycle and sedan 
Passenger vehicles at/below 20 seats 
and trucks at/below 2 tonnes 
Passenger vehicles between 21 -50 
seats and trucks between 2 -5 tonnes 
2 
5 
10 
Passenger vehicles at/above 51 seats 15 
and trucks between 5 -50 tonnes 
Passenger vehicles and trucks over 51 25 
tonnes, and container trucks 
Table 6.2 Toll rate in Deqing county, 1997 
Type of vehicle Toll (in yuan) 
Motor -cycle 3 
Sedan, small vehicles 10 
Van, medium -size vehicles 20 
Truck, large vehicles 30 
Container truck 35 
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Fig. 6.4 Toll stations and their impact on Deqing's peasant- market interactions, 1997 
Mr Bian of Shegui village, located near Jiangbianwei village, has had a 
similar experience: 
Residing 4 km and 5.5 km from Changgang and Datang rural markets 
respectively, Mr Bian chose Changgang market instead of that at 
Datang (Fig. 6.4). Although he said distance was the prime reason for 
his choice, he also mentioned that the toll station at the border was an 
equally important factor. It has discouraged people, including himself, 
from visiting Datang market. 
Similarly, peasants from Huilong town rarely crossed the border to visit the 
Changgang market. Because of the difficulty of access from neighbouring villages, 
Datang market also remained quiet - its turnover value in 1997 was 2.6 million 
yuan, the lowest in Deqing county; its annual number of visitor, only 0.29 million, 
was also the lowest. 
The Datang example contradicts Skinner's general thesis that improved 
road routes will increase the value of rural market turnover. Since a paved road 
linked Datang with other towns, the stagnation of its market could not be seen as a 
consequence of poor transport routes. Also, it contradicts Skinner's (1965a:220) 
argument that the demise of standard markets can follow improvements in road 
links to higher level markets. In the Datang case, the need to comply with 
government regulations at the toll station outweighed the benefits of a good road. 
Worst of all, not only did peasants in Changgang town rarely cross the border, but 
Huilong peasants also ignored Datang market. For example: 
Mr Meng lives in Dabao village, the remotest village in the study area. 
Located in the north hilly border of Huilong town, the village is situated 
9 km and 25 km from Datang and Decheng rural markets respectively. 
Despite the long distance, Mr Meng and other villagers brought clothes 
and shoes in Decheng rural market (Fig. 6.4). According to Mr Meng, 
his choice was due to the larger scale of market and greater variety of 
commodities. In contrast, Datang market has declined and was 
unattractive. The long distance between Dabao village and the market 
prompted Mr Meng to rely on local bus services - referred to as 
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`small wheels'. Since `small wheels' were privately owned, the fare was 
7 yuan and travel time was seventy -five minutes. In fact, Mr Meng was 
not a big farmer with stable income. Cultivating less than 1 mu of paddy 
field and earning a pittance from pine resin production, Mr Meng is one 
of many small peasants in Huilong town. Owing to the decline of the 
local market, Decheng rural market had thus become the nearest market 
place for Mr Meng. In fact, low income, long distance and high bus 
fares have constrained Mr Meng's shopping pattern. Last year, he 
visited Decheng rural market only once, buying a new shirt for the 
Chinese New Year. 
Mr Liu of Pingshan village also provides important insights: 
Living 18 km to the west of Decheng rural market, Mr Liu also 
purchased clothes and children's wear in the market. Mr Liu said he 
was not a choosy consumer but the Iocal rural market - Datang - did 
not provide the commodities he needed. Decheng market has therefore 
become the nearest suitable market, despite a travelling time of over 30 
minutes and bus fare of 5 yuan (Fig. 6.4). Like many peasants in 
Huilong town, Mr Liu said family income has determined his shopping 
pattern. As a result, he visited the market only twice last year. 
As local peasants bypassed Datang, the market remained quiet on market days, 
with trading hours now shortened to one to two hours. Since Datang market was 
established under administrative principles, it wiII not die `naturally' despite the 
decreased number of visitors. 
The decline of Datang market has been recognised by Deqing county's 
ICMB. However, the authority considered that the toll station was not an issue in 
its decline, believing instead that the sparse population of Huilong town was the 
prime factor. Despite the downturn of Datang market, a new one is planned in 
Huilong's town - government seat (Plate 6.6). If a sparse population has caused 
stagnant market conditions in Huilong, the establishment of another market in the 
town will prove to be a poor decision. Indeed, local peasants did not have high 
expectations about the new market, the opening of which was postponed. It was 
still not open when I re- visited the town in early 1999. Whether the new venue will 
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Plate 6.6 Huilong's new rural market - -- A good example of government regulation 
be more successful than the existing one is yet to be seen. However, there is no 
doubt about the negative impact of the toll station on the choice of market by 
peasants and on Deqing's overall rural market development. 
In Dongguan, toll stations appeared to have had little impact on rural 
market development. A major reason is that Dongguan's rural market system has 
always been more advanced and diverse than that of Deqing. In Wangniudun town, 
there were 8 rural markets and 5 of them were at village -level. They provided an 
ample choice of foodstuffs, clothes, household articles and electrical appliances, so 
peasants seldom crossed the border to other venues because a full range of 
commodities was available within their own town. For example: 
Mr Dui of Duwuxin village purchased foodstuffs, footwear, children's 
wear and other daily necessities at the village -level and town -level 
markets (Fig. 6.2). As Mr Dui had a motorcycle, he travelled 3 km to 
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visit the town -level market two to three times a week. According to 
him, he seldom visited venues outside Wangniudun town because he 
was satisfied with the variety and quality of commodities locally. Last 
year, however, Mr Dui made one visit to Guancheng, the city 
government seat, to buy an imported colour television set. 
Clearly, the advanced market system in Dongguan had neutralised any negative 
impact caused by the toll stations. 
That toll stations were responsible for the decline in Deqing is further 
demonstrated by the fact that their abolition elsewhere has produced the reverse 
effect. This is illustrated by the example of Guanxu rural market located 13 km to 
the north of Decheng central market, the largest in Deqing. Although there were 
linked by a paved road, peasants in Guanxu seldom visited the Decheng market 
because a toll station had been established on the only roadway linking the two 
towns. Like the toll station on the border of Huilong town, the presence of the toll 
station had discouraged Guanxu peasants from visiting Decheng market. For 
example: 
Mr Qi, who lived in Tongyougen village of Guanxu town, had a 
motorcycle but seldom visited Decheng market because of the toll 
station. He said the toll station had severed local people's connections 
to the Decheng market because many of them could not afford the toll 
payment. After the toll station was abolished in early 1998, Mr Qi 
travelled frequently to the Decheng market (Fig. 6.4). He said the 
abolition of the toll station was of significant consequence to him and 
other motorcycle riders. 
Since peasants can now travel freely to Decheng market, their trips have become 
more frequent. 
The abolition of the toll station has also attracted many Guanxu peasants, 
like Mr Li, to the Decheng central market. 
Mr Li lives in Maotang village, a medium size village with a population 
over 500. As one of his sons has been a migrant worker, family income 
had been quite stable. Several years ago, Mr Li had spent 30,000 yuan 
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rebuilding his house. Although he was relatively wealthy, he never 
visited Decheng market before the abolition of the toll station. Guanxu 
market, which was located 6 km from Maotang, was his sole choice for 
buying clothes and daily necessities (Fig. 6.4). While cycling to Guanxu 
market took him about 40 minutes, Mr Li said the distance was 
acceptable. After the abolition of the toll station, Mr Li switched to the 
Decheng market, which was larger in scale and had a greater variety of 
commodities than Guanxu. Although Decheng market was located 7 km 
from Maotang village, Mr Li still insisted on cycling, though sometimes 
he chose to take the recently introduced public bus services. Mr Li was 
pleased to see these changes and he thought the 2 yuan bus fare was 
acceptable. As a result, he visited Decheng market more frequently than 
before to purchase clothes, footwear, daily necessities and non -staple 
foods. 
The situation of Mr Nie, of Dengcun village, also illustrates the positive 
effects of abolishing the toll station: 
He did not visit Decheng market when the toll station was in operation. 
Although Dengcun village was situated 9 km to the north of Guanxu 
rural market, it was his only choice for buying food and daily 
necessities. The abolition of the toll station has enabled him to visit a 
bigger and closer market, which was located 4 km to the south of 
Dengcun village. Although the bus fare was only 2 yuan, Mr Nei 
preferred cycling because he thought 4 km was only a very short 
distance. While cycling to Decheng market took Mr Nei 20 minutes, he 
did not visit the market regularly. Like many peasants in the county, he 
thought income had significantly affected his choice of market and 
shopping frequency. Nevertheless, it was the abolition of the toll station 
that let him choose between a wider range of markets (Fig. 6.4). 
Consequently, Decheng market has become busier because its peasants are no 
longer restricted by government regulations from visiting it. Moreover, the 
abolition of the toll station has also increased the efficiency of the road (see 
Chapter 5). Positive impact on rural market development that brings about by road 
improvement has been revived. 
Case studies of Deqing and Dongguan have highlighted that government 
strategies included direct intervention through price controls and roadblocks, and 
indirect intervention through the establishment of toll stations. However, the 
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impact of all these factors has varied depending on local contexts. While 
roadblocks and price controls have highly restricted producers in Deqing from 
marketing local products, the consequences have been less significant in 
Dongguan. Toll stations have created unexpected barriers to the choice of markets 
in both places. However, given the variations in economic development and market 
establishment, the effect of government regulation on rural market development 
has been more substantial in Deqing than Dongguan. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the significance of administrative factors in rural 
market developments in both Deqing and Dongguan. A similar situation has been 
observed in the Sudan of Africa where marketing activities are constrained by state 
monopoly, and wage and price control (Lado, 1988). However, government 
regulations in China have been more dominant and decisive. The adverse effects of 
government intervention were illustrated by the use of administrative principles to 
establish markets; the attempt by local government to block private trade in special 
products; and the establishment of toll stations. Regulation could be seen as an 
`invisible wall' that blocked movements of people and commodities between towns 
and counties. The administrative principle of `one designated town, one market' 
has restricted the choice of market for both producers and consumers. Roadblocks 
have constrained the export of special local products. Toll stations have obstructed 
the movement of people between towns and thus limited their choice of markets. 
Government regulations have wiped out the benefits created by transport and 
economic improvements which would have altered the nature of interactions 
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between peasants and rural markets. This was mainly the case in Deqing county, as 
market forces were not as well established as in Dongguan. 
By focusing on administrative factors, this chapter has demonstrated that 
their significance has not diminished during the reform era. Skinner has addressed 
their importance but he also overplayed China's market liberalisation during the 
reform era. This chapter has provided strong counter -arguments to Skinner's rather 
parochial views on the importance of transport elements. Transport was not the 
only component involved in China's rural market development. In addition, 
variations between Deqing and Dongguan have suggested that China's rural market 
development was much more complicated than envisaged in Skinner's analysis. 
232 
Chapter 7 
Deqing, Dongguan and Skinner's regional framework: 
A discussion 
Local rural market systems are regarded by Skinner as forming the basic level of a 
regional hierarchy, in which these systems are connected horizontally to similar 
local systems, and vertically to higher level systems. Although local systems are 
similar in size and functions, there are considerable socio- economic and cultural 
variations among them. These variations are addressed by Skinner through his 
regional framework. Based on China's topography, Skinner (1977b) classifies the 
country into eight macroregions (See Chapter 2 and Fig. 2.3). Each region features 
a "system of cities that provide[s] its skeletal structure" and is further divided into 
cores and peripheries by reference to the concentration of trade and socio- economic 
development (Skinner, 1977b:212, 1994). Moreover, each macroregion's core and 
periphery have a similar level of development, though some of them are being 
situated in China's inland and border areas (Skinner, 1994:49). 
This chapter examines the validity of Skinner's framework by reflecting on 
the experiences of Deqing and Dongguan. Focus is placed on Skinner's core - 
periphery notion and its explanatory value with regard to variations between these 
two places which are located within the Lingnan region - one of Skinner's eight 
macroregions (Skinner, 1977b, 1994). This is followed by a discussion of and 
debates on the urban -rural concept. Arguably, the urban -rural notion still provides 
an insightful way of understanding spatial variations despite its analytical value 
being questioned by some scholars. This is particularly true in the case of China, 
where political factors still play an important role in socio- economic development. 
233 
7.1 Core and periphery: A regional approach 
Previous discussions of Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate that they have 
distinctive types of local markets; the former exhibits a simple structure with a high 
degree of government intervention and the latter is more open and sophisticated 
with a relatively low degree of regulation. In Deqing, marketing and shopping 
patterns demonstrate that sales and consumption are highly concentrated in rural 
markets as a result of the county's relatively poor retail network and road system. 
In contrast, Dongguan has a diversified shopping and marketing pattern, made 
possible by its well -developed transport network and the relatively high income of 
its peasants. 
Differences between Deqing and the Wangniudun market of Dongguan and 
their relationship with neighbouring market systems demonstrate what Skinner 
(1977c, 1994) regards as core and periphery in macroregions. According to Skinner 
(1977c:282), core and periphery are initially defined by using: 
population density as the major indicator of resource concentration on the 
grounds that it is a major component of demand density and correlates 
strongly with agricultural productivity both as cause (labour inputs) and as 
effect (the carrying capacity of the land). 
The empirical validity of Skinner's concept is examined by Sands and Myers 
(1986). In considering six rural variables - population density, cropping density, 
total grain surplus, total sown area, proportion of irrigated farmland and proportion 
of farming households - they question the value of his notion because their 
findings show no marked differences in rural activities between macroregions. 
Also, they argue that Skinner's core -periphery hypothesis has oversimplified the 
situation during the early twentieth century. Using the same indicators to examine 
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concentration of resources in macroregions, Sands and Myers (1986:737) argue 
that Skinner's idea does not provide an effective tool for understanding Imperial 
China because these concentrations varied between the cores and peripheries of 
different macroregions. 
Skinner's (1994) recent work argues that the legitimacy of the core - 
periphery notion has persisted during the reform era. However, here he adopts a 
gradual developmental model to explain spatial variations between core and 
periphery to accommodate the complexity of economic and social development in 
China during economic reform. Using the Lingnan macroregion as a case study, 
Skinner (1994) reclassifies it into seven zones in accordance with economic, 
educational, welfare and demographic variations.' From the centre to the rim, these 
zones include an inner core (Zone 1), outer core (Zones 2 and 3), near periphery 
(Zones 4 and 5) and far periphery (Zones 6 and 7) (Fig. 7.1). In terms of 
development, according to Skinner (1994:28), "Lingnan's Zone 1, the inner core, is 
comparable to the Four Dragons, whereas Zone 7, the far periphery, resembles 
Nepal ". 
In this scheme, Deqing would be located in the outer core (Zone 2) and 
Dongguan in the inner core (Zone 1). There is little doubt about Dongguan's 
central location and prosperity. Conversely, given Deqing's stagnant economic and 
social development, it is surprising to find the county is included as a core area in 
Skinner (1994:33 -47) analysed 20 variables. They are the level of mechanisation, irrigation, tractor 
ploughing, electricity use, grain yields, meat production, gross value of agricultural output, 
agricultural labour force, industrial labour force, size of largest town, gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output, illiteracy rate, junior -middle schooling level, infant mortality, farm income, 
child -woman ratios, general fertility rates, age structure, household size, and migration. 
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Skinner's scheme. Since the rural market system in Deqing is rudimentary and its 
economy semi- closed, one can only speculate about its counterpart in the far 
periphery areas (Zone 7). Without comparing a marketing district from the far 
periphery with those of Deqing and Dongguan, it is hard to validate Skinner's 
classification. His claim has to be the topic of further research. 
Skinner's (1994) recent modification of his original work is still 
problematical, despite various inclusions to strengthen his argument about China's 
core -periphery structure. The shortcomings stem from his failure to include 
political and policy factors, alongside the economic, demographic, and transport 
issues which he has considered. The differences between Deqing and Dongguan 
result from the varied effects of market forces and government regulations, 
demonstrating that a shift in Chinese development philosophy during the reform 
era has produced considerable unevenness in market development. The socialist 
ideal of equality between regions and between urban and rural areas during Mao's 
period has been replaced by Deng's `let a small number of people get rich first', 
which places greater emphasis on market forces to achieve rapid economic growth. 
Under this ideology, a widening developmental gap between coastal and inland and 
core and periphery is tolerated (Fan, 1997). Scholars, such as Hu (1998), argue that 
unequal growth is inevitable when China is in transition from a planned economy 
to a market economy.2 Like some Chinese leaders, Hu seems to believe that trickle - 
down effects will finally bring prosperity to the whole of China. 
2 In contrast to Hu, Wang and Hu (1999) argue that the unequal nature of China' regional 
development is avoidable. This is because the inequality is generated by preferential policies to 
specific places. Abolition of these policies may generate a relatively balanced growth between 
different regions. 
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There is no doubt that while market forces have boosted economic 
development they have also increased regional inequality during the reform era. 
Paralleling the shift in China's development philosophy has been the adoption of a 
coastal- oriented strategy whereby foreign investment has been pumped into coastal 
areas such as Dongguan. The establishment of special economic zones, open 
coastal cities, economic and technological development zones and open coastal 
economic zones has given preferred status to specific places. Benefits of this 
include exemption from customs duties, industrial and commercial taxes, local 
income taxes and the right to retain local foreign exchange earnings. In contrast, 
inland areas, like Deqing, have not been covered by these policies, serving to widen 
the gap between these areas. The variation in foreign investment input in Deqing 
and Dongguan illustrates the disparities created by preferential policies (see 
Chapter 4). Foreign investment, however, is missing in Skinner's (1994) data sheet, 
though he claims his figures have incorporated the effects of these policy changes. 
The shortcomings of the core -periphery concept in explaining variations in 
post 1979 China are further demonstrated by examining changes to the 
administrative hierarchy. Focusing on Imperial China, Skinner suggests a 
correlation between administrative and economic systems in core and peripheral 
areas and argues: 
Cities whose economic centrality was exceptionally high tended to be 
capitals of extra -large prefectures with extraordinarily broad spans of 
control Span declined steadily and regularly with the capital's 
economic centrality until cities of exceptionally low economic 
centrality are seen to have been capitals of very small prefectural -level 
units with extraordinarily narrow spans of control (Skinner, 1977c:312). 
In other words, high -level administrative units, such as prefectures, were situated 
in core areas and low -level administrative units - zhou (chou) and ting (t'ing) - 
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were found in peripheral areas. Since 1949, zhou and Ling have been abolished and 
replaced by town and township as the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy. 
Case studies of Deqing and Dongguan show that there is little correlation 
between the centrality of location and the span of control. Dongguan enjoys a 
central location but its span of control is similar to that of Deqing. Both are 
encompassed by administrative boundaries. Town and township are both found in 
Deqing and Dongguan. Moreover, since towns in both places are at the same 
administrative level they have the same span of control, irrespective of whether 
they are situated in the centre or the edge of Guangdong province. Thus, a place's 
span of control is defined by its administrative status and not by location. This is 
particularly significant in China where the administrative hierarchy takes 
precedence over the economic hierarchy. 
The weak correlation between location and span of control is generated by 
the institutional reform of city -leading- counties (shi guan xian) since 1982 which 
has re- arranged China's spatial organisation. The power of prefecture -level cities 
has been expanded by putting counties and towns, regarded as rural, under their 
jurisdiction. In so doing, urban and rural areas have been placed under one 
administrative unit. This extension of power, however, does not imply that the core 
area has also expanded. In fact, it indicates that a rapid urbanisation process has 
taken place through government regulation.3 Many new prefecture -level cities, 
regarded as urban, are now set up in non -central locations. Guangdong was one of 
3 Another measure to accelerate urbanisation is the change of establishment criteria. Yang (1996) 
gives a detailed description of these. See Lin and Ma (1994) for a description of the urbanisation 
process in Guangdong. 
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the first three provinces to implement the city -leading -counties system. Under the 
new arrangement, Zhaoqing city, the prefecture -level city to which Deqing is 
administratively subordinated, has been established in the western border of the 
province. Moreover, designated towns have been set up in both central and 
periphery locations. Many of them in Guangdong are local economic and transport 
hubs. This is particularly the case for those acting as county government seats (Lin, 
1993). 
The limitation of the core -periphery concept is further illustrated by 
variations in government control which are reflected in Deqing and Dongguan. If, 
as Skinner suggests, the span of control is broad in core areas and relatively narrow 
in peripheral ones, the degree of government control should also be tight in the 
core area and loose in the periphery. in fact, Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate 
the opposite case. The impact of toll stations, existence of trade barriers and direct 
regulation of agricultural production in Deqing highlights the fact that the border 
county suffers from a greater degree of government control than Dongguan. 
In studying China's urbanisation process, geographers attempt to explain 
why spatial variations exist in the degree of government control. Employing an 
economic imperative, Chan (1992) suggests that tight control in urban areas 
stemmed from the high cost of urbanisation. During the pre -reform period, a series 
of measures were implemented to minimise the cost of urban development. In all 
cities, these included tight management of migration, a rationing system for all 
necessary consumables, full employment, suppression of both incomes and 
consumption of urban workers, and limitation on the growth of the services sector. 
As argued by Chan (1992), the aim was to `economise' the cost of urbanisation 
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without hampering the pace of China's industrialisation. 
Tang (1997) further exposes how the tight control of urban areas has been 
brought about by China's `shortage economy', characterised by expansion drives 
and investment hunger.4 To prevent the expansion of cities, created by industrial 
activities, the state had to limit their growth - a situation absent in rural areas 
which are dominated by agricultural production. 
The persistence of `shortage' conditions during the reform era has been 
dependent upon the level of market liberalisation. When central planning resulted 
in resource shortages, state regulation was reinforced. The introduction of market 
forces during the reform era has proved to be an effective tool in breaking down 
this vicious circle. Another measure used to combat shortages is to increase local 
government' s autonomy by decentralising economic decision -marking power. 
Both courses, however, have been ineffective in improving Deqing's situation. 
Obviously, Deqing, which is located on the provincial border and enjoys no 
preferential policies, is under less regulation from market forces than Dongguan. 
The relatively poorer natural and economic conditions present in Deqing have 
resulted in the continuing of resource shortages, despite the decentralisation of 
power to local government. For Deqing, faced with heavy fiscal pressure stemming 
from the termination of direct subsidies from the state, the increasing cost of 
bureaucracy and working targets set up by governments at higher levels, 
government regulation is probably the best way to allocate local financial resources 
to selected sectors and protect them from economic risk. In contrast, Dongguan has 
° The concept of a `shortage economy' was originally presented by Kornai (1980a, b). It provides an 
excellent tool to analyse the economic situation in planned economies like China. 
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enjoyed a massive influx of domestic and foreign capital as a result of various 
preferential policies. Decentralisation of economic decision -making power has 
enabled Dongguan to make use of a golden opportunity to develop into one of the 
coastal region's most prosperous places. With the loosening of central control, 
government surveillance has changed from a direct to an indirect form of 
intervention. 
Variations in government control have also been examined by political 
scientists from a different perspective. Focusing on administrative structures and 
personal appointment procedures, Edin (1998) suggests that tight control at the 
local level is a double function of fiscal incentives available to local government 
and personnel interest of local cadres. As noted, these fiscal incentives are driven 
by financial pressure generated by economic reform. The prospects for promoting 
local cadres are determined by their achievements, evaluated ostensibly on the 
basis of both their economic and non -economic performances - usually the former 
takes precedence (Ho, 1994). To achieve their targets, local cadres use their 
authority to concentrate effort and resources on monitoring selected sectors and 
industrial enterprises (Edin, 1998). Consequently, more local resources and 
enterprises are put directly under the local government control. 
Government control of local resources does not automatically generate 
economic growth. Where economic objectives are hard to achieve in hilly areas 
like Deqing, local cadres pay more attention to non -economic goals including the 
implementation of unpopular policies such as birth control and revenue collection 
(O'Brien and Li, 1999). This explains why social control persists in areas of poor 
economic performance. In contrast, social control in economically prosperous 
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areas, such as Dongguan, is relatively loose because local cadres expend most of 
their efforts on economic issues. 
In short, Skinner's (1994) update has strengthened the explanatory power 
of his core -periphery notion by refining many oversimplified arguments in his 
1970s papers. However, the situation in Deqing and Dongguan suggests these 
concepts are still inadequate to explain spatial variations during the reform period. 
A major shortcoming is the neglect of foreign investment and its impact. 
Furthermore, while Skinner examines the significance of various socio- economic 
factors using data matrixes, political aspects, which are not readily quantifiable, are 
still missing. Moreover, the core -periphery concept fails to address disparities 
caused by structural forces. Although these matters have been criticised by Wang 
and Hu (1999:207) as not being in conformity with the socialist ideals, they are 
crucial for understanding China's spatial development during the reform period. 
However, Skinner made little alternation to macroregions. Despite socio- 
economic changes being observed within these regions, he argues: 
Each of the late imperial macroregional systems persists to the 
present The central metropolises (apex cities) of all nine 
macroregional economies remain unchanged (Skinner, 1994:23). 
Since Skinner's macroregions are defined in terms of drainage basins, the division 
remains valid unless the topography changes. However, this classification appears 
to be inappropriate for explaining regional economic development because the 
Chinese economic system is constrained by administrative boundaries. 
The three -fold division of eastern, middle and western - probably the most 
widely adopted classification in regional analysis - provides a good illustration of 
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inappropriate regionalisation.5 Despite this division being claimed to consider 
various factors, such as resource endowment, economic, social and cultural 
differences and level of urbanisation, the classification is still based on provinces. 
This practice, as commented on by Shen (1999:184), has a strong sense of state 
orientation because all regions are determined by administrative boundaries. 
Nevertheless, Li (1996) suggests that administrative boundaries have practical and 
immediate significance in academic research because all statistics are published by 
province and county. 
The country has been re- classified into seven economic regions in 
formulating the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996 -2000) and the blueprint of economic 
development in the next century (Fig. 7.2). These regions are: (a) Changjiang 
(Yangzi) Delta and areas along the Changjiang; (b) Bohai rim; (c) South -eastern 
coastal; (d) South -west and part of south China; (e) North -eastern; (f) five 
provinces in central China; and (g) North -western, however, their boundaries have 
not been precisely defined. For instance, while highlighting the Bohai rim region, 
the blueprint mentions both Beijing and Tianjin, and the Liaodong and Shandong 
peninsulas, demonstrating that regional classification has gone beyond the 
constraints of provincial boundaries by putting more emphasis on the economic 
and transport connections between central cities (Fan, 1997:631). Whether such a 
5 This classification was defined by the Chinese government during the Seventh Five Year Plan 
(1986- 1990). The eastern region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi provinces; the 
inland region includes Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi and Hunan provinces; 
the western region includes Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and 
Xinjiang provinces. 
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trend will continue is yet to be seen. This development shows that increasing 
emphasis has been put on economic forces. 
Fig. 7.2 The seven economic regions defined by Chinese government, 1996* 
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7.2 Urban -rural perspective: New meaning in a new context 
The shortcomings of the core -periphery notion in explaining variations between 
Deqing and Dongguan invites reconsideration of the urban -rural concept, which 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate in recent years. McGee 
(1998:471) has suggested that the urban-rural dichotomy is losing "its utility as a 
heuristic concept and a policy paradigm ". He further argues that "the concept of 
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rural -urban division based on spatial demarcation is merely an artificial one" 
(McGee, 1998:471). The reason for this is because the dichotomy has created 
difficulties in placing definitive boundaries around the concepts of `urban' and 
`rural', particularly in cases where the development of globalisation and the global 
imperative of production, investment and trade have increasingly integrated 
regional economic activities. Koppel (1991:60 -61) believes these activities have 
not only led to the influx of private capital into urban centres, but have also 
redefined the rural service markets involving land and labour. Consequently, urban 
and rural areas are no longer seen as two separate, antagonistic areas. 
The other rationale behind McGee's argument is his study of functionally 
integrated zones and megapolitan regions in Asia's developing countries. Based on 
his empirical studies of the urban transition, McGee argues that functionally 
integrated zones, which combine both agricultural and industrial activities, are 
emerging. He uses the term desakota, the Indonesian word meaning village (desa) 
and town (kota), to denote these integrated zones (McGee, 1989:93 -4). According 
to McGee (1989:96), desakota is a region which has "no clear cut division between 
rural and urban relations ", Functionally, it is "an intensive mixture of agricultural 
and non -agricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city 
cores" (McGee, 1991:7). 
By applying the desakota concept to Asian countries, McGee and his 
followers argue that functionally integrated zones have appeared in Taiwan, Japan, 
Indonesia and various parts of China (McGee, 1989; Zhou, 1991; Johnston, 1994; 
Lin, 1997b; Wang, 1997). The emergence of desakota implies cities and their rural 
counterparts are no longer separated and disparities between them are receding. In 
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turn, urban -rural interactions have been reinforced and both areas have become 
increasingly integrated in a "web of transactions" (McGee, 1998:485). This 
development suggests urban and rural areas have been integrated by a regional 
network. Within this network, the urban and its rural counterpart are seen as being 
well connected by transport systems allowing frequent interactions of people, 
commodities and capital flows. These linkages are said to narrow the development 
gap between the city and countryside. 
McGee's argument is not without its supporters. Koppel (1991) and Koppel 
and Hawkins (1994) also question the legitimacy of the urban -rural dichotomy in 
understanding current developments in Asian countries. Koppel and Hawkins 
(1994:4 -7) suggest that a crucial step in understanding the complexities of rural 
labour processes in Asian countries is to reject the primacy of the urban -rural 
dichotomy. Koppel (1991:48) regards the dichotomy as a "deceptive dilemma" of 
two misleading alternatives. He criticises studies employing this perspective as 
being too rigid because current political, economic, social and cultural changes in 
Asian countries do not always dovetail with the concepts of `urban' and `rural'. 
The growth of cities in Asia, for instance, will not eliminate the huge rural 
population in these countries. According to Koppel (1991:48 -50), these special 
processes and their underlying causes cannot be explained by the urban -rural 
dichotomy. 
The assumptions that underlie the urban -rural dichotomy, according to 
Koppel (1991:49), are confusing and misleading. The first puzzling premise is that 
rural society is dependent on its urban counterpart through a variety of 
interrelationships. Under this hypothesis, rural areas are regarded as regions 
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responsible solely for agricultural production and isolated from urban markets and 
urban residents, and vice versa. Second, an oversimplifying logic assumes that the 
decline of agricultural activities and productivity is the result of an increase in 
urban economic influences. The third erroneous belief is that a particular set of 
political, economic, social and cultural relations is embedded in cities and the 
countryside. Therefore, the urban -rural dichotomy assumes that the same set of 
relationships can be found in different cities and their rural counterparts. Any 
studies based on these assumptions, and the urban -rural perspective, are said to be 
weakened by their failure to "recognise that the dichotomies are part of the 
problem" (Koppel, 1991:51). This is particularly the case in analysing the impacts 
of rural reforms and policies which favour agricultural production and its support 
system. 
A different viewpoint from that of McGee, Koppel and Flawkins is 
presented by Potter and Unwin (1995). They focus on interactions between urban 
and rural areas in the developing world, which stem from recent urbanisation and 
global changes, and argue that these demonstrate the importance of the urban -rural 
perspective. Although the formation of functionally integrated zones has physically 
linked the city and the countryside, it is doubtful, according to Potter and Unwin 
(1995), whether rural areas will benefit from this integration during recessions and 
times of high international debt. They suggest that there are several conditions 
which are unfavourable to rural areas (Potter and Unwin, 1995:69). First, the 
concentration of private capital in the urban cores has grown, as a result, offshore 
manufacturing enterprises are drawn to the principal urban rather than rural areas. 
Secondly, adjustments to cope with recession may also be used to restrict 
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the spread of new technology from urban areas. Finally, the exchange of 
agricultural and industrial products between urban and rural areas favours the 
former. This is because central places for economic activities - urban areas - 
always have a higher potential to generate revenue for both state and private 
investors. Consequently, "rather than growth spreading from urban to rural areas in 
these hard times, the rural zones seem to be paying an exceptionally high price for 
the polarised forms of urban development" (Potter and Unwin, 1995:69). 
Moreover, global political changes, particularly the collapse of socialism in 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, have boosted the spread of capitalism - a 
process which is intimately associated with urbanisation. Further, in order to 
incorporate developing countries into the world economic system - dominated by a 
market economy - and to attract foreign investment, they have had to expand their 
urban infrastructure. A similar situation is observed in China, where most foreign 
direct investment has been located in urban areas (Yeh, 2000), Consequently, the 
gap in development between urban and rural areas has widened. 
The debate on urban-rural dichotomy is still ongoing. However, there does 
seem to be value in retaining the concept in order to understand the spatial 
development of Asian countries, particularly China. There is no doubt that rapid 
development in these countries, such as the emergence of rural industries, has 
blurred the distinction between urban and rural. However, the continuing 
juxtaposition of development and underdevelopment, prosperity and poverty, and 
rich and poor highlights a dilemma for McGee, Koppel and Hawkins. The outright 
rejection of the urban-rural perspective simply assumes that exploitation between 
regions (particularly those between city and countryside), between the agricultural 
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and industrial sector, and unequal development between urban and rural areas no 
longer exists. In fact, in most Asian developing countries, the conflicts between 
formal and informal sectors, different policies in agricultural and non -agricultural 
activities, and the inequalities of income between rural and urban are problems too 
pronounced to be ignored. These conflicts and disparities are closely related, or 
produced, by the dichotomous development of these countries (Sethi, 1994:12). For 
example, Tang and Chung's (2000) study demonstrates that economic integration 
between urban and rural areas in Jiangsu province - one of China's most 
prosperous regions - has been constrained by the administrative system. While 
spatial fragmentation and inequality still exists between sectors and regions, the 
idea of dismissing entirely the urban -rural perspective seems an over -reaction to 
the development of rural China. 
The urban -rural notion still plays an important role in understanding 
China's spatial development during the reform period. This is because 
administrative measures have continued to be used to organise spatial development 
(see Chapter 3). Under the political- cum -economic system, `urban' and `rural' 
cannot merely be seen as spatial concepts, they are also political notions that 
explain institutional and power differences over space. Concomitantly, urban -rural 
relations in China are not merely relationships of economic activities over space, 
but also between different administrative units. Accordingly, unlike Skinner's pure 
spatial core -periphery concept, the urban -rural notion is a geopolitical one which 
explains China's regional variations and provides "a link between policy and real 
power" (Sethi, 1994:17). This viewpoint remains a useful tool for understanding 
China's political economy and spatial development since 1949 in general, and the 
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variations between Deqing and Dongguan in particular. 
The urban -rural concept helps scholars understand that variations between 
Deqing and Dongguan are not merely economic or spatial, but are also structural 
due to their administrative status. During the pre -reform period, China was 
administratively divided into two spatial units - urban and rural. The former was 
administratively organised by cities and the latter by counties. Further, the city 
specialised in industrial production and the rural in agricultural activities. Thus, 
urban and rural areas were separated, with certain economic activities being 
organised and managed by different administrative bodies. Since inter -regional 
interactions were highly restricted, rural areas were regarded as closed economic 
units that specialised in food and raw material production. Economic activities in 
rural areas were determined by orders and plans sent down from the higher levels 
rather than by direct contacts with urban areas. Urban areas were closed in the 
same way. 
Although economic reform since 1978 has broken down the rigid division 
of labour between urban and rural areas and has reactivated the interactions 
between them, the administrative structure has persisted. In the early 1980s, both 
Deqing and Dongguan were county -level units. However, after Dongguan was 
promoted to `county -level city' and `prefecture -level city' in 1985 and 1988 
respectively, it has been granted an `urban' status with associated powers and 
privileges. This has included greater economic autonomy, more power to approving 
land development projects and more central investments. Moreover, urban related 
authorities, such as departments of planning, power supply, transport and sewerage, 
have been established. hi contrast, Deqing has persisted in its county position with 
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little increase in power. Administratively it is still regarded as `rural'. 
Deqing and other rural districts have been further undermined by the city - 
leading- counties system. This is because counties are administratively subordinated 
to prefecture -level cities (leading cities) under the new system. Instead of helping 
the countryside to develop, the urban area exploits the resources of rural districts. 
Such a situation is regarded as `city -extorting- counties' (shi gua xian) (Gao and Pu, 
1987; Xia and Yang, 1991; Wang, 1992; Pu, 1995; Ma, 1996). Whether leading 
city Zhaoqing has extorted from Deqing is unknown. However, the system of city - 
leading- counties reinforces the unequal position between urban and rural areas. 
Also, it provides a mechanism for the unequal exchange of resources between 
urban and rural areas. Due, in part, to fewer central inputs, rural districts and 
agricultural activities are generally in subordinate positions. Disparities between 
urban and rural areas are expanding (URSE -Study Group, 1996a, 1996b; Fan and 
Xiang, 1999). Thus, variations in administrative status (i.e. urban and rural) have 
structurally determined Deqing and Dongguan's differences in economic and 
market development, not to mention the impact of preferential policies and 
disparities in foreign investment. 
While case studies of Deqing and Dongguan illustrate variations in 
government regulations determining rural marketing activities, the urban -rural 
notion provides a useful framework for understanding how and why such variations 
have occurred. This goes beyond general descriptions of spatial differences by 
linking them to their political context and policies. It reminds researchers of the 
continuing importance of political factors in any study of China, despite economic 
reform weakening the capacity of the state to regulate. Moreover, the juxtaposition 
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of government regulations and market forces in Deqing and Dongguan's market 
development demonstrates that a purely economic perspective is inadequate. While 
Huang (1996b) suggests political scientists adopt an economic perspective to 
understand local government behaviour, it is equally important for geographers to 
employ a geopolitical view in studying China's spatial development. This inter- 
disciplinary perspective is more attuned to China's complex reality during the era 
of economic reform. 
The urban-rural concept is not a panacea for understanding all types of 
spatial variations in China However, it is still a useful tool for gaining insights into 
China's regional development and its underlying determinants because economic, 
social and political evolutions are so different between urban and rural areas. While 
this study has highlighted gaps in market development between rural areas with 
different administrative status, other disparities between urban and rural market 
growth also require investigation. As noted in Chapter 3, the number of urban 
markets increased twice as fast as their rural counterparts between 1979 and 1997. 
Population growth does not provide a sufficient explanation for such expansion 
because there is an active birth control policy in the cities. Accordingly, why does 
this situation exist and how can it be explained? These questions require further 
research. 
Apart from market development, a number of research questions need to be 
raised about the continuing legitimacy of urban-rural concepts. For example: (a) 
Why do economic reforms appear more successful in rural than in urban areas? (b) 
Why have democratic elections been launched in villages but not in cities? (c) Why 
has local corporatism emerged in the countryside while rarely being found in urban 
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areas? and (d) Why are the rural `new rich' so eager to pay money for urban 
household registrations? In considering these issues, it is necessary to look at how 
structural differences between urban and rural areas have created disparate forms 
and ways of development during the reform era. Classical geographers are in a 
good position to contribute to these discussions given their abiding interest in 
spatial variations. 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
Regional analysis, as noted by Kirkby (1985), has never been an easy task in China 
because of its extraordinary scale. Yet Skinner's core and periphery concept has 
extended geographers' understanding of regional development. However, it is 
inadequate as an explanation of spatial variations during the reform period. The 
core -periphery notion does not provide the critical connection between spatial 
distribution and the political context in which it is embedded. While the situation in 
Deging and Dongguan reflects spatial variations that are closely related to their 
administrative status, an inter -disciplinary concept is needed which deals with 
space and structural differences. Although its analytical value has been questioned, 
the urban -rural concept is still a useful tool for understanding China's complex 
situation during the reform period. 
This chapter has presented some criticisms of Skinner's core -periphery 
notion and his regional framework but this does not mean it is without merits. 
Skinner's thesis has theorised China's spatial structure and shown its 
interrelationship with economic and social development in an insightful way. His 
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macroregional framework and core -periphery concept offer useful tools for both 
academic studies and the formulation of regional development strategies. This is 
particularly important given China's extraordinary scale and extreme local 
diversity. 
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Chapter 8 
Skinner, rural market development and economic reform: 
A conclusion 
Skinner's simple but inspirational framework on rural marketing was widely 
applied in developing countries during the 1970s (Bromley, 1971; Eighmy, 1972; 
Beals, 1975; Appleby, 1976; Plattner, 1976; Schwimmer, 1976; Symanski, 1978; 
Handwerker, 1978). None of these studies, however, found Skinner's models 
entirely satisfactory. This is because market improvement and its pattern are 
embedded in the historical, economic and social structures of a place. The re- 
examination of his thesis in China during the economic reform echoes this finding. 
Skinner's contention provides a well -developed framework for understanding 
China's rural market development and its relationship to the administrative system. 
Generally, his description of the association between market evolution and 
agricultural specialisation reflects the nature of China's rural market development 
since 1978. Factors addressed in his sophisticated framework, such as road routes, 
level of self- sufficiency and commercialisation, and government regulation, are 
still important factors shaping China's rural market development. Furthermore, 
Skinner's equation of improved road routes and rural market advancement proved 
to be valid in some areas of Deqing and Dongguan. Also, his predictions about the 
level of self -sufficiency and commercialisation during market modernisation 
almost precisely outline the general situation in the case -study areas. 
Skinner's attempt to generalise rural market evolution, however, has 
oversimplified China's situation. While his hypotheses about distribution, 
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intensification, modernisation of markets and transport development have provided 
useful insights, his studies are not without problems. 
Oversimplification has weakened Skinner's fundamental arguments. 
Although Skinner (1964, 1965a) used a number of case studies to illustrate his 
model of rural market modernisation, his description of rural districts near 
Chengdu, Shanghai and Ningbo were not truly representative of China's situation. 
These examples only reflect the local condition in a few parts of China, and merely 
provide a general picture of prosperous regions, notably the lower Yangzi region 
and the Sichuan basin. Similarly, Skinner's (1965a) use of two models to explain 
market patterns in plains and mountainous areas recognises the importance of 
topography but they fail to fully accommodate China's physical diversity. Since the 
connections between market development and the economic and social context are 
cut off, other differences created over time and space are neglected. 
The separation of rural market change and its economic and social context 
has generated a sense of environmental determinism. The two models focus on how 
physical differences affect patterns of settlement and their economic and social 
development. Although Skinner has progressed beyond the homogeneous plain of 
Christaller and Lösch, his efforts still underplay geographical differences. The 
discipline of modern geography considers how space shapes and reflects a region's 
social, historical and cultural background. Consequently, concepts like spatial 
contingency effects, spatial boundary effects and locality effects have been 
introduced to tackle the problem. These concepts remind geographers of the 
significance of China's changing political economy and its impact on rural market 
growth. Moreover, they also highlight the importance of a study area's local 
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economic, social, historical and cultural contexts and their interrelationships with 
market expansion. Instead of the plains and mountain models, the progress of 
China's marketing needs to be examined within distinct local contexts. This 
argument is particularly important given China's extraordinary geographical scale 
and diversity. 
In particular, Skinner's over -generalised description has weakened the 
portability of his model beyond the Imperial period. Skinner (1985b) aligns China's 
policy changes with the country's rural market development using a policy cycle 
theory. However, he does not address structural forces such as the control 
mechanisms of a planned economy and the behaviour of local government. 
Accordingly, his study fails to comprehend why government intervention has 
persisted during the reform period, which he regarded as a `liberal phase' (Skinner, 
1985b). 
Oversimplification has severed the connections between Skinner's theory 
and its social, economic and political contexts. Thus, the application of his models 
and concepts to Deqing and Dongguan provides an inadequate explanation of 
historical and geographical differences. The experiences of Deqing and Dongguan 
testify to the complexity of rural market development during the era of economic 
reform. This process is not merely a function of one or two key elements, but is 
generated by various social, economic, political and environmental factors, each of 
which has equal weight but is important in different ways. Moreover, a number of 
new components have emerged while old ones have changed their significance. As 
a result, while the role played by transport remains important, accessibility is not 
the only force contributing to market development. Foreign investment, rural 
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industrialisation, environmental problems, government regulations, the level of 
self- sufficiency among peasants and their respective income levels are all 
significant in shaping China's rural market development during the reform era. 
The case studies of Deqing and Dongguan demonstrate that no simple 
correlation exists between social, economic, political and environmental aspects 
and rural market growth. While transport elements are important generally in 
Dongguan and in some villages of Deqing, they are not the sole determinant 
elsewhere. Similarly, government regulations play an important role in influencing 
Deqing's rural marketing activities while their impact on Dongguan is very limited. 
These variations highlight the close connection between market evolution and local 
contexts. Thus, economic, social and political factors have a different impact when 
they are embedded in different contexts. The causes and constraints on rural market 
advancement in Deqing are different from those in Dongguan and other places in 
China. In other words, rural market development has unique characteristics in 
every locale. These findings demonstrate that grand theories, which attempt to 
generalise the reality, are always inadequate in explaining differences between 
places. 
The persistence of government regulation in Deqing reflects the 
significance of political factors in China. While economic reform has weakened the 
state's central control, that of local governments has been reinforced by the 
decentralisation of power. This has affected both central -local relations and the 
forms of government regulation. Indeed, local government intervention explains 
why Skinner's population- market equation and some hypothesises on market 
growth do not apply in Deqing and Dongguan. Thus, assessments on market 
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development cannot readily be made by reference to Skinner's models because he 
does not address the structural forces and the changing political economy of China. 
The inadequacy of Skinner's framework has not only challenged the 
legitimacy of grand theories, but also the application of Western hypotheses in 
China. Indeed, Skinner noticed the close relationship between administrative and 
economic hierarchies and the importance of the former in Chinese society. 
However, his analysis pinpointed economic components and argues that economic 
hierarchy was basic in understanding Chinese society (Skinner, 1977c). This 
argument stemmed from his attempt to use western economic theories, based on 
rational choice, to explain a non -Western society. Such practice is criticised by 
Wang, Mingming (1997) as `cultural imperialism' which overlooks cultural and 
historical differences between East and West. Nevertheless, whether social and 
economic theories based on Western experience can explain Chinese society is still 
debatable. While this dissertation suggests a direction for rethink this issue, much 
debate may occur before a consensus is ready. 
This dissertation has re- established connections between rural market 
development and its economic, social and political context at both national and 
local levels. While peasant -market interactions have been examined, connections 
between different local market systems have not been fully analysed in this study. 
This would entail research on a much larger geographical scale and analysis of 
flows of commodities and people between counties. This suggests a direction for 
future work. 
The findings of this dissertation can be elaborated by looking at market 
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growth in other areas and provinces. While Skinner (1994) identifies seven zones 
in the Lingnan (Guangdong and Guangxi) region, it is imperative to study different 
levels of market improvement within these zones. In doing so, one would need to 
appreciate the spatial variations of rural market advancement and their underlying 
causes. Also it would be worthwhile to compare rural market systems in different 
macroregions to provide a more complete picture of the role of spatial 
differentiation in rural market development in post -reform China. 
8.1 Invisible hand or invisible wall: Prospects for rural market development 
and China's reform 
The joint functions of the `invisible wall' and the `invisible hand' in Deqing and 
Dongguan suggest that a hybrid market system has been formed. This structure is a 
unique product of China's economic reform and its emergence challenges the 
assumption that market forces and central planning cannot co -exist in a functional 
economy (Muldavin, 1998). Also, this scheme implies that economic reform since 
1978 has yet to find an ideal path in China. Accordingly, old and new systems, 
market forces and government intervention continue to co- exist. 
Whether a pure market- driven system - Skinner's `natural' system - will 
emerge is yet to be seen. While more emphasis has been put on the invisible hand 
during the reform era, the importance of government regulation in China's rural 
market development remains intact. Li, Maowen (1999) praises the establishment 
of an Office of Market Establishment (shichang jianshe bangongshi) by a city 
government and the practice of centralised planning in establishing rural markets in 
Henan province. He suggests administrative measures are necessary to regulate 
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rural market development. Peng (1999) goes further in arguing that the state should 
play an active role in establishing intermediate agents to improve China's 
rudimentary rural market structure, particularly in mountainous areas. Moreover, 
Li, Bingkun (1999) suggests that the state has to play a more important role in 
establishing a modern market network with a centralised core of wholesale markets 
connecting rural market and urban retail systems. 
Spatial variations in rural market development between coastal and inland 
areas and prosperous and poor hilly areas have also inspired calls for greater state 
regulation among Chinese scholars. They argue that the central government needs 
to have functions which direct, support, protect, standardise, regulate and monitor 
rural market growth under a socialist market economy. One of the major tasks of 
government regulation, according to Sheng and Chen (1996), is to maintain 
`balanced growth' in the rural market system between different regions. This is 
crucial for the establishment of a rational distribution mechanism which links 
central and local wholesale markets, rural market places and urban retail systems. 
Also, Jiang (1999) urges local governments to put more effort into developing their 
sphere of circulation to help rural markets flourish. 
It is not surprising to find that many Chinese scholars strongly emphasise 
the need for government regulation. In fact, unequal growth between urban and 
rural areas, irrational location and distribution of rural markets, and poor 
connections between some regional wholesale and Iocal markets have aroused 
dissatisfaction with the country's market development. These factors entail 
significant drawbacks to the reform of China's rural economy which comprises 70 
per cent of the country's population. This is particularly true when the state has 
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decided to stimulate rural market growth so as to maintain a minimal national 
economic growth of 8 per cent annually. 
The state ICMB has recognised the above requests. Indeed, Cao (1996) has 
stressed the importance of regulating rural market improvement. The Bureau insists 
that market growth must follow the principle of `state control, central planning, 
local government construction of markets, rational distribution of markets and 
TCMB monitoring'. This principle does not have any legal effect but it provides a 
powerful mechanism for government intervention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
guarantee central policies on market development will be implemented at the local 
level, given the complex situation in the reform era and the changing relationship 
between central and local governments. This is because local governments now 
have enormous power within their jurisdictions. Whether rural markets are well 
built or not is a direct result of local government intervention but not economic 
forces. 
The call for state intervention demonstrates the shortcomings of market 
forces in shaping China's rural market development. However, some defects are 
generated by government regulation. Accordingly, the request for regulation to 
correct errors made by government intervention is a strange logic. This muddled 
thinking is not surprising because China has been regarded as a country "riddled 
with policy contradiction" during the reform era (Oi, 1999a:627). Attempts in 
Deqing to use administrative measures to guide rural market development have 
been problematic. Apparently, China's rural market evolution has lost its direction 
on the way towards a socialist market economy. 
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Obviously, the paradox is generated by a double track system which permits 
the co- existence of central planning and market forces, and intervention and free 
competition. The old system based on central planning remains the core while the 
new one hinged on market forces has developed around it. This juxtaposition of the 
old and new has created serious problems. A significant consequence has been the 
intensification of `rent seeking' behaviour that generates bribery and corruption, 
drains state resources and distorts the economy.t This is because the old and new 
systems, symbolised by state authorities and market forces respectively, cannot be 
reconciled. Once the authorities created a privileged `rent seeking' niche, market 
forces were distorted and a level playing field was difficult to achieve (Fan and 
Gao, 1998). Moreover, gaps occurred during the transition period when the new 
system was being established, intensifying the conflict between the rival systems. 
Whether China will successfully make a transition to a market economy depends 
on the growth of the new system and the support of a well -established legal 
scheme. 
The double track structure is a unique product of China's gradual reform 
process - a great leap economically but a tiny step politically. As political and 
social stability has been the first priority in this gradualist approach, China has 
successfully avoided large -scale social and political turmoil during the past two 
decades. However, many sensitive areas remain untouched by reform for the same 
reason. In other words, China's gradual reform protects those with vested interests 
The concept of `rent seeking' has been widely applied to studies of local government behaviour. It 
refers to `behaviour in institutional settings where individual efforts [are made] to maximise value 
[of personal interest]" (Buchanan, 1980:4). See Lu's (1994) study for an application of this concept 
to China's private enterprises development. 
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in the old system (Min, 1995). Many structural problems persist and examples of 
this are plentiful. For instance, China's market liberalisation proceeds "on the 
condition that a steady supply of low -cost food" is available (Rozelle, 1996:198). 
This is a political rather than an economic consideration because social and 
political instability will arise if the state fails to feed its 1.3 billion population. The 
trade -off of this approach is a slow increase in the income of peasants and stagnant 
growth of rural marketing activities. Consequently, agricultural production has 
generally been overlooked, agricultural products have been `under -priced' and the 
incentive for peasants to perform agricultural activities has been dampened. 
Thus, the efficiency of the gradualist approach to reform has been minimal 
in the countryside and the cost is high. Despite this, China's reform process, 
including rural market development, marketisation of grain, cotton and other 
important agricultural products, will persist on the basis of a gradual approach. This 
is because the strategy has brought about considerable improvements in both 
industrial and agricultural productivity without causing any chronic economic 
problems (Gang, Perkins and Sabin, 1999). Socially, many individuals and groups 
have benefited from the reform despite the growing gap between rich and poor. 
They preserve a stable social and political environment for future reform. 
There is little political pressure for China to undertake radical changes. 
Since the economic reform to fast -track China's development was initiated by the 
state, the regime is unlikely to lose its legitimacy. Indeed, unlike Eastern European 
countries and the former Soviet Union, where dramatic political changes have 
occurred, China remains politically stable. Accordingly, a radical approach is very 
unlikely to be adopted in China and the country will continue to follow its 
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gradualist strategy. This also implies that political reform will be slow. As long as 
the double track structure persists, the hybrid market scheme will become an end 
state. In this case, China's reform "is not [making a transition] from communism to 
capitalism, but from central planning to a hybrid system" (Muldavin, 1998:290). 
The rural market, as an arena where market forces and state control compete, 
remains under the contradictory influence of both the invisible hand and the 
invisible wall. 
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Appendix I. Rural markets in Deqing county and their general situations, 1997 
Decheng 
Central Market 
Decheng 
Western Market 
Decheng 
Eastern Market 
Datang 
Rural Market 
Guanxu 
Rural Market 
Maxu 
Rural Market 
Location Decheng town 
(the county seat) 
Decheng town 
(the county seat) 
Decheng town 
(the county seat) 
Huilong town, 
Datang 
Administrative 
Guanxu town, 
town government 
seat 
Maxu town, town 
government seat 
Zone 
Total area (m2) 7266.25 2530.96 2279.76 344 1113.21 1128.9 
No. of people 
visited 
(in millions /year) 
2.92 1.09 1.83 0.29 0.36 0.44 
Market days 2, 5, 8, 10 2, 5, 8, 10 2,5,8,10 3, 6, 9 3,6,9 1,4,7 
No. of fixed stalls 506 101 108 41 110 118 
Open days 1992, December 1992, September 1988, May 1987, May 1990, May 1995, January 
Established by* ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB 
Market type ** C C C C C C 
Annual turn -over 
value 
(in million yuan) 
197.3 52.6 51.2 2.6 115.7 127.5 
* ICMB denotes Industry and Commerce Management Bureau; * * C denotes comprehensive market 
Source: Interview of ICMB officials, 1998 
Appendix I. Rural markets in Deqing county and their general situations, 1997 (continue) 
Maxu 
Farm - cattle Market 
Gaoliang 
Rural Market 
Mocun 
Rural Market 
Yongfeng 
Rural Market 
Yongfeng 
Farm -cattle Market 
Bozhi 
Rural Market 
Location Maxu town, town 
government seat 
Gaoliang town, 
town government 
Mocun town, 
town government 
Yongfeng town, 
town government 
Yongfeng town, 
town government 
Bozhi town, town 
government seat 
seat seat seat seat 
Total area (m2) n.a. 2530.96 2279.76 344 1113.21 1128.9 
No. of people 
visited 
(in millions /year) 
0.07 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.15 0.47 
Market days 1,4,7 2,5,8 1,4,7 2,5,8 2, 5, 8 3, 6, 9 
No. of fixed stalls 20 201 68 95 40 108 
Open days n.a. 1997, September 1992, May 1992, May 1983, April 1987, September 
Established by ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB 
Market type S* C C C S C 
Annual turn -over 
value 
(in million yuan) 
2.7 132.7 9.9 18.25 7.97 131.1 
* S denotes specialize market 
Appendix I. Rural markets in Deqing county and their general situations, 1997 (continue) 
Wulong 
Rural Market 
Fengcun 
Rural Market 
Jiushi 
Rural Market 
Liucun 
Rural Market 
Yuecheng 
Rural Market 
Shapang 
Rural Market 
Location Wulong town, 
town government 
Fengcun town, 
town government 
Jiushi town, town 
government seat 
Jiushi town, 
Liucun 
Yuecheng town, 
town government 
Shapang town, 
town government 
seat seat Administrative seat seat 
Zone 
Total area (m2) 786.44 5466.7 1725 528 5616.81 230 
No. of people 
visited 
(in millions /year) 
0.29 0.49 0.45 0.22 0.47 0.18 
Market days 1,4,7 1,4,7 3, 6, 9 2,5,8 2,5,8 5, 10 
No. of fixed stalls 54 111 111 48 146 40 
Open days 1988, May 1989, May 1993, August 1974, April 1991, May 1990, June 
Established by ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB ICMB 
Market type C C C C C C 
Annual turn -over 
value 
(in million yuan) 
8 13.5 12.4 6 13 5 
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An investigation on the marketing and shopping patterns of rural families 
Surname: ; Village: 
Household population: 
Annual income (1997): from agricultural activities: yuan 
from non -agricultural activities: yuan 
Part A Production and Selling Pattern 
(A) Crops and their utilisation 
(a) Name of the crop: Yield: jin 
Utilisation: 
self- consumption 
state procurement -r purchase price: yuan/jin 
sell in free markets --> name of the market: 
selling price: yuan 
others (please indicate): 
(b) Name of the crop: Yield: jin 
Utilisation: 
self- consumption 
state procurement -+ purchase price: yuan/jin 
sell in free markets -> name of the market: 
selling price: yuan 
others (please indicate): 
(c) Name of the crop: Yield: jin 
Utilisation: 
self- consumption 
state procurement -+ purchase price: yuan/jin 
sell in free markets -> name of the market: 
selling price: yuan 
others (please indicate): 
(d) Name of the crop: Yield: jin 
Utilisation: 
self- consumption 
state procurement -> purchase price: yuan/jin 
sell in free markets -* name of the market: 
selling price: yuan 
others (please indicate): 
(e) Name of the crop: Yield: jin 
Utilisation: 
self -consumption 
state procurement -> purchase price: yuan/jin 
sell in free markets -> name of the market: 
selling price: yuan 
others (please indicate): 
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(B) Other products sold in the free market: 
Where were they from? self -grow; buy from other peasants 
(C) Transport methods: (check the appropriate box) 
manpower (i.e. shoulder -pole); roadway; waterway; railway; 
others: 
(D) Transport means: (check the appropriate box) 
on foot; horse -drawn carriage; tricycle; bicycle; motorcycle; 
public bus; private car; others: 
Time of the journey: 
Cost: 
(E) Time you arrive the market: (check the appropriate box) 
before 6 am; between 6 -8 am; after 8 am 
Departure time: 
fix, i.e. when markets close; 
no fix time, after all products sold 
(F) Factor(s) determining your choice of market: (put 1,2,3...according to 
importance) 
distance and location; market days; selling price; trading scale 
of the market; market fees; market organisation; others 
(G) Distance between your home and the following places: 
(a) the nearest market place: ; its name: 
(b) the nearest village: ; its name: 
(c) town government seat: ; its name: 
(d) the nearest bus terminal: 
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Part B Shopping Pattern 
Where did you go to buy the following things? 
(A) Meats, vegetables, and other foodstuffs (i.e. sugar, cooking oil) 
(a) Name of the market place 
location: distance from this village 
(b) Market days (if applicable): 
(c) Shopping frequency: 
everyday; no fix schedule (please specify): 
(d) Time spends in the market: 
less than 10 minutes; 10 to 20 minutes; over 20 minutes 
(e) Reason(s) for visiting this market: 
distance and location; market days; price; product variety 
product quality; market scale and atmosphere 
(f) Transport means: 
walk; house /cow -drawn carriage; tricycle; bicycle; 
motorcycle; bus; private car; others (please indicate) 
(g) How long did the journey take? and the cost: 
(h) How much money did you spend? 
(i) Did you buy the same products at other markets? 
always, never, occasionally 
(B) Daily necessities, clothes and footwear 
(a) Name of the market place 
location: ; distance from this village 
(b) Market days (if applicable): 
(c) Shopping frequency: 
everyday; no fix schedule (please specify): 
(d) Time spends in the market: 
less than 10 minutes; 10 to 20 minutes; over 20 minutes 
(e) Reason(s) for visiting this market: 
distance and location; market days; price; product variety 
product quality; market scale and atmosphere 
(f) Transport means: 
walk; house /cow -drawn carriage; tricycle; bicycle; 
motorcycle; bus; private car; others (please indicate) 
(g) How long did the journey take? and the cost: 
(h) How much money did you spend? 
(i) Did you buy the same products at other markets? 
always, never, El occasionally 
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(C) Bicycle, electric appliances and imported utilities 
(a) Name of the market place 
location: ; distance from this village 
(b) Market days (if applicable): 
(c) Shopping frequency: 
everyday; no fix schedule (please specify): 
(d) Time spends in the market: 
less than 10 minutes; 10 to 20 minutes; over 20 minutes 
(e) Reason(s) for visiting this market: 
distance and location; market days; price; product variety 
product quality; market scale and atmosphere 
(f) Transport means: 
walk; house /cow -drawn carriage; tricycle; bicycle; 
motorcycle; bus; private car; others (please indicate) 
(g) How long did the journey take? and the cost: 
(h) How much money did you spend? 
(i) Did you buy the same products at other markets? 
always, never, occasionally 
(D) Production goods such as fertilisers, farm -chemicals and pesticides 
(a) Name of the market place 
location: ; distance from this village 
(b) Market days (if applicable): 
(c) Shopping frequency: 
everyday; no fix schedule (please specify): 
(d) Time spends in the market: 
less than 10 minutes; 10 to 20 minutes; over 20 minutes 
(e) Reason(s) for visit this market: 
distance and location; market days; price; product variety 
product quality; market scale and atmosphere 
(f) Transport means: 
walk; house /cow -drawn carriage; tricycle; bicycle; 
motorcycle; bus; private car; others (please indicate) 
(g) How long did the journey take? and the cost: 
(h) How much money did you spend? 
(i) Did you buy the same products at other markets? 
always, never, occasionally 
(E) Factor(s) determining your choice of market (put 1,2,3...according to 
importance) 
distance and location; market days; price; product variety 
product quality; market atmosphere 
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